

ADVAITASIDDHI Vs NYĀYĀMRTA

An up to date Critical Re-Appraisal

PART - I

by

Śāstranidhi, Dvaitavedāntarasajña, Madhvamunipriya

Dr. B.N.K. SHARMA, M.A., Ph.D., D. Litt.,

Retired Professor and Head of the Dept. of Sanskrit

Ruparel College, Bombay - 400 016.

Recipient : Sahitya Akademi,

President of India and Govt. of Maharashtra Awards.

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ABOUT THE BOOK AND THE AUTHOR

The history of Dvaita-Advaita Polemics in its massive form, in Sanskrit, dating from Vyāsātirtha in the first quarter of the 16th century and ending with the 18th is an event exciting wonder and admiration and has kept the spirit of quest of philosophical truth alive and active to this day.

In 1964, Dr. K. Narain of the Allahabad University reopened it in modern garb in English and brought it to the modern academic forum, in his *Critique of Mādhva Refutation of Sankara School of Vedanta*. It has since been reprinted in 1988.

The main targets of his attack are the *Niṣyāmra* of Vyāsātirtha and its defence against the reply of the *Advaitasiddhi* of Madhusūdana, in Rāmācārya's *Tarangīnī*. Dr. Narain has undertaken to dispel what he calls "the darkness let loose by Vyāsātirtha" and restore Advaita Vedanta to its *status quo ante bellum*, as the culmination of Indian thought.

The philosophical world has waited long for the reaction to Dr. Narain's work from the Dvaita side. The mantle has fallen on the doyen of modern scholars of Dvaita thought Dr. B. N. K. Sharma (b. 1909), whose credentials to speak and write with authority and inward knowledge of the rival schools have been acknowledged by Savants of international reputation.

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AN UPTO DATE RE-APPRAISAL**

ABBREVIATIONS

A-Siddhi	Advaita - siddhi
Ait. Up.	Aitareya Upaniṣad
AV	Anu - Vyākhyāna (Madhva)
Brh. Up.	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
B.S.	Brahma Sūtras
B.S.B.	Bṛahmasūtra Bhāṣya
Chān.Up.	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
DVSRF	Dvaita Vedanta Studies and Research Foundation (Bangalore)
J	Jayatīrtha
M	Madhva
Mānd.Up.	Māṇḍukya Upaniṣad
Nym	Nyāyamṛta
NS.	Nyāya Sudhā (Jayatīrtha)
PL	Pramāṇa Lakṣaṇa (Madhva)
PLt	Pramāṇalakṣaṇa Tīka (Jayatīrtha)
PM	Philosophy of Madhvācārya
P.M.S.	Pūrvamīmāṃsā Sūtras (Jaimini)
RV	Rg Veda
S	Sankara
TD	Tattvapradīpa (Trivikrama Paṇḍita)
TDy.	Tattvodyota (Madhva)
TDyt.	Tattvodyota Tīkā (Jayatīrtha)
Tg	(Nyayamṛta) - Taranginī (Rāmācārya)
TT	Tarkatāṇḍava (Vyāsātīrtha)
Taitt. Up.	Taittirīya Upaniṣad
VTN	Viṣṇutattvanirṇaya (Madhva)

Reverentially Dedicated to

Śrī Viśveśa Tirtha Svāmiji

of

Śrī Pejavar Mutt, Udupi

**in acknowledgement of his abiding
interest and inspiration in my literary career.**

FOREWORD

All of us who are interested in Indian Philosophy and in Vedanta in particular are greatly indebted to DR.B.N.K.SHARMA. He has in this volume added to his magisterial **History of Dvaita School** (2nd Edition, 1981) and other writings with an exposition and unfolding of Vyasatirtha's **Nyayamrta**. Although the Neo-Vedantin philosophy espoused by Swami Vivekananda was an important riposte to the critiques of Indian religion and philosophy launched by many missionaries and colonial administrators, and so became a potent weapon in the defence of Indian nationalism, its great influence has indeed tended to obscure the real total shape of Vedanta, taken in its various forms. Dr. Sharma's restoration of Madhva's rightful place in the whole scheme of Hindu thought has been most welcome. This latest undertaking of his shows how later important figures in the Dvaitin tradition still produced important criticisms of the Non-Dualist epistemology and metaphysics. They pointed to certain instabilities in the Advaitin philosophy. Dr. Sharma incisively points to the contradiction in supposing that God is after all a deceptive magician. Both Western and traditional Indian scholars are in his debt for making the **Nyayamrta** available to a modern public. I congratulate him on this volume's appearance.

Ninian Smart,
J.F. Rowny Professor of Comparative Religions,
University of California,
Santa Barbara,
U.S.A.

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पुरोवादः

“निगमगमनिर्णीतिनिर्जंराधीशमम्बिने ।
 नृपेन्द्रमुकुटीरत्ननोराजितनिजाङ्घ्रये ॥
 निरहंकारचित्ताय नीतिमार्गोपवेशिने ।
 शेषाय नरवेष्टाय शिक्षितास्तरवैरिणे ॥
 पुराणपुद्गलध्यानपुष्पस्पृशकलमूर्तये ।
 मध्वाचार्यमताम्भोजमाताङ्घ्यायिततेजसे ॥
 ब्रह्मण्यतीर्थंशिष्याय ब्रह्मनिर्मलमूर्तये ।
 व्यासतीर्थयतीन्द्राय विद्वदिम्बीबरेन्धवे ॥”¹
 इत्येवं स्वगुह्येन स्तुतो यः कृष्णभूषुजा ।²
 तस्य श्रीव्यासतीर्थस्य कृतिर्ग्यायामृताभिषा ॥
 आङ्गल्यां सारतोऽनूद्य भागशः संप्रकाशयते ।
 तरङ्गिण्यादितट्टोका उपाश्रित्य यथामति ॥
 निरस्य चण्डनान्येवं । प्रत्ननूतनधीमताम् ।
 मूलोक्तानां प्रमेयानां सुस्थिरत्वं प्रदर्शयते ॥
 प्रबन्धमेनं सुधियो विमृशन्तु सकौतुकम् ।
 उभयोः पक्षयोः सम्यक् बलाबलपरीक्षया ॥
 अनेन ज्ञानयज्ञेन संप्रीतो यज्ञभुग्धरिः ।
 मुनिव्रजेण सह मे सन्निधत्तां सदा हृदि ॥

1. Copper plate grant Krishnadevaraya to Vyasa-tirtha (Ep. Car) — Shimoga.

2. See Krishnadevaraya Kṛti Appendix

ओ ओ -मत्सरकुत्सितान् सुमतयो दुर्वेषीगवितान्
 आकाशावतारभापिन इवाहंयून् समाढौष्य किम् ?
 श्लाघाकम्पनमेकमेव सिरसः श्रीव्यासयोगीशितुः
 मेरुणां शतमर्हति क्षितितले विद्यासु विद्यावताम् ॥

न्यायामृतं निगमवारिनिधेर्गुहोत्वा
 श्रीव्यासयोगिहरिणा प्रविंतीर्यमाणम् ।

पीत्वा मृशं सुमतयो धिषणाभिरन्यान्
 सर्वनिर्मसत तृणाय सपत्नवर्गान् ॥

Somanātha : Vyāsayogicarita

PREFACE

The Dvaita system of Vedānta, of which Śrī Madhvācārya (1238-1317) was the historical Founder, has come to stay as the most formidable rival of the Advaita philosophy of Sankarācārya. Tho' Rāmānuja and his predecessor Yāmuna had also vigorously opposed the claims of Sankara-Vedānta to be *the sole representative* of the philosophy of the Upaniṣads (*aupanṣadam* Dattanam), "Viśiṣṭādvaita" by its very label and certain in-built Monistic leanings and mental reservations, such as its (ostensible) acceptance of Brahman's Abhinna-nimittopādāna-kāraṇatva in respect of the world, the *uniformity of svarūpa* of a plurality of Selves and their utmost equality (*paramasāmyam*) with Brahman, in spite of the spirit and letter of the Sūtra *Jagadyāpāravarjam* (B. S. iv, 4, 17) in the released state, could not live up to the rigid requirements of an *Unadulterated Theism*, pledged to the supreme majesty and transcendence of Brahman (notwithstanding its immanence) in all respects (1) Rāmānuja's Critique of the presuppositions of Śankara Vedānta in the introduction to his *Śrībhāṣya* and its exposition by Sudarśana Sūri and the further criticisms of the doctrines of Māyāvāda by Vedānta Deśika in his *Ṣaṭadūṣanui* did not evoke any noteworthy reaction from the Advaita side, till very recently at the hands of Mm. Ananta-krishna Sastri, in his *Śrībhāṣya-Khaṇḍanam*.

Not so in the case of Madhva. His frontal attacks on almost all the vulnerable positions of Monistic philosophy from an altogether fresh standpoint of his New Realism in Vedānta, differed from those of earlier Realisms known to the Advaitins. It was equipped with a new set of concepts and categories like the ONE 'Svatantra-tattva'. Viśeṣas, Sākṣi, Svarūpabheda, distinction of attributes into permanent (*Yāvad-dravyabhāvi*) and impermanent (*ayāvad-dravyabhāvi*) the former being Saviśeṣābhinna with the substance, acceptance of identity-in-difference between substance and its permanent attributes thro' the agency of Svarūpa-Viśeṣas, which permit of distinction of reference between Guṇa and Guṇī without involving any distinction of essence between them.

1. See *Viśvataḥ paramam nityam (Puruṣasūkta) Tatstham tadvyatiriktaṁ ca nityantāram namāmahe* (Skānda)

This New Realism propounded by Madhva seems to have come upon the Advaitins of his days as a complete surprise. They had to deal with the double task of plugging the vulnerable holes in their own doctrines exposed to his criticisms and upon which he could turn the tables against them (2) and to go into the merits and demerits of the alternative solutions of metaphysical problems offered by him on the basis of the New Logic of the *Brahma-Tarka* relied upon by him in regard to the concept of *Sākṣī* as the never-erring principle of validation of all knowledge, the criterion of *Upajīvyā-pramāṇa-prābalya* in resolving the apparent conflict between *Pratyakṣa* and so-called Monistic texts. In addition, Madhva's works had brought to light from both the extant sacred literature of the *Prasthānatraya* and from a large body of fading and forgotten source-books he had salvaged from oblivion and wanton destruction of ancient Manuscript Libraries in the country during the disturbed political conditions in the wake of the invasions of a crusading faith. These tasks were time-consuming. Meantime, the *Akṣobhya Vidyāraṇya* disputation on the 'Tat tvam asi' text and its result as confirmed by the referee *Vedanta Desika*. (3)

2. cf. नहि धमिप्रतियोग्यपेक्षया भेदस्यास्वरूपत्वम् ऐक्यवत् स्वरूप-
स्यैव तथात्वात् । स्वरूपसिद्धावपि तदसिद्धिश्च जीवेश्वरैक्यं यदतः सिद्धम् ।
(M. VTN.) and Jayatirtha's elucidation—यथा अनपेक्ष-
प्रतीतिकप्रत्यक् चैतन्यस्वरूपमपि जीवेश्वरैक्यं 'जीवस्य ब्रह्मणा ऐक्यं' इति
धमिप्रतियोगि-प्रतीत्यपेक्षया प्रतीयमानं परेणांगीक्रियते तद्वत् (J. VTNT.)

3. “मसिना तत्त्वमसिना परजीवप्रभेदिना ।

विद्यारण्यं महारण्यमक्षोभ्यमुनिरच्छिनत् ॥”

(Quoted in *Muvvāyiroppadi Guruparam para Vaibhavapre Kāśikā* of Brahme tantra Svatantra Jeer (See my *HDSV*. p. 281 (1981))

had come as a set-back to Advaita.

'Pūrṇaprajñadarśana' as Madhva's philosophy now came to be called, for the first time in Mādhava's *Sarvadarśana-Sangraha* had thus come out triumphant on its own credentials. The systematic formulation of its doctrinal details and their elaboration thro' patiently worked out Prakriyas (organic details) the definitions of concepts and the standardization of thought and the final presentation of the edifice of Madhva-Siddhānta in all its architectonic unity and grandeur were accomplished by the genius of Jayatīrtha (1365-88). His *Nyāyasudhā* on M's *AV* and commentaries on the Khaṇḍana-traya had done splendid work in this direction, not to mention his excellent *ṭīkās* on the *Tattva-dyōta* and the *VTN*. Thanks to him the system of Madhva had attained an indisputable place of honor, authority and equality of status with those of Śāṅkara and Rāmānuja as one of the three principal schools of Vedānta, both in respect of its adhikaraṇaprasthāna and the Vāda-Prasthāna. However, the circumstance that most of his monumental works like the *Nyāyasudhā*, the *Tattvapra-kāśikā* and others on which he had spent his time and energy in giving exhaustive analysis and critical exposition of almost all the vital problems of logic and metaphysics not only of his own school but of most of the other leading schools of thought known and studied in his days, were mostly in the form of commentaries on the original works of Madhva was probably the reason why they were missed by or had escaped the attention of his contemporaries of other schools. That seems to be the reason why we do not come across any references or criticism of his writings in the works of Advaita writers who came after him till we come to Nṛsimhāśrama. His *Vadāvali* however has laid the foundation for more elaborate dialectical works in the succeeding centuries.

The next generation after Jayatīrtha saw the advent of Rājendra Tīrtha and his successor Jayadhvajā. Tradition has it that they spearheaded the spread of Suddha-Vaiṣṇava Bhakti Siddhānta of Madhva in Bengal, which flowered into the Caita-

nya-Sampradāya. The Guruparampara of the Caitanya Sampradāya, as given by Baladeva and Kavikarṇapūra traces the spiritual descent of Caitanya to Madhva thro' Jayatirtha and Vyāsathirtha (See Appendix)

Rājendra's pupil Viṣṇudāśācārya was the author of three monumental dialectical works *Vādaratnāvali*, *Vivaraṇavidambanam* and *Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍana*. The first one alone has survived and has been printed. The others are *not extant*. They are however mentioned by name and quoted in the *Vādaratnāvali* itself. The first and the last named have been quoted in Vyāsathirtha's *Nym*. also.

III

The third quarter of the 15th century saw the birth of Vyāsathirtha (1460-1539), the Prince of Dialecticians of the Dvaita school. He was the sixth in succession from Jayatirtha, in his senior Pontifical line from Rājendra. He modelled his *Nyāyāmṛta* on the *Vādāvali* and *Vādratnāvali* of his predecessors, enlarging their scope and dimensions considerably and producing a masterly treatise on Dvaita-Advaita philosophical polemics on a novel plan and pattern as the last word on the subject. He did similar work in regard to the philosophy of the Brahmasūtra on the basis of an indepth study and assesment of their different lines of thought represented by the three principal schools. He has also bequeathed to Indian Logic a masterly analysis and criticism of the logical and epistemological theories of the Founder of Navya, Nyaya in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* and its learned commentaries by Pakṣadhara, Vardhamāna and Rucidatta, in his *Tarkatāṇḍava*.

Vyāsathirtha's *Nym* represents the highest achievement of Dvaita dialectics in the exhaustive and incisive analysis and assesment of the viability of the Monistic metaphysics of Sankara school, over the last eight hundred years. It is unparalleled both in depth of thought and range of survey. It has taken in its stride the entire gamut of its metaphysics and

subjected it to a dignified and objective analysis and criticism without heat or passion, in strict parliamentary language, dealing with almost all shades of its thought, in one single work, covering the other side of the picture as well, of the rival school of realistic metaphysics.

In one word, Vyāsātīrtha's achievement was *an event in the history of Vedānta Sāstra as a whole*. It shattered the prestige of the Advaita school as never before. His dexterous handling of Vedic exegesis of Mimāṃsā and the utilisation of the rulings of the Vyākaraṇa Sāstra of Pāṇini and his commentators in determining the import of disputed Śruti texts and his expertise in both the Prācīna and Navya Nyāya schools, not to speak of his apt citations from several standard works of other systems-known and studied in his days, (4) for purposes of criticism of Advaita doctrines and in support of those of his own school. This added several new dimensions to the final presentation of Mādhva's Realistic Theism and placed it firmly on an all-India pedestal from which it could not be dislodged and gave it a philosophical status and staying power which had to be reckoned with by all serious thinkers.

If the Vedānta system is the culmination of Indian thought, Dvaita philosophy has every right to be recognised as the historical and ideological culmination of Vedāntic thought. The thinkers of this school have doubtless benefited by the speculations of earlier schools, both cognate and rival. The Vedānta itself for example has dropped the concept of Samāvāya and the Mādhva conception of Śakṣi as the Apperceiving Self immune from error of judgments is a *decided improvement* on the conception of Śakṣi in Advaita as the *reflection* of pure immaculate Caitanya in Avidyāvṛtti. This deprives Epistemology of any final principle of validation of knowledge within the framework of Svataḥpramāṇyavāda in Vedānta. As Prof. S. Bagchi has pointed out "students of Indian thought can

4. For List of Works cited by Vyāsātīrtha in his Nym. See my *HDSV* p. 301.

always expect to learn something fresh and new from the writings of the thinkers of the Madhva school." It is a real pity that the post-Vyāsātīrtha writers of the Navya-Nyaya school of Logic have not cared to look beyond their noses and take note of the searching criticisms of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* and its great commentaries by Pakṣadhara and others in Vyāsātīrtha's *Tarkatāṇḍava*.

A classic of such magnificent range and depth as the *Nyāyāmṛta* could hardly remain neglected or ignored in a living system of thought like the Vedānta, for long, by the aggrieved party. It had administered a rude shock to the self-complacency into which the Advaita thinkers had lapsed after their spectacular victories over the earlier realistic systems like the Sāṅkhya, Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā. To their dismay, they found a new "Mahāmalla" in Madhva Siddhānta and its triumphant entry into the philosophical arena, equipped with an altogether new metaphysical ideology in Realistic thought and a new technique of Vedantic exegesis based on the criterion of Upajivvyapramāṇaprābalya in tackling the conflict of experience with Monistic texts, without depriving or down-grading either of them as "atattvavedaka"

But It was not till half a century after the exit of Vyāsātīrtha from the philosophical scene that a determined effort was made in Advaita circles to take stock of the situation and set the house in order by closing the breaches made and put up a stout resistance and a spectacular defence. It was the talented Logician from Bengal Madhusūdana Sarasvati who took the challenge and came out with his *Advaita-Siddhi* in refutation of the *Nyāyāmṛta*. It was however promptly answered by two stalwarts from the Dvaita side Rāmācārya-Vyāsa and Ānandabhaṭṭāraka in their *Nym-Tarangini* and *Nym-Kaṇṭhaḥkoddhāra* respectively. Both these scholars come from Puntamba in the Ahmadnaga district of Maharashtra, where Madhva Siddhānta had taken deep roots since the days of Madhva and Padmanābha Tīrtha. The *Tarangini* was refuted by Brahmananda Sarasvati of Bengal in his

Brahmānandīya. It was in its turn refuted by Vanamala Miśra a North Indian follower of Madhva Sampradāya from Brindavan (U. P.) He was also the author of several other works on Madhva thought (For details See my HDSV).

IV

There the great controversy came to a halt and a standstill, in the traditional style of Sāstrārtha-Vicāra in Sanskrit, so admirably suited to incisive thought-dissection.

The rapid decline of Sanskrit after the advent of foreign rule in India and the establishment of modern Indian Universities with English as the medium of higher education, paved the way for the emergence of "Indologists" and their entry into the field. Their influence on the pursuit of advanced studies and Research in Sanskrit was exerted mainly through the medium of the English language. The new generation of "Sanskrit Scholars", students and Researchers who came out of the portals of the new Universities in the nationalist period in Indian history had come under the powerful influence of the speeches and writings of Swami Vivekananda, who had thrown the full weight of his magnetic personality, eloquence and spiritual halo, heavily on the Advaitavāda of Sankara, which he believed to be the highest reach of the "Vedānta" of the Upaniṣads. He had however judiciously administered his own orientations to some of the key notes of the traditional Sankara Vedānta such as the doctrine of Māyā and "Mithyātva" to make them more acceptable to the taste of Western Rationalists and Indian intellectuals. His diluted versions of Advaita and Māyāvāda were made more popular by academic writers brought up in that milieu. Before long, it came to be seriously believed that "Vedānta" is synonymous with "Advaita" and the two are convertible terms.

But whatever may have been the vogue in the writings of the earlier authors of the Buddhist, Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā schools prior to the advent of the Vedānta schools of Rāmaṇuja and

Madhva, in regard to the use of the terms "Vedānta", and "Vedāntins" to denote the Sankara school, it is *now* no longer valid, justifiable or defensible, in the context of the present established position of the three principal schools of Vedānta to restrict it to one of them. It is high time our "modern" scholars and intellectuals, who ought to know better, not only discourage this vicious practice but themselves learn to desist from it altogether in their own writings. It is therefore regrettable to see that Dr. Narain himself has not been able to rise above this temptation and has succumbed to it by monopolising the use of the term to denote the Sankara school exclusively. It is to be hoped he will not do so in his future writings.

In the infancy of Indian philosophical studies by Western and modern scholars, much capital had been made of a few random quotes from the Upaniṣads such as 'Tat tvam asi', 'Aham Brahmasmi' torn from their legitimate context, in favor of 'Advaita' and the other schools of Rāmaṇuja and Madhva were labelled as "Bhakti schools" "belonging more to the religious history than to the philosophical development of Indian thought" (Rādhakrishnan). The syllabus for Post-graduate studies in Sanskrit and Indian Philosophy has been and still is heavily overweighted in favor of Advaita-Vedānta with but a meagre half-hearted provision for the study of the other schools of Vedānta in many of our Universities. It is a fit case for the University Grants Commission to set right this anomaly.

Such a deplorable state of affairs in our "temples of learning" has greatly impoverished the standard of philosophical scholarship and creative thinking among the alumni. It has bred a wrong notion that non-Monistic systems of Vedānta are to be looked at askance as the outcome of interference of religious prejudice with the pursuit of true philosophy and the aftermath of the reign of religion in contemporary philosophy. Such unmerited denigration of and slur cast on the realistic systems of Vedānta of our country has at times received overt and covert encouragement from various publicity media including those at

Government level. This state of affairs is highly detrimental to the free and unfettered development of the true philosophical spirit of which this country has been the home, the cradle and the exemplar, for thousands of years.

The right way to restore balance of thought sanity and sobriety of judgment on the subject is to mobilise public opinion among our intellectuals and the rising generation to extend complete parity of place and attention to all the different systems of Vedanta which have a living interest and following in the country.

V

Unlike some other writers on Indian philosophy who have blacked out Dvaita philosophy from the public gaze. Dr. Narain has done a real service to the advancement of thought and Vedantic studies thro' his first work (*Out lines*) of *Madhva Philosophy*. It has however come upon me a startling surprise that barely within two years of its appearance he should have come out with his *Critique of Madhva Refutation of Sankara School of Vedanta* (Udayana Publication, Allahabad, 1964) which has recently been reprinted (1988) by Munshiram Manoharlal, Delhi. His first work was highly appreciative of Madhva philosophy while the second is highly censorious of the performance of Madhva, Jayatirtha and Vyāsathirtha, accusing them of grossly misrepresenting Advaita by wantonly or otherwise confusing between the Pāramārthika and the Vyāvahārika levels of truth in Sankara's philosophy and holding it up to misplaced criticism throughout.

The following quotes from Dr. Narain's second work will suffice to make this clear (1) "The Mādhva philosopher is satisfied with his theory that 'Ajñāna' is the negation of knowledge and its existence is quite negative" (P. 5). (2) "Most of the criticisms against Sankara and his followers are grounded in

5. This is a totally mistaken view. Madhva philosophy too accepts *Bhavarupa Ajnana* - See my *PM* p. 261. (1986)

the confusion of standpoints to which the opponents of Śāṅkara have shown a persistent tendency. Here also the confusion is caused in the minds of the Mādhva critics that knowledge cannot be the substratum of the superimposition of the object, as the substratum must always be of a higher degree in the order of reality " (p. 63) (3) " But for Madhusūdana's defence in his monumental work, the "Vedānta" position would have been completely eclipsed by Vyāsātīrtha's terrible onslaught. We would naturally find much light to *dispel the darkness let loose by Vyāsātīrtha's criticisms in Madhusūdana's magnum opus*" (P. 166) (4) The Mādhva philosophers have at times misrepresented the "Vedānta" position (p. 192) They have *deliberately overlooked the philosophy of Vivarta* that had been invented for avoiding the contradictions and inconsistencies that would otherwise follow in the wake of the Parīṇāma conception of Brahman. *Is it not a matter of pity that the Masters of the Mādhva school have in their enthusiasm of nullifying all the achievements of the rival school refused to take notice of the most important aspect of "Vedānta philosophy"?* (P. 209) - Italics mine.

It is a gross perversion of the truth for Dr. Narain to say that the Masters of the Dvaita school *have deliberately overlooked* the explanation of Vivarta invented by the Advaitins. All the three masters have been quite well informed about the Brahma-Vivartavāda and have refuted it in their writings. If Dr. Narain would look into Madhva's AV he will find him, after refuting real redolent Brahmaparīṇāma-vāda of Bhāskara and the ostensible Parīṇāma-vāda interpretation of the Sūtra Prakṛtiśca (I, 4, 24) as the "Purvabhūmi" of Vivartavāda, as the Saṅkṣepasāriraka puts it, taking the clue from the labored explanation of the *Bhāmati* (*Iyam copādanaparīṇāmāḍibhaṣa.....*) taking on the new-fangled Vivartakāraṇavāda "invented" by the Advaitins to save their Brahman:

Yaccāvikṛtam evaikam Brahma viśvātmanā mṛṣā

Drśyate maṇḍadr̥styaiṣa sa sarga iti kathyate

Explaining the details of the Vivartavāda here Jayatīrtha gives a lucid exposition of *avikṛtam*, *mṛsā* and *mandadr̥ṣṭi* and elucidates the Advaita position as follows—

“Just as the rope without undergoing any change or modification appears falsely in the form of the serpent, so too Brahman. The Sūtra “*Prakṛtiśca* tells that B. is the *Upādānakāraṇa* of the world just as now clarified. Here, “*upādānatva*” is not conceived in the sense of material transformation, but as the substratum of the false appearance, due to the modification of *Avidyā* (NS. i. p. 205):

मृषेति—यथा खलु रज्जुरविकृतेव मृषा भुजंगाकारेण भासते, तथैवेति । मन्दा भवति यया माययेत्यर्थः । तदेतत् मिथ्या प्रपंचारोपाधिष्ठानत्वमेव ब्रह्मणः प्रकृतिश्च इत्यादिना कथ्यत इति । एतदुक्तं भवति—प्रकृतिश्चेत्यादिसूत्रैः पूर्वोक्तरीत्या ब्रह्मणो जगदुपादानत्वमुच्यते । उपादानत्वं च न परिणामितया, अपि तर्हि अविद्यापरिणाममृषाविश्वभ्रमाधिष्ठानत्वमेव अतो नोक्तदोष इति ।

This should make it clear who is misrepresenting whom ! The third Master Vyāsātīrtha too has devoted a section to the examination of the vivartavāda in terms of its three alternative explanations of B's causality in association with *Avidyā*, as propounded by the Vivaranakāra. Jayatīrtha's NS too has indicated these three alternative positions of the Vivaranakāra. In his assessment of this threefold explanation Dr. Narain finding it difficult to meet the objections of Vyāsātīrtha tries to get away with an irrelevant plea that “there is a lurking doubt in the minds of the Vivaranites on the question of the causality of Brahman. The Sāṅkarites find it expedient to associate it in some way or other (Italics mine) with the Anirvacanīya - *Māyā* and the three alternative “suggestions” (Italics mine) are only different ways of explaining the relation and this does not mean that the explanation is to be literally accepted, (Op. cit p. 210). This practically gives the whole case away.

The conception of "upādāna" as a transforming material cause is widely accepted in our Śāstra usage. The derivation of the terms *upādāna* and *upādeya* (from *upa-a-dā*) signifies the passing on of some essential characteristic of the *upādāna* to the *upādeya*. This is accepted by Sureśvara who says that "Ajnāna (Avidyā) is the *upādāna* of the Magic show of the world and that Brahman is said to be the cause thro' the medium of this "Ajnāna:

Asya dvaitendrajālasya yad upādānakāraṇam

Ajnānam, tad upāsrtya Brahma kāraṇam ucyate

As "Ajnāna" is thus the *Upādānakāraṇa* of the world-appearance its essential character of *anīrvacanīyatva* is passed on to the world. But none of the essential characters of Brahman such as its consciousness, blissfulness and *Pāramārthikatva* is passed on to the world which is "Jaḍa". There lies the crux of the problem.

Nor can *Upādānatva* be construed in the sense of its being the substratum of an illusory condition (*bhramādhiṣṭhānatvam*) That would make the deluded perceiver of the shell-silver the *Upādāna* of the shell-silver as he is the abode (*āśraya*) of the deluded cognition. If it is said that the substratum of the superimposed object is the *Upādāna*, the shell cannot be the *Upādāna* of the illusory silver, as it is not cognised as having the shell for its locus. For the cognition takes the form "this is silver" and not as "in this (*asmin*) there is silver. If it is contended that the *Upādāna* is that with which the superimposed object is cognised as put in apposition (*Sāmānādhikarāṇya*), it will not cover the case of an illusory cognition like "the conch is yellow". For the illusory cognition does not take the form "Yellowness is the conch" (by way of *Sāmānādhikarāṇya*), but as "the conch is yellow-tinted".

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī therefore tries to circumvent these difficulties and the criticism of the Mādhva thinkers with an *improvised definition* of his own of Upādānatva (material causality) as applicable to B. as the causality founded in its own self in creating the world: (*Svaniṣṭha-kārya-janīhetutvam*). This may perhaps preclude overpervasion of the definition in respect of the efficient causality of the Pot-maker, as the pot produced by him does not inhere in him but in its material causal stuff of clay.

But the question is whether the Nirviśeṣa-Brahman can be called the cause of production (*kāryajanīhetu*) as it is Niṣkriya and Nirdharmaka. (void of activity and attributes). The world (*Kāryaprapanča*) subsists in its own causal Stuff of Avidyā, according to Advaita (Cf. *Avidyā saha kāryeṇa nāśīd asti bhaviṣyati*). The world is thus Avidyāniṣṭha. and *not* Brahmaniṣṭha. Neither can *hetuva* (causality) as such be said to subsist in Brahman, which is Nirviśeṣa. Moreover, the role of Nirviśeṣa. B. as the substratum of the superimposition of the world upon it (*prapančabhramādhiṣṭhānatvam*) in Vivartavāda, is absolutely *passive*, and its causality purely *nominal*, whereas Anirvacanīya. Māyā (Ajñāna), with its twin characteristics of *āvarana* (concealing) and *Vibhrama* (projecting an appearance) has far better claims than the Nirviśeṣa-B. to be regarded as producing the Kārya inhering in its causal stuff of Ajñāna.

Moreover, in Advaita it is the Saguna-B 'the (Upahita-B) which operates as the efficient cause, while the Nirviśeṣa remains the passive substratum, *without consent and participation* in it. This makes for two Brahman performing different functions. And the Suddha and Upahita Brahman are *not*, strictly speaking, identical, except in the loose sense of the bare *Cit* which cannot however be designated as the 'cause' (*kāryajanīhetu*). As the Nirviśeṣa-B. is the only real and true B., it cannot play two different roles, or even one for that matter, as required by the wording of the Sūtra (Prakṛtiśca) — the conjunctive particle denoting the sense of *equal strength* (*tulya bala*).

B's Abhinna-nimittopādānatva as expressly spelt out in Sankara's bhāṣya on the Sūtra has been *modified in the Bhāmati* in terms of Vivartavāda. Sarvajñātman has tried to explain its presence in the Bhāṣya as the "prelude" to the official view of Vivarta (*Vivartavādasya tu pūrvabhūmih*). The Masters of Dvaita have therefore dealt with both the theories of Parināma and Vivarta as they are found in Śankara's Sutrabhāṣya and in the modified version of Vivarta as developed by his Scholiasts. They have thus been quite fair to the Advaitins and have ignored or suppressed neither. Yet Dr. Narain without looking into their works *presumes* to accuse them of having *deliberately overlooked* the Vivartavāda interpretation, with intent "to nullify the achievements of the rival school" (*Op. cit.* p. 280)

By opting for Vivartavāda, the Advaitins have virtually abandoned the Brahmapādānavāda, and transferred it to Anirvacaniya Ajñāna. As Maya is *not* the same as Brahman, it makes no difference whether Māyā is the Upādānakāraṇa or the Prakṛti of the Sāṅkhyas, as both are Jaḍa. The dismissal of Prakṛti as "A-śabdām" (foreign to the Śrutis) in Sankara's interpretation of the Ikṣatyadhikaraṇam of the Sūtras has been shown to be baseless in the works of Madhva and his commentators. (See my *BSPC* Vol. I pp 28-29).

The distinction made in Advaita between the Vyāvahārika and the Pāramārthika levels of truth may no doubt be very vital to its interest. But as I have stated elsewhere in my *Philosophy of Madhva* (p. 470), *it is not good logic to take it for granted and build a superstructure on it*. It has become second nature to spokesmen of Advaita to parry the criticisms of the Realists by seeking shelter behind the two level theory and repeating the charge of their critics persistently overlooking that basic distinction or deliberately confusing between them and expecting to convince the casual reader by repeating this charge *ad nauseum*. It is time this bluff is called off. Far from being oblivious of the distinction drawn by the Advaitins between the two levels of truth, or ignoring it in their criticism, the Dvaita writers have shown themselves in their writings to be

fully aware of it, right from the days of Madhva and have given the fullest consideration to the grounds on which it is based and shown them to be wanting in probative value. Hence the disagreement on this issue is *not* the outcome of any ignorance or misunderstanding on the part of the Dvaitins or their falling a prey to any confusion of thought. The burden of proof regarding the two level theory of truth rests on the Advaitins. They have to admit that the "Vyāvahārika" and the "Prātibhāsika" are equally "mithyā", irrespective of the time lag between their exposure.

Bhrānter bahukāla-anuvartitvam ca aprayojikā (Nym) For, what is "Mithyā" is stultifiable (*bādhya*). And *Bādhya* again as accreditedly defined in the school is as sweeping as it is unsparring in terms of negation for all the three periods of time as we shall repeatedly see. No doubt there are two views about the frame of reference from which it is said to be operative one from the "Pāramārthika level" (*Pāramārthikatvākareṇa nisedhah*) and the other of absolute negation with reference to all the three periods of time in essence of the object (*svarūpena nisedha*). In his analysis of the nature of this *Nisedha* (stultification) from these two points of view on the subject of the nature of "Mithyātva" it will be seen that Vyāsātirtha has laid bare the fallacy of mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*) which dogs the footsteps of *Bādha* from the Pāramārthika point of view and the reduction of the counterpositive of negation in essence (*svarūpena nisedha*) with reference to all the three periods of time to utter non-existence inclusive of its *asad-vailakṣaṇya svarūpa*). An astute Logician, Madhusudana when confronted by Vyāsātirtha quietly abandons the older view of sublation from the Pāramārthika standpoint on account of the mutual interdependence it involves and accepts boldly the only other alternative left to him of "*Svarūpena-nisedha* regardless of the consequence which Vyāsātirtha is quick to point out, as we shall see on P. 31 The two level theory of truth for all its apparant simplicity as an "open sesame" has proved to be a veritable labyrinth for Advaita.

The contention that the Śrutis teach Mithyātva of the world is also unsustainable. There are many more which insist on the reality of the world such as "Viśvam satyam...(R. V, li, 24, 12) Yāthātathyato arthān vyadadhat...(Isa Up.). The creation texts and cosmological details in the Upanisads are not a mere make-believe. Vyāsātīrtha rightly points out the relegation of the Śrutis which deal with the details of cosmic creation in a systematic order and the involution in the reverse order at the time of world-dissolution, the references to the sojourn of the souls in Heaven and Hell and rebirth will be reduced to a mockery if the world is pronounced to be Mithyā off hand. The establishment of the concept of Mithyātva itself depends on the establishment of the two level theory of truth and that again as we have seen is yet to come out of the labyrinth.

Madhva himself has raised a pertinent question if the doctrine of threefold reality is to be established on the basis of a proof falling under the first order of reality called Pāramārthika-Sat or by one falling under one or the other of the other two viz. the Vyāvahārika or the Pratibhāsika. Since it is beyond the scope and jurisdiction of the Vyāvahārika or the illusory real to say anything about the nature of the Pāramārthika, the said proof of establishing the Pāramārthikasatya must be the Pāramārthika-Brahman itself or some other equally Pāramārthika real. But as the Advaita Brahman is by definition "Nirviśeṣa" it is powerless to establish, prove or disprove anything. To call in some other Pāramārthika to aid would disrupt the doctrine of the one real. The contention that the Śrutis establish that Brahman alone is the truly real has already been shown to be wishful thinking. See Chap. XIX.

Dasgupta was the first to draw the attention of Modern scholars to some of the philosophical problems at issue between the Dvaita and Advaita schools raised by Vyāsātīrtha and the controversy provoked between the two schools. But Dasgupta confined himself only to a few select topics and had given the respective views of the parties without entering into an assessment of them of his own.

Dr. Narain has now widened the scope of the subject matter and given his own assessment of the arguments of the contending schools. But from the quotes from his work I have already given here it will be seen that he has not hesitated to play tricks with evidence, suppress material facts from the writings of the Dvaita authors and accuse them of deliberately misrepresenting the Advaita position and generally making them out to be the villains of the piece.

It has therefore become necessary for me to repair the damage done to the reputation of the Masters of Dvaita thought and set the record straight so far as the case for Dvaita is concerned. I have also taken note of the attempted defence of the Advaita arguments by Dr. Narain and given my Re-appraisal of them. Dr. Narain could very well have avoided all the digressions and excursions into the background materiale relating to Epistemological, ontological and other speculations in the different schools of Indian philosophy and confined himself strictly to the problems at issue between the Advaita school and its rival and included in his survey topics more relevant to them primarily. I have therefore stuck to the order of topics raised by Vyāsātīrtha in the main.

The net result of the Dvaita-Advaita Polemics initiated by Vyāsātīrtha has been to bring to the forefront the rifts and fissures in the body-politic of Advaita metaphysics and its presuppositions. (See P. vi fn 2) To give an instance, in his criticism of the second definition of Falsity of the world, Vyāsātīrtha first of all disposes of its first alternative that the sublation of the world contemplated by Pratīpannopādhan traikālikanīṣeḍha-pratīyogitvam, is from the Pārāmārtika level, on the ground that it is vitiated by the fallacy of interdependence and that it cannot therefore pass muster. Evidently, Madhusūdana accepts the force of this argument as he does not attempt to rebut it. When Vyāsātīrtha confronts him with the other alternative of sublation in essence of the suchness of the appearance inclusive of the rescinding of its *asadvilakṣaṇatvākāra* Madhusūdana boldly and

unhesitatingly opts for it. *Svarūpeṇaiva traikālikaniṣedhasya prapance Suktirūpyādau ca angikārāt*. As "Svarūpeṇa niṣedha" involves the wiping out of the "*asadvilakṣaṇatvākāra*" of the appearance, its effect will be to reduce the object in question to a nullity. That would make the so-called 'Vyāvahārika-satyatva' ostensibly granted to external world in Advaita thought a mere eyewash and reduce it to the Samvṛtisatya of Nihilism. Such is the nemesis of the traditional Advaita of Sankara expressly admitted, probably for the first time, by Madhusūdana. Well may one wonder whether Advaitic circles would consider Madhusūdana to have done a service or a disservice to their cause. Perhaps traditional Advaita may not be bothered in the least about the consequences of the A-Siddhi's confession.

"Neo—Vedanta"

But the conscience of modern Apologists of Sankara-Advaita who would fain uphold its claims to be most rational in its outlook "where thought follows thought naturally until Advaitism is seen to complete and crown the edifice" (*Radhakrishnan I. Phil.* ii. p 657), has been at pains all along to remedy the situation. What Dr. Radhakrishnan presents in his *Philosophy of Integral Experience* is an attempt and an example of an improvement and departure from the strictly unitary conception of Sankara-Advaita and its background of Māyāvāda and Jagan-Mithyātva.

Earlier still, Swami Vivekananda had given a twist and a reorientation to Sankara-Advaita and his Māyāvāda by liberally diluting the content of Māyā and Mithyātva.

Recently, Swami Tapasyānanda, Head of the Sri Rama-Krishna Mission, Madras, in the Introduction to his *Bhakti Schools of Vedanta* (1990) has elaborated the principles of what he calls "Neo-Vedanta", which he says emerges from the experiences and teachings of Ramakrishna and the speeches and writings of his gifted disciple Swami Vivekananda. He says that 'classical Vedanta' by which term he *excludes* the Bhakti Schools, will have an honoured place, if it comes to accept the outlook of Neo-

Vedānta and receive world-acceptance and that the followers of Vedānta should abandon the polemical method.

This overlooks the fact that the dialectical method has contributed immensely to the clarification of numerous problems of philosophy and the richness of thought content of various systems in the past and is still capable of providing sound guide - lines and fresh insights for the development of a Pan-Indian Philosophy, in substance and in principle, if implemented on right lines.

The distinctiveness of "Neo-Vedānta" according to Swami Tapasyānanda, lies in its acceptance of both the Saguna or Saviśeṣa-Brahman and the Nirviśeṣa (Nirguna) Brahman as two sides of the same coin. They exist and have the same reality and validity with two different frames of reference. It rejects the two tier theory of truth into higher and lower knowledge the Pāramārthika and the Vyāvahārika. The latter, with its worship of God of the Bhakti schools, endowed with all auspicious attributes as the Creator of the world and the bestower of Grace and deliverance is as real as the Nirviśeṣa-Brahman. The only difference is that when the one is experienced, the other is not. The other distinctiveness is that of the concept of sublation of the world (Bādha) when true knowledge dawns. In Neo-Vedānta Bādha is rejected outright. And with it goes Sad-asad-anirvacaniya-Māyā and the Mithyatva of the world, which have been read into Śankara's classical system "by his scholastics",— (presumably in their over-enthusiastic smartness).

This picture is however far from being correct or true to Śankara's own clear pronouncements in his BSB, or even logically consistent. Śankara's pronouncements on the status of the Saguna and the Nirguna Brahman and the factual existence of the world even after A, B, or C attains realisation and merging in the Nirviśeṣa gives no support to any of the articles of faith of "Neo-Vedānta" that the Saguna and Nirguna Brahman have been placed on the same par as the two sides of the same coin having the same reality and validity. After crying down the two-

tier theory of truth it is a surreptitious way of introducing it again by way of "different frames of reference". Śankara is adamant that the Saguṇa or Sa-viśeṣa B. is always associated with *Upādhis* (adjuncts) and these Upādhis according to him are necessarily the projections of Avidyā (ignorance)—"avidyākālpita as he calls it. (See BSB. ii. 2. 11) The Immutable or "Kūṭastha-Brahman, (Nirviśeṣa) is the only truth (BSB. ii, 2, 16). The entire Universe is just "Māyāmātram" It is liable to sublation (Bādha), like the dream world, with this difference that while the latter is sublated everyday, the external world by the knowledge of Brahman, when it arises (BSB. iii 2,4), It is thus a question of shorter or longer duration of the error between them. The idea of the Saviśeṣa and the Nirviśeṣa both having the same reality and validity as the two sides of the same coin or the vast liquidity of the Ocean and the solid icebergs in another part has been severely criticised by Śankara under BSB. ii, 1, 14

न चानेकात्मकं ब्रह्म, यथा समुद्रात्मना एकत्वं, फेनतरंगाद्यात्मना अनेकत्वम् *** नैवं स्यात् । नायं व्यवहाराभावोऽवस्थाविशेषनिबद्धोऽभिधीयते इति युक्तं वक्तुम् । ब्रह्मात्मभावस्यानवस्थानिबन्धनत्वात् । एकत्वमेव एकं पारमार्थिकं दर्शयति, मिथ्याज्ञानविजृम्भितं च नानात्वम् उभयसत्यतायां हि कथं व्यवहारगोचरोऽपि जन्तुरनुताभिसन्ध इत्युच्येत ? न चास्मिन् दर्शने ज्ञानान्मोक्ष इत्युपपद्यते । सम्यग्ज्ञानावोद्यस्य कस्यचित् मिथ्याज्ञानस्य संसारकारणत्वेनानभ्युपगमात् । उभयसत्यतायां हि कथं एकविज्ञानेन नानात्वज्ञानमपनुद्यत इत्युच्येत ? नहि कूटस्थस्य ब्रह्मण अनेकधर्माश्रयत्वं संभवति ।

He argues that the Supreme Brahman can never be *anekāt-makam* (double sided) like the coin with two sides (as Neo-Vedanta wants to have it.) He thunders—*Non-duality will have nothing to do with accommodating difference of states of experience of the Saguṇa and Nirguṇa from different frames of reference at any time in its being. The reader may check up the references with the original text of Sankara's Bhāṣya.*

The theory of 'Anekātmakatva' of Brahman as dual-natured for ever *on the same par* (as two sides of a coin) is repugnant to Śankara. He explains that as Liberation is attainable according to Vedānta only thro' right knowledge, the Anekātmakatva theory of Brahman at the same time (irrespective of your different "frames of reference") cannot afford to admit the existence of any "Mithyājñāna", as the cause of Samsāra and the Vyāvahārika state, which is to be *sublated* by right knowledge (See BSB. ii, 1, 14). Brahman cannot be *intrinsically double-natured* (Na svata eva anekātmakam) as the two natures are diametrically opposed to each other (*virodha*). It can only become so under the influence of Upādhis and these Upādhis are necessarily the projections of Avidyā (S. BSB. iii, 2, 16) Lastly, the Upanisadic thesis of Ekavijnānena sarvavijnānam (knowing the many by knowing the One) will be disproved and falsified, if it were true that when the one is known the other is not (as Tapasyananda has put it).

The foregoing references are more than sufficient to show that "Ādi-Śankara" himself is dead against the stand taken by Neo-Vedānta" as outlined by its exponents. It is thus wrong and disingenuous to put Ādi Śankara and his scholiasts against each other, on such fundamental issues. "Neo-Vedānta", whatever its merits, credentials and plus-points, will have to leave Ādi-Śankara alone with his scholiasts in peace and go its own way, without seeking in any way to capitalise on his name.

In the last analysis, then, "Neo-Vedānta" will have to join hands with Pantheistic schools of thought like those of Bhāskara and Yādavaprakāśa, if it wants to have it both ways. In fact, the Anekātmakatvavāda of Brahman refuted by Śankara in his Sutrabhāṣya (ii, 1, 14) is that of the Vrttikāra who was a precursor of Bhāskara. Pantheism would pull the Deity to the gutter. It has its own drawbacks and as Ramanuja puts it is worse than Māyāvāda: *Brahmājnānavādād api pāpīyān ayam Bhedābhedaupakṣak Vedārtha-Sangraha* However, that may be, Pantheism would confirm the reality of the

external world as a transformation of Brahman and make it as real as Brahman. To that extent it will endorse the reality of the world which is one of main points of difference between the author of the Nym and his opponents. If Neo-Vedanta would wholeheartedly accept the reality of the world it should find itself in agreement with the finding of Vyasa-tirtha that the ultimate difference between the supreme Brahman and the world consists in the unchanging eternal existence of Brahman for all time and the changeful and limited existence of the Universe in space and time and not in the real existence of Brahman and the Mithyātva (imagined existence or imagined appearance) of the Universe.

Brahma kālatrayepi Sat. Vidyādādi ca kadācid eva. Iti nityatv-dhītyatvābhyām eva Vaiṣaṇyam. Nātu Satyatva-Mithyātvābhyām (Nym. p. 39)

If this book should evoke a Rejoinder in its turn as of old, it will be welcomed in the interest of further clarification of the problems of Vedanta. For too long the Monism of Śaṅkara has been monopolizing the field and has been luring the intellectuals with common-place analogies like the dream world and the 'Serpent and the Rope and silver in shell' silencing the voice of Realistic thought by gagging it with the authority of the supposed "Monistic texts". In fact there has been a standing complaint by many modern writers who have been brought up in the belief that "Vedanta is Advaita" that Indian Philosophy has been emasculated by its thralldom to the Śrutis. It is Dvaita philosophy which has taken the lion's share in nailing down this charge as baseless. It has suggested a harmonious way of demarcating the respective and legitimate jurisdictions of consolidated human experience and the intimations of Scripture about the life in Mokṣa, without their encroaching on each other's domain, on the basis of the principle of Upajivya-pramāṇa-prābalya, according to exigencies of each case. If God is and

ought to be *more* and *greater* than the world and Man¹ the quest of Philosophy must end with *rediscovering* the eternal truth.

Svatantram Paratantram ca dvividham tattvam isyate

CONCLUSION

The stupendous range of survey of the problems of Indian philosophy carried out by Vyasa-tīrtha in his *Nyāyāmṛta*, for the first time in the Post-Sankara and Post-Jayatīrtha period and the recondite nature of the topics discussed by him with his amazing expertise in the writings of most of the system of thought known and studied in his days places severe restrictions on the ability and equipment of any modern scholar aspiring to do even remote justice to monumental classics like the *Nyāyāmṛta* and its rival. I have ventured on this task rather late in life. I have explained what prompted me to do so. I do not stop to anticipate how far I may be able to go thro' with it and complete it. But there is no harm in making a beginning and leaving the rest to kindred spirits to come, as the great Sanskrit Poet Bhavabhūti has said, long ago.

I am very much beholden to Prof. Ninian Smart. I.F. Rowny Professor of Comparative Religions, University of California, Santa Barbara (U. S. A.) for his kindness and courtesy in introducing this work to the modern philosophical world. Indeed, it is most appropriate that the celebrated author of 'Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy' should be interested in the great dialectical confrontation between Realism and Idealism in the final stage of development of traditional Vedānta in India, which forms the subject matter of my book. It is my

१. एकतो वा जगत् कृत्स्नं एकतो वा जनार्दनः ।

सारतो जगतः कृत्स्नादतिरिक्तो जनार्दनः ।

भस्म कुर्याज्जगदिदं मनसैव जनार्दनः ॥

(Mbh. V. 66, 7-8)

pleasant duty to express my thanks to him for his insightful Foreword.

The President of the Akhila Bharata Madhva Mahamandal and its Anandatirtha Pratisthana, Sri Vishnumurti Yerkaditaye and his council have been good enough to accept this book for publication under their auspices, with the gracious approval of the Founder of the Mahamandal and the Chief Trustee of the Anandatirtha Pratisthana, the revered Sri Visvesa Tirtha Swamiji of the Sri Pejavar Mutt, Udupi.

This is the first time the Pratisthana is publishing a work in English on the subject of an epoch—making ~~Ved~~ ^{Vi}dagrantha in Dvaita philosophy and its sequel and making it easily accessible to the modern philosophical world, for comparative study.

I take this opportunity of dedicating this book to the revered Swamiji in token of all I owe to his abiding interest and inspiration in my literary career, all along.

I thank Prof. D. Prahladachar of the Bangalore University for sparing time to discuss some knotty textual points.

4/2, Shah Building, Bhagat Road, Bombay - 16. Vijaya Dasami 6-10-92.	}	(Dr.) B. N. K. SHARMA.
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INTRODUCTORY

The *Nvāyāmyta* of Vyāsātīrtha (1460-1539) enjoys the highest reputation in the history of Dvaita--Advaita dialectics. It represents the pinnacle of development of the incisive exposition and reinforcement of the realistic metaphysics of Ānandatīrtha—its logic and world-view, including the nature of bondage and liberation of Souls to be attained by Bhakti (devotion to the Supreme Being) and Divine Grace (*prasāda*). Its object and purpose is not purely negative or destructive. Demolition precedes construction. The realistic metaphysics rises on the ashes of the Monistic Advaita. The reinforcement of purely Dvaita doctrines, on the nature of truth and reality, difference as foundational and in respect of God, Souls and the world of matter, (*pañcabheda*) the nature of bondage of souls and the place of Sādhana, the importance of Bhakti and *grace* in the attainment of release, the complete manifestation of the bliss of selfhood and its gradation in Mokṣa — which concludes the treatment — are all of them equally critical, exhaustive and authoritative. Madhva's Vedānta Darśana is, by comparison and contrast with the Advaita, shown to be the most satisfactory reconciliation of the place, rights and claims of God, Souls and the world of matter, each with its own real status, place of honor and importance in a coherent system of Theistic metaphysics, wherein God or Brahman occupies the pivotal position as the One and Only Independent Reality (*Svatantra tattva*). It deals with the entire gamut of realistic metaphysics in its architectonic unity and is written in a crisp and spirited style of urbane philosophical language.

After the seed time of the founder and the crystallization of Dvaita thought and its standardization at the hands of Jayātīrtha, Vyāsātīrtha's *Nym* raised it from its parochial

moorings and set it on the high seas of metaphysical cogitation, transcending regional limits and gave it an All-India status and importance in the critical and comparative study of Vedānta Darśana -- *India's greatest contribution to world-philosophy*.

This had the intended effect of rousing the sleeping spirit of philosophical quest, after the Advaitavāda had scored its innings and settled itself to a comfortable ease.

Vyāsatīrtha reopened the issues from the vantage of Madhva's metaphysics which held the key to many crucial problems of philosophy which, the Advaita dialecticians before him had shelved as insoluble and therefore relevant only to the Vyāvaharika level of thought, riddled with its own fallacies :

अनवस्थादयो दोषाः सत्तां निध्नन्ति वस्तुनः ।

अद्वैतिनां ते सुहृदः प्रपञ्चे तत्प्रसंजकाः ॥

He took up the problems where the earlier Masters had left them and widened their horizon of both criticism and self-examination. This was no small service to the onward march of Vedānta philosophy and its Renaissance in the 16th century.

Fifty years after the appearance of the *Nym* the reaction to it came from far off Bengal from the pen of Madhusūdana Sarasvati in his *Advaitasiddhi*. This led to a brisk exchange of thought and criticism between the champions of the two systems for nearly three centuries, as has already been stated. In the words of Mm. Anantakrishna Sastri who has edited and published a part of all the main works pertaining to this controversy with his own resume in the *Calcutta Oriental Series*, IX. "It was Vyāsatīrtha who, for the first time, took special pains to collect together from the vast range of Advaita literature all the crucial points for discussion and arrange them on a novel yet thoroughly scientific and systematic plan. He also exhibited in his work more than a hundred points of

departure and has discussed them with a minuteness of observation and mastery over details rarely to be found even among some of the Titanic thinkers of the past" (p. 36). A glance at the Table of Contents of the *Nym* would easily bear out the stupendousness of the task attempted and achieved by Vyāsātirtha. (See Summary of contents of the four Paricchedas given hereafter).

The main purpose of the *Nym* is to vindicate the cogency of Madhva's realistic metaphysics and give it permanent staying power and living interest in the philosophical field and contain the aggressive ascendancy of the Advaitavāda among the intellectuals of the times. This is clear from what he himself has to say about the aims, objects and scope of his work :

विक्षिप्तसंग्रहात् क्वापि क्वाप्युक्तस्योपपादनात् ।

अनुक्तकथनात् क्वापि सफलोऽयं श्रमो मम ॥

"My labor of love is amply rewarded by gathering the threads of doctrine and details of Madhva Siddhānta, found piecemeal and scattered here and there in the original works and their commentaries and re-presenting them in a co-ordinated form and reinforcing them with additional arguments and corroborative materials where necessary, bringing *fresh facts to light* based on my own cogitations".¹

¹ Among such topics, not actually discussed or fully dealt with in all their ramifications, in the earlier works of the school and here fully dealt with, may be mentioned (1) the *detailed* discussion of Brahman's Upādānakāraṇatva of the world as set forth by the Vivaraṇakāra in Advaita, in three different ways, in conjunction with Avidyā, with their concomitant details; (2) the exhaustive analysis and refutation of the theory of perception in Advaita known as Pratikarma-Vyavasthā and (3) the equally exhaustive discussion of the place and relative position of Bhakti and Prapatti in the Rāmānuja system and their bearing on Tāratamya in Mokṣa, and Prapatti as a

The critical exposition (*upapādana*) envisages a corresponding analysis, criticism and assessment of the rival positions, in the interest of the stabilisation of the Siddhānta.

With a quiet confidence, born of his own intellectual and emotional conviction of the truth of Theistic metaphysics of Madhva, he writes :

श्रीमध्वशास्त्रदुग्धाब्धिं धीमन्दरमहीभृता ।

आमथ्योद्घ्रियते न्यायामृतं विबुधतृप्तये ॥

“Diving deep into the Milky ocean of Madhva-Siddhānta and churning it well with my intellect as the Mandara mountain, I have extracted the nectar of Theistic Logic and metaphysics, for the delectation of the connoisseurs”.

PARICCHEDA I

As the work is cast in a dialectical mould *cap à pie* of the traditional style of Vāda-granthas, it starts with the framing

Continued from page 3)

“Laghūpāya” in Viśiṣṭādvaita. Hence, the objection raised in some quarters against the wording “Anuktakathanāt” in the Nym. is not well-founded. Read also the ff. from Vijayindra Tirtha’s Nym-Āmoda in answer : तनु, ‘अनुक्तकथनात्’ इत्युक्तम् । पूर्वाचार्यैः प्राचीनग्रन्थेषु कथनीयस्य सर्वस्यार्थस्य कथनात् अन्यथा, तत्र तेषामज्ञानप्रतिपादनं पयवसितं स्यादिति वाच्यम् ।

ज्ञानिनामप्युचितवैमुख्यदर्शनात् । तदभावेऽपि ज्ञातस्य सर्वस्मोक्ति-
नियमानावाच्च । अस्मदादिष्वपि ज्ञातसर्वानुक्तेरनुभवसिद्धत्वान् । अन्यथा,
तस्य तदज्ञानप्रतिपादनपरत्वे, ‘अज्ञातकथनात् क्वापि’ इति ब्रूयात् (अवक्ष्यत्)
तस्मात् यत्किञ्चिदेतन् ॥

(Nym-Āmoda. p. 8. Mantralaya Mutt Edn. 1991)

of the issues between the two systems (*Vipratipattipradarsana*) and discusses them in all their bearings and ramifications, by way of clearing the ground for the presentation of the Siddhanta position in due course.

A realistic metaphysics has sooner or later to come to grips with its Monistic rival. Hence, Vyāsātīrtha, at the very outset, takes the bull by the horns and enters into a thorough examination of the thesis of Monism about the falsity of the Universe (*Viśvam mithyā*) in all its aspects of definition, proofs, premises and conclusion before turning to the constructive exposition of the criterion of reality in the realistic system.

He then turns to establish the primacy of Pratyakṣa (sense-perception in all its forms) the first gateway to knowledge, with which all thinking beings are endowed by a kindly Providence. The attempt to discredit Pratyakṣa on various grounds of its being superficial, limited to the present and the possibility of future contradiction, want of nexus between consciousness and objects of perception, their liability to disproof by inference and scripture, the superior validity of inference and Śrutis to mere surface-perception — the stock in trade of all Monistic systems, is met with stout resistance, after incisive analysis, criticism and final answers. There is much confusion of thought about the quality of Pratyakṣa, whose primacy is the first ground of Realism. It is *not* the cheap, common sense view that is intended by the term Pratyakṣa as a proof of the reality of world-experience. It is the "tested perception (*parikṣita-pratyakṣa*) after applying all possible tests and being assured of the correctness of the experience.

It is *not* at all contended by Madhva and his followers that sense-perception *never goes wrong*. In fact, there is ample scope for erroneous perceptions of things and illusory perceptions of the snake in the rope and the silver in shell variety, which are the stock-in-trade of Advaita. The existence

of illusory perceptions does not upset or annul valid perceptions of the joys and sorrows and other poignant experiences in life. The first perception of silver-in-shell (*idam rajatam*) is corrected by the stultifying cognition *Nedam rajatam* and this subsequent Pratyakṣa is veridical and uncontradicted and therefore absolutely true and valid. If the Bādhakajñāna (correcting cognition) should, in its turn, be open to contradiction, it cannot be termed a correcting cognition.

That apart, following Madhva and Jayatīrtha, Vyāsātīrtha has thoroughly discussed the question of the relative superiority (*balābalaavicāra*) between Parikṣita-Pratyakṣa (tested Pratyakṣa) and Inference of falsity of experience and the verdict of Pratyakṣa (even of the Parikṣita type) being overridden by Advaita Śruti — which is the trump-card of Monism. Against this, the Mādhva philosophers have formulated a sound criterion that Āgama (Śruti) is valid in matters which fall *exclusively* within its jurisdiction — such as the transcendental nature of Brahman and its attributes and the existence of supersensuous realities. It cannot invade or upset the jurisdiction of Pratyakṣa-involving the intuitive experiences of souls of their poignant experiences of the sorrows and the intimate experience of the joys of life, their own *Kartṛtva* (doership), *bhokṛtva* (enjoyer, ship) and dependence on a higher power :

प्राबल्यमागमस्यैव जात्या तेषु त्रिषु स्मृतम्
उपजीव्यविरोधे तु नास्यास्तन्मानता भवेत्
तत्प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धेऽर्थे नागमस्यापि मानता
उपजीव्यमक्षजं यत्र, तदन्यत्र विपर्ययः
लौकिके^२ व्यवहारेऽत्र प्रत्यक्षस्योपजीव्यता
अवतारादिदृष्टौ स्यादागमस्योपजीव्यता ॥ (AV)

^२ The term “लौकिके” is not a qualifying adjective to “व्यवहार” This line is to be carefully understood, as explained by J. in his NS. See my *Philosophy of Madhvacharya's* p. 153.

The enunciation of the exegetic principle of *Upajīvyā-pramāṇa-prābalya* (be it *Pratyakṣa*, inference or *Śrutis* according to exigencies) is a forward step taken by the *Mādhva* school is finding other ways of reconciling the meaning and purport of the identity texts with that of the *Bheda Śrutis* which, as *Śrutis*, are equally *nirdoṣa* and *apauruṣeya*. The attempt to belittle the *Bheda Śrutis* as repetitive of what is already established by *Pratyakṣa* is unsustainable, as the *Śrutis* are the only valid source of knowledge about the existence of Souls and Brahman. As such, the *Dvaita* and *Advaita Śrutis* must be equally *Tattvāvedaka* and in cases of apparent conflict between them there is no justification to denigrate one set as being merely repetitive (*anuvādaka*) and *a-tattvāvedaka* (not truth-declaring). The *Advaitavādins* themselves are pressurised into seeking the help of *Lākṣaṇikārtha* (secondary meanings) and *Bhāga-tyāga lakṣaṇā* or *Cinmātraikya*, by way of non-relational judgments, in tackling the 'upajīvyā-virodha' in opting for a straight open identity between *Jīva* and Brahman as they are given in experience (*viśiṣṭaika*). *Madhva* has shown how without violating the status of both the *Advaita* and *Dvaita Śrutis*, the former can be very reasonably and rationally reconciled and harmonised with the spirit of the *Dvaita Śrutis* :

स्वातन्त्र्ये च विशिष्टत्वे स्थानमत्यैक्ययोरपि

सादृश्ये चैक्यवाक् सम्यक् सावकाशा यथेष्टतः

(AV)

Realistic philosophy believes in the competence of *Pramāṇas* (means of proof) to establish the truth or otherwise of things to be known or investigated. These proofs must therefore be credited with their own intrinsic reality and validity to establish or dis-establish any thing for certain. The *Advaita* cannot afford to concede this, as the acceptance of the reality of *Pramāṇas* (even of *Śruti* in respect of B.) would be detrimental to the thesis of Monism that there is only one reality. This obliges the *Advaita* to depreciate the meaning of such scriptural

statements as *Auponiśadoḥ Puruṣaḥ, Na avedavin manute tam bṛhantam* "Śāstrayonitvat" and other pronouncements. The difficulty is sought to be overcome by claiming Brahman to be *Svaprakāśa* or self-illuminated and self-established. The Mādhva philosophers too readily agree that both the Jiva and B. are *svaprakāśa* in their essence. But while the definition of *Svaprakāśa* in Advaita forbids B. from being capable of knowing itself to be self-shining by its self-consciousness, and is equally averse to letting it to be known by any other source, it seems to be rushing to reduce its B. to a state of *aparakāśatva*. The Advaita Brahman is in an unenviable position of *not* being able to know itself or that it *exists*, for fear of offending a grammatical rule of *kartṛkarmavirodha*. It is conveniently forgotten that the (grammatical) principle of the subject and the object having to be kept apart is only a *vyāvahārika-niyama* pertaining to Grammar, while the Śrutis themselves expressly assert in so many words that B. alone existed in the beginning. "It knew itself as "I am Brahman" (*Brh. Up.* 1.4.10).³ Here also Śaṅkara's commentary raises the bogey of *kartṛkarmavirodha*. In contrast, Mādhva thought, with its concept of *Svarūpaviśeṣas* is able to explain B.'s (and Jiva's) *Svaprakāśatva* in terms of the capacity to be aware and be conscious of one's own existence and attributes by the power of its *Svarūpajñāna*. The Advaita B. being "Nirviśeṣa" is incapable of knowing or being aware of its own existence or self-luminescence, even conceding for argument that as there is no second real, B cannot know any thing else. But should this incapacity be extended to its own being and awareness of its own being? An unknown and unknowing B. is *irrelevant to philosophy* like the "Śūnya" of the Buddhist.

³ For M's and S's interpretation of this text. See my *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Up. From M's Perspective* DVSR Foundation, Bangalore 4 (1988).

Another ground of *Mithyāiva* of the objects of perception is the impossibility of establishing a real viable relation between consciousness and its so-called objects (दृक्दृश्यसंबन्धानुपपत्तिः). Hence the relation between them must be a fictitious and superimposed one. This has also been discussed by Vyāsātīrtha.

As the Advaitavāda sets a premium on the *Aikya Śrutis* as overriding all Pratyakṣa and Bleda Śrutis, Vyāsātīrtha devotes considerable space to the discussion of several representative Advaita Śrutis such as *Ekam eva advitīyam Brahma*, *Neha nāsti kiñcana*, *Vācārambhaṇam vikārah*, *Māyāmātram idam Dvaitam*, *Indro māyābhiḥ* and above all *Tat tvam asi*.

He then passes on to discuss various problems connected with the concept of Avidyā or Bhāvarūpa Ajnāna, in Advaita, its definition and proofs and the question of its *locus*, whether it is pure consciousness or the empirical ego and the *viṣaya* (object) of this ignorance, as well as the concept of Anirvacaniyatā itself. He then turns to the Advaitic doctrines about the Self, especially the one which holds that the empirical ego in us is *not* the same as the Ātman (self) revealed in dreamless sleep (*susupti*) and that the acts of knowing, willing as well as “doing” and enjoying associated with the self are all due to superimposition (*adhyāsa*) of the Vṛttis (changing states) of the mind - stuff (*antaḥkaraṇa*) on the pure self and the consequent mistaken identification of the self and the not-self (*dehātma-aikyādhya*sa).

The discussion of *Adhyāsa* leads to a comprehensive examination of the theories of Erroneous Knowledge (*bhrama*) and its nature and constituent factors, in Advaita (*Anirvacaniya-khāyati*). This is followed by a constructive exposition of the Siddhānta theory relating to erroneous knowledge, how it arises and the epistemological status of the object presented to cognition (*Abhinava-Anyathākhyāti*).

As the Advaita regards the pṛcept in the illusory cognition to be endowed with a *Pratibhāsikasatya* and is therefore subsumed under 'Mithyā', the opportunity afforded by this topic is utilized by Vyāsātīrtha to discuss the Advaita doctrine of threefold classification of reality (*satta-traividhya*) into Pīramīrthika, Vyāvaharika and Pratibhāsika, before concluding the first *Pariccheda*.

PARICCHEDA II

The first thirteen sections here are devoted to the subject matter of Brahman as depicted in the Advaita system. It begins with a discussion of what is called 'Akhaṇḍārthavāda' or the theory of non-partitive or non-relational, non-synthetic judgments as the purport of all scriptural texts defining or describing B. (as *Satyam jñānam anantam*) or the identity of Ātman and B. As an illustration of this theory, the interpretation of the texts "*satyam jñānam.....*" and *Tat tvam asi* is taken up for examination. The author then passes on to discuss other texts believed to represent B. as Nirguṇa (attributeless), Nirākāra (formless) and suffused by Māyā. He then deals with the theories of B.'s causality of the universe as both the *upādāna*, *nimitta* and *Vivarta*. This is followed by the discussion of B.'s *svaprakāśatva* - (as understood by the Advaita) and its inexpressibility thro' *Śabda* (*avācya*).

The next twelve sections are devoted to the tenets of the *Siddhānta*, such as the establishment of the pivotal doctrine of Difference (*bheda*) as "Dharmisvarūpa" (involving the concept of Viśeṣas) and the doctrine of five-fold difference (*Pañca-bheda*) in respect of Jivas, Jaḷas and Brahman from one another and among Jivas and Jaḷas themselves mutually.

It is this five-fold difference that is meant by the term 'Prapañca' which has been shown to be eternal, by a Tarka

argument in the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*. Then follows a very recondite discussion of the concept of Difference as criticised by leading Advaita Dialecticians from Maṇḍana upto Citsukha and others and the vindication of the reality of Difference and the rationalisation of its relation to the relata with the help of the concept of Viśeṣas. The importance of the category of Difference to Dvaita philosophy is reflected by the author's devoting two consecutive sections to the refutation of certain general objections to the category and more specific objections. This is followed by a very important section allotted to the doctrine of Viśeṣa in Madhva's ontology which lies at the root of all concepts of identity - in - difference. Viśeṣa is the life-breath of Dvaita ontology, theory of judgments, and relation between substance and its permanent attributes. *It is one of the most outstanding contributions of Madhva to India's philosophical thought* and holds the key to the solution of many insurmountable difficulties facing the theory of creation, etc.

The next section deals with the topic of identity of Jīva and Brahman. Vyāsatīrtha argues that the Aikya Śrutis are against the grain of their own *upajīvyā-Pramāṇa* in the form of Sākṣyanubhava⁴ and Bheda Śrutis, backed by the six-fold marks of purport. After discussing the concept of non-difference from the point of view of *aṃśatva* and *Pratibimbatva* of the Jīva, the author concludes the Pariccheda establishing the atomicity of the Jīvasvarūpa, according to Madhva.

PARICCHEDA III

The third Pariccheda deals with the scope and interrelations between the traditionally accepted means of realisation - *Sādhana*s like Śravaṇa, Manana and Dhyāna. It reviews the position of the *Vivaraṇa* school regarding the primacy of *Śravaṇa* of which the other two are ancillaries. In Madhva's view

⁴ For refutation of the Advaita view that Sākṣī is *not* the immaculate self but only its reflection in Avidyāvṛtti See the argument of Tg. in Chap. XV. f. 5.

Dhyāna holds the key position to which the other two are ancillary. The concluding section deals with the interesting doctrine of 'Śabda - aparokṣa' in Advaita which claims that it is within the competence of Śabdapramāṇa - such as *Tat tvam asi*, *Tad dhāsyā vijajñau*, *Vedantavijnānasuniścītārthāḥ parimucyanti*, etc. on the analogy of '*Daśamas tvam asi*', ("You are the tenth person (supposed to be missing)") to produce Bhahmāparokṣa (direct realisation of B.).

PARICCHEDA IV

The last Pariccheda discusses the nature of final liquidation of Avidyā in the Advaita system and its status, whether it is real or otherwise and its precise relationship to the Ātman, whether it is identical with Ātman or different from him or else indescribable (*anirvacanīya*) and whether such a cessation of Avidyā (which is deliverance) is stultifiable in its turn or is an absolutely uncontradicted reality. It also points out the logical difficulties in the way of the final Vedāntic-Vṛtti (psychosis) operating as the liquidating instrument of Anadi - Avidyā. This is followed by a discussion of how far the state of Mokṣa in Advaita is compatible with the actual experience and awareness (*anubhava*) of svarūpa - sukha (bliss of selfhood) to deserve its being accepted as a worthy object of human endeavour (*puruṣārtha*). The next section brings out the untenability of the concept of Jīvan-Mukti (release while yet in the physical body) as conceived in the Advaita system. The Dvaita view of Jīvan - mukti as a proximate state of coming Mokṣa, till the Jīvātman receives the final saving grace of the Lord (*mocaka-prasāda*) is then explained. While in the state of jīvanmukti these Aparokṣajñānins serve as a beacon light to society around.

The last section provides a colorful account of the state of Mokṣa as conceived in the philosophy of Madhva - where the released souls retain their intrinsic personal identity as individ-

uals and their respective place and position in the gradational scheme of Tāratamya. All of them are still subject to the Lord's government and enjoy the full manifestation of their irrespective optimum of *Svarūpānanda* (bliss of selfhood) without let or hindrance, by the grace of the Lord - each released soul enjoys his *Svarūpānanda* in his own way, commensurate with his fitness, but without any trace of jealousy or discord and other bad passions (in spite of their Tāratamya) because they have once for all left behind all such bad passions, before attaining final release. They now enter into a complete state of harmony and fellowship with the community of the blessed ones there and rest in eternal blissful communion with the Lord - the remover of their erstwhile bondage and the bestower of their final liberation by His Grace.¹

अज्ञानां ज्ञानदो विष्णु ज्ञानिनां मोक्षदश्च सः ।

आनन्ददश्च मुक्तानां.....

This type of Mokṣa, where the released Souls are many and retain their individuality under the sovereignty of the Lord, has no interest or attraction for the Monist to whom there are no more any Jivas in Mokṣa. But it has a meaning and great importance for Theist philosophers of the world⁵ and Indian Theistic philosophers like Rāmānuja and Madhva who accept the survival of the souls and their individuality in its pristine purity and their personal consciousness in Mokṣa.

Therefore, Vyāsatiṛtha devotes a special section to discuss the rational basis and the scriptural authorities in support of the thesis of *Svarūpānanda* - *Tāratamya* in Mokṣa, a point on which the Rāmānuja school disagrees (in spite of its acceptance of the survival of a plurality of souls in Mokṣa) as well as its covert acceptance of Tāratamya as between Mukta-Jivas and Nitya-mukta jivas (accepted by the Rāmānuja school, called "Nitya-sāris").

5. See Albert Schweitzer *Indian Thought and Its Development* P. 61.

In this connection, Vyāsātīrtha has given us an illuminating discourse on the place of Bhakti and Prapatti as separate means of Mokṣa as advocated by the Rāmānuja school. He discusses the mutual relationship of the Bhakti and Prapatti mārgas in Viśiṣṭādvaita and their bearing on the results accruing from either and to what extent their divergence makes room for a modicum of Tāratamya in the consummation of blissful existence. This section shows his *inward knowledge*, of the Rahasya-granthas on Prapatti in the Viśiṣṭādvaitā tradition.

With a burning zeal of mellowed devotion to the Lord of the realistic Universe of matter and souls and a firm faith and philosophical conviction in the *superiority of Theism as the world's only sane philosophy of life*, Vyāsātīrtha dedicates his masterpiece as a humble “Vag-yajña” (a *Jñāna-yajña*) to the Supreme Master and Enjoyer of all Yajña (*Gītā* IX. 24)

मत्प्रेरकेण हरिणा या पूजा स्वस्य कारिता ।
वाग्यज्ञरूपा लक्ष्मीशस्तया प्रीणातु केशवः ॥⁶



6. The profound sublimity and sincerity of such a dedication are missing in the dedicatory verses at the end of the *Advaita Siddhi*.

Doctrine of Falsity (Mithyātva) of the World

Advaitavāda is pledged to the view that there is only one real Being in existence, in the whole universe. It is bare consciousness without a specific content (*nirviśeṣa - cinmātram*). It is called Ātman or Brahman. All duality and plurality experienced in the world of name and form and spoken of in the Vedas and Upaniads are therefore a myth (*mithyā*) - a superimposition on pure consciousness, caused by beginningless Ignorance (*anādi - avidyā*). The life and career of souls in their transmigratory career, their joys and sorrows and their efforts to get free from their cycle of births and deaths are equally so, in principle. The simple truth is :

***Brahma satyam jagan mithyā
Jivo Brahmaiva na aparāḥ.***

As such a position cannot be credibly maintained on the evidence of consolidated universal human experience based on sense-perception and the evidence of the Apperceiving self known as *Sākṣī*, with which every living being is endowed¹ it has to be presumed that the unreality of experience of the world is made known by Inference and the testimony of the *Srutis*. The preamble to 'Śaṅkara's *BSB* known as "Adhyāsa - Bhāṣya" contains the rudiments of this philosophical theory which were subsequently developed, defined and elaborated by his commentators and leading Dialecticians of the school, giving them the necessary wealth of details, definiteness of shape and meaning and arming them with the requisite technical paraphernalia and logical subtlety. The Vagueness surrounding the concept of *Mithyātva* as adumbrated by Śaṅkara thus came to be remedied within a couple of centuries after him. That is why we find

¹ सुखदुःखादिविषयं भक्षं संसारमेवैवपि शुद्धम् (Av. II. 1. adhi 3)

Theistic philosophers like Rāmānuja and Madhva who came after Śaṅkara's commentators concentrating more on the clarifications of these commentators and Dialecticians in their assessment of the Advaita position. They had no other alternative as Śaṅkara himself had left many points vague and ambiguous.²

As a result of the vigorous and fertile cogitations of these celebrated Advaita Dialecticians, as many as five different ways of defining 'Mithyatva' had come to be formulated and patented, associated with the names of writers like Padmapāda, Prakāśātman, Ānandabodha and Citsukha. These were taken note of by Madhva and Jayatīrtha in their critiques of Advaita doctrine in the *Khaṇḍanātṛaya*, the *Anuvyākhyāna* (of Madhva) and the *Nyāyasudhā* (C. on AV) and in his short polemical work *Vādivālī* by Jayatīrtha.

However, it was Vyāsātīrtha who came out with the most upto-date, exhaustive, self-complete and meticulous review, criticism and appraisal of all that had been said and written, for and against the two philosophical view-points of Advaita and Dvaita upto his times in a monumental metaphysical treatise, written in the strictly objective norm of philosophical dignity and decorum of assessment, doing full justice to both sides of the controversy. A work of such magnitude and precision could not be ignored or remain unrecognised or not respected by the scholarly world for long.

While Theism can stand the test and survive by its own inner dynamics, a Monism has to dislodge all duality, root and branch, to make room for itself.

तत्र, अद्वैतसिद्धेः द्वैतमिथ्यात्वसिद्धिपूर्वकत्वात्
द्वैतमिथ्यात्वमेव प्रथममुपपादनीयम्

(*Advaitasiddhi*, p.1, Sri Vidya Press Edn, Kumbakonam).

² Dr. K. Narain 'A Critique of Mādhva Refutation of 'Sankara School of Vedanta' Intro. p. 7.

The *Advaitasiddhi* has also argued that it is superfluous to invest the "many" with a distinct *esse*, in each case, as the *esse* of the many can be explained as the transfusion of the *esse* of the one reality (Brahman) - particularised and fragmented by *illusion*. That would also make intelligible the uniformity of reference to the different *esses* by the same term, without positing many discrete and distinct entities, each with an *esse* of its own.¹

Madhva himself has anticipated this kind of argument in saying that the law of parsimony cannot ride roughshod over the rights of individuals and abolish their *esse* : *Kalpanāgauravād eva Padārthī na syur eva hi*. The *Tarangīṇī* answers² the *Advaita-siddhi* that by the same token, it may be contended that just as there is perception and practical reaction to "silver in shell" in our illusions, without the factual reality of that silver in space and time, even without the actual existence of the *one real*, it should be possible to perceive and react to its perception. So much so there will be cent per cent economy, if one dispenses with the *esse* of Brahman itself as the one real and accounts for the reference to the "existence" of B. on the same analogy of the "silver" in the shell. If the reality of B.'s *esse* is true because it is established by *Pramāṇa*, the same applies to the world of plurality. It would be far-fetched to argue that the inference of there being no separate being or *esse* for the world, backed by the logic of gravity of assumption

¹ एकस्यैव सवन्निगतेन सर्वत्र सत्त्वप्रतिपत्त्युपपत्ती, ब्रह्मवत् प्रपञ्चस्य प्रत्येकं सत्त्वभावकल्पने मानाभवात् अनुगतव्यवहाराभावप्रसंगाच्च

(*Op. cit.* P. 3)

In M's philosophy, the uniformity of reference to different *esses* is explained on the basis of resemblance (*sādhya*). See my *Philosophy of Madhvacarya*, 2nd Edn. 1986, p. 107-108

² रजतं विनापि शुक्ली रजतप्रतिनिव्यवहारादिदर्शनात् सत्त्वार्थं विनापि सत्प्रतीत्यादेरुपपत्ती अतिज्ञाप्तावमिति, ब्रह्मापि न सद्वृत्तं स्यात् । प्रमितत्वात् ब्रह्म सद्वृत्तमिति तु, जगत्पि तुल्यम्.

involved in accepting many distinct *esses* will itself culminate in the abolition of the world's separate reality apart from Brahman's. For no *reductio ad absurdum* (*tarka*) can upset the *esse* of things established by Pramāṇas. Otherwise, the inference that there is no reality at all, as such, being the very simplest, will compel acceptance and the whole world will be steeped in utter darkness. Thus "Kalpanālāghava" (economy of assumption) is a game at which two can play.

All Vedāntins are committed to the intrinsic self-validity of knowledge. And the essence of Pramāṇya of knowledge consists in the non-contradictability of its objective content. Here the Realist is on firm ground, as the reality of the world and of the selves is borne out by valid perception and Sākṣi-anubhava. Inference, on the other hand, has to depend on sound Pratyakṣa for its ascertainment of *Vṛtti* and other preconditions of its acceptability. It cannot deny the authenticity of its own data, standing-ground (*upajīvyapramāṇa*) and weave fanciful theories in thin air. What is left to be decided is what the Śrutis have to say. That has to be settled on the basis of accepted canons of scriptural interpretation laid down in the Pārva Mīmāṃsā Śāstra and the guide-lines of Logic - and not on subjective standards of one's own predilections and preferences. There is irrefragable truth in Madhva's observation : दृढवस्तुनो मिथ्यात्वानीकार युक्तप्रमेया, न पुनः सत्यत्वे Truth needs no proof ; only falsity does.

It is not without significance therefore that Advaita strains every nerve to denigrate Perception and seeks to damn it with sweet praise as 'Vyāvahārika pramāṇa' and build its castle of Monism on the airy foundations of the Mithyātvānumāna. We have five different definitions of Mithyātva in the writings of the Advaitins.

Vyāsātirtha takes them up one by one and subjects them to a close and rigorous analysis and criticises them all, in all their ramifications.

The First Definition

The first definition of Mithyātva is *sadusattva-unadhikaraṇatvam*. This may be construed in three different ways. (i) as a karmadhāraya compound, that the 'false' is that whose being is composite with absence of non-being or (ii) has the two properties of total absence of being and non-being; or (iii) absolute negation of non-being qualified by the absolute *absence of non-being*. The first is acceptable to the Realist, to whom the world is real and is solely of the nature of 'being,' without being composite with non-being. The second is self-contradictory, as being and non-being are contradictories and this applies to their respective absences as well, which cannot co-exist in the same substratum. The third is equally vitiated by self-contradiction, as out of the two self-contradictory properties (as above) one of them cannot be made to qualify the other. Further, the fact that the attributeless Brahman which, by hypothesis, cannot be invested with *any property* such as *even* of absolute absence of being, while at the same time, it is also nevertheless conceived as of the *essence of being*, (*sadrūpam* or *satsvarūpam*) makes the inference futile, as the world too can similarly be recognised as Sat in essence (*sadrūpa*) without possessing the property of *sattvam*, but having the other property of absence of non-being (*asattva-atāntābhava*). The illusory silver (in Advaita) while being the substratum of the absolute absence of 'being', is not at the same time the locus of the absolute absence of non-being (*asattvam*), in so far as it is conceived in the Advaita as 'mithvā, which, by definition, is *asad-vilakṣaṇa* other than pure non-being.

Here, the author of the *Advaitasiddhi* makes a bid to evade the self-contradiction in the last two alternative definitions (of *sad-asattvānadhikaraṇatvam*) on the ground that Advaita does *not* admit any mutual exclusiveness between being

and non-being - in the Dvaitin's sense, of *asat*, in describing the world as *mithyā*. To be 'mithyā' is *not* the same as being a total non-existence. The *Asat* is that which is utterly incapable and unfit to be presented to cognition, *as existing* in any given substratum, at any time or place - *kyacid apyupādhan sattvena pratiyanarharvam*. The *Mithyā*, on the other hand, while being absolutely other than *Sat*, is still presentable to cognition *as existing* in some locus. The law of the Excluded Middle does not apply to what is *Mithyā*. Hence it can accommodate simultaneous negation of both *Sattvam* and *asattvam* in its bosom.

Vyāsacūṭha has anticipated this backdoor escape of the Advaita, from self-contradiction in the definition. He shows the baselessness of the assumption behind the improvised definition of *Asattvam* attempted by the Advaita to save its face.

It will be seen that the source of this definition of *Asattva* is to be found in the second part of Śāṅkarīe *Ārthāpatti* - "*Asat Cet na pratiyeta*". It is obvious that *pratiyeta* in the predication refers to presentation *as sat* (existing). If non-being (*asat*) then is already prejudged and preconceived as incapable of presentation *as existing* (*sattvena*), the hypothetical proposition whose consequent is the same as its antecedent would be tautologous — "what cannot present itself as existing will not present itself as existing". To avoid this tautology, '*Asat*' has *necessarily to be defined* simply as the counterpositive of absolute negation with reference to all periods of time: *traikālikanishedhapratiyogitvam* and *nothing more*.

तद्यपि 'असच्चेन्न प्रतीयेत' इति वदता, उक्ताप्रतीतिं प्रति प्रयोजकस्य अन्यस्यैव असत्त्वस्य वक्ष्यव्यत्वात् (Nym)¹

¹ See the lucid commentary of Bīdarahaṃji Srinivāsaśārya on this - 'असच्चेत्' इत्यस्य सत्त्वेन न प्रतीयते चेदित्यर्थः । तद्यपि, सत्त्वेन न प्रतीयते चेत्, सत्त्वेन न प्रतीयेत इत्यापाद्यापाशकयोः अभेदादित्यर्थः

The question whether *such* Asat can be presented as *set* (existing) has to be decided on the evidence of our correcting cognition (*bhūdhakajñāna*) following an illusory cognition of silver in shell. Error consists in the (mis-) apprehension of what is *non-existent as existent* and vice-versa in a given setting. The Realist therefore merely wants to affirm that there is no such error in our normal perceptions and experience of the world. The distinction sought to be made between Asat and Mithyā by the Advaita is thus unsustainable. It is only a face-saving device.

The negation of the false (विज्ञा) with reference to all the three periods of time, as contemplated by the Advaita, if it is to be a *real fact* would spell danger to the principle of Monism by opening the door to a duality - viz. the reality of the negation itself besides Brahman. If this negation is to be regarded as *prātibhāsika* (apparent) such an apparent negation will *not* affect the reality of the world. If it is regarded as *Vyāvahārika*, such 'vyāvahārikatva, by hypothesis, being sublatable, will *not* affect the reality and truthfulness of the negation. Moreover, if the negation with reference to all periods of time were only 'Vyāvahārika' (and *not* *pāramārthika*) the 'Neha nānāsti' Śruti held to be negating the world's reality would amount to a negation of the world's Vyāvahārika-reality and *not* its *pāramārthika* reality. But earlier masters of the Advaita school declare :

पारमाथिकमद्वैतं प्रविश्य शरणं श्रुतिः ।

विरोधादुपजीव्येन न विभेति कुतश्चन ॥

If the world, which is) the counterpositive of the negation, is itself Vyāvahārika it makes no sense to resort to a Vyāvahārika negation of it, instead of making the *negation Pāramārthika*.

The negator and the negated cannot be of the same order of reality. The only instance of such a negation cited by the Advaitin is drawn from the domain of dream which belongs to the Prātibhāsika. That cannot be extended to the Vyāvahārika world. If the Vyāvahārika world is at all to be negated, the negation must perforce be of a higher order. That is where the shoe pinches the Advaita.



Second Definition of Mithyātva

Advaita will have to clarify if, in the second definition of Mithyātva as *Pratipannopādhau traikālikaniṣedhapratratīyogivam*, the 'niṣedha' (negation) contemplated includes the very suchness of the subject - the counterpositive, *as it is presented (svarūpeṇaiva niṣedhaḥ)*,¹ - or without rescinding the suchness in which it had been appearing, in terms of being *other than* the totally non-existent (*asadvilakṣyaśvarūpamupamardana*).

The first alternative would be untenable because (i) the world of name and form, space and time, whose creation, dissolution etc., have been dealt with in the Śrutis and Smṛtis and which is further competent to fulfil our practical needs and is further admitted by the Advaita itself as a product of Avidyā (which is its material cause) and is open to liquidation by knowledge. (ii) the shell-silver which has been cited as an example of what is false (*mithyābhūta*) cannot be negated *in essence*,² for all time *including the time and place of its existence* and in the case of the world, in its Vyāvahārika state also.

In his reply to this point, Madhusādana Sarasvatī says that being open to origination etc is *not* necessarily the determinant of non-negatability because the Dvaita philosophers themselves violate the invariable concomitance between origination and destruction and the essential non-originated character of entities when they themselves *do not* admit the origination of *Ākāśa*.²

¹ In terms of धीकालवियमानासद्विलक्षणत्वाकारेण.

² Vide Dr. Narain's *Critique of Madhya Refutation of Sankara School of Vedanta*, p. 37.

And also अव्याकृतं हि गगनं साक्षिगोचरम् । प्रदेष्टुं इति विज्ञेयं, नित्यं नोत्पद्यते हि तत् तथापि(AV. II. 3.1)

This criticism is beside the point at issue whether origination, destruction etc. can be meaningfully predicated of things which are *ex hypothesi* negated and negatable *in essence* (*svarūpeṇaiva traikālikānisedha*). In Dvaita philosophy, there are two kinds (1) Bhūtākāśa, elemental Ākāśa and (2) Avyākṛtākāśa (space). The former is non-eternal (*anitya*) and has origination (*Taitt. Up. i. 1*) and destruction (*dhvamsa*) in Pralaya. But destruction is not the same as *traikālikānisedha* as conceived by the Advaita. Avyakṛtākāśa which is *eternal* and all-pervasive, is nevertheless subject to genesis (*utpatti*) in the sense of "Parādhīna-Viśeṣṭi", as in the case of other *Nitya padārthas* such as Jivasvarūpa, Kāla, Prakṛti, etc. [For details see my *Philosophy of Madhvacarya* (2nd edn. 1986, Chap. XI)]. Hence, the rejoinder of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī :

न ह्यनिषिद्धस्वभावत्वमुत्पत्त्यादिमत्त्वे तन्त्रम्-परैरनिषिद्ध -
स्वरूपत्वेनांगीकृतस्य विद्यदादेः उत्पत्त्याद्यनंगीकारात्

is obviously *due to his not being aware of the Dvaita position* in regard to the admission of creation of Nityapadārthas also, *in a special sense*, in deference to the Śrutis (*Sa*) *idam sarvam asṛjata* (*Taitt. Up. 3.6*) and *Nityo nityānam*.

Any attempt to make out the said negation to be absolute rescinding the very essence of the thing such as it may be (*svarūpeṇa*) will be in conflict with the position of earlier teachers of Advaita, that in illusory experiences such as of silver in shell, it is the silver other than the apparent one (*anābhāsa*) - i.e. to say, the silver in the shop that is negated in essence, or that it is the apparent silver (*ābhāsa*), that is negated in its *pāramārthika*-aspect, which is the counter-positive of the negation for all time. Moreover, *Svarūpeṇanisedha* for all time, including the time of its presentation would reduce the thing negated to an utterly and out and out non-existence, - a position which

would ill accord with the much-advertised 'Vyāvahārika-reality, so generously *believed to be conferred* on the world, by the Advaita.

Nevertheless, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī maintains that both the cosmos in cosmic illusion (*jagad-brahma*) and the shell-silver in *Śuktirajatabhrama* (illusory appearance of silver) are negated inclusively of the suchness of their Vyāvahārikatva or Prātibhasikatva, as the case may be.

Svarūpeṇaiva traikālikaniṣedhapratityogitvasya Prapance, Śuktirāpye ca angikārāt (p. 5 - Srividya Press Edn.) That makes a *mockery* of the so-called Vyāvahārikasattā *said to be* granted, by the Advaita to the empirical world — which some critics deplore has *not* been properly understood or appreciated by the Realist philosophers. Vyāsātirtha hits the nail on the head when he says :

मिथ्याभूतस्यापि स्वरूपेणैव त्रैकालिकनिषेध इति पक्षे,
निःस्वरूपत्वस्य दुर्वारत्वात्

The explanation that as the *svarūpa* (suchness) of the world is equally *Mithyā* it can coexist with its own absolute negation makes matters worse. For, a negation and its counterpositive can not co-exist - except in a terminological fiction. So it will have to be admitted that the suchness of the counterpositive ceases to be and is reduced to utter non-existence (*asattva*). That will cut at the root of the adjunct of *asad-vilakṣaṇatva* (otherness from the *asat*) in the definition of Mithyātva.³

Moreover, in order to distinguish *mithyātva* from *asattva* (non-being) Advaitavāda tries to define utter non-being (*tuccha*)

³ ब्रह्मप्रमान्येन वा, सप्रकारेण वा अबाध्यत्वे सति, असद्विलक्षणत्वे सति ब्रह्मान्यत् प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगि (मिथ्या)

such as the hare's horn as what is inconceivable (*pratityaviṣaya*) or what is outside the pale of denotation (*padaśaktyaviṣaya*) while what is *mithyā* is conceivable and denotable.

Vyāsātīrtha rejoins that even the fictitious hare's horn is mentally conceivable and is denoted by the term '*nirupākhya*'—what is inconceivable or not denotable. Moreover, if what is termed '*asat*' should be inconceivable, how can the Advaitin afford to *know* and recognise the *mithyā* as being *other than asat* (the non-existent) or deny its presentability or designate it by the term '*Asat*'?

Nor can the *asat* be defined as what is not presentable to *direct cognition*. For certain eternally supersensible entities like *dharma*, *adharma* and so on are not also open to our direct perception. We have a Śruti text which reports that there were some thinkers who in all seriousness maintained that "Asat alone existed in the beginning, whence Sat was born" (*Chān. Up. vi. 2.1.*) This shows these persons could conceive of the Asat as existing and operating as the source of being tho' it is an untenable proposition. The point is that Asat is not beyond the pale of being conceived as existing tho' mistakenly so. The form of the predication in the Śruti '*Asat āsit*' implies its possibility tho' not its actuality. *Advaitasiddhi* tries to explain it away by saying that this statement of the Śruti is not to be taken as an affirmative proposition but as a negative one denying and negating the truth of the proposition *Sad eve idam agra āsit*, by shifting the negative prefix *a* (*nañ*) in '*A-sat*' from its given place and connecting it after the *tit*.⁴ The *Taraṅgiṇī* rightly points out that nullification of the thought-content of the Śruti-*Sad eva*

⁴ 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्' इत्ययमिदं एव प्रतिपाद्यते, न असत्तः सत्त्वम्
(Advaitasiddhi)

idam agra āsit, reduces it to a non-being,⁵ there is no escaping the possibility of *asat* being presentable as *sat* though, of course, wrongly.

Nor can *Asat* be defined as "other than the *anirvasaniya*. The latter itself cannot be conceived without a prior knowledge of the former.

असद्विलक्षणजप्यं ज्ञातव्यमसदेव हि
तस्मादसत्प्रतीतिश्च कथं तेन निवार्यते ?

(M. Av.)

The only way to avoid all such difficulties is to admit frankly that *asattva* (non-being) is the logical counter positive of a negation with reference to all periods of time, everywhere.

There is no substance in the contention that the absolutely non-existent cannot be conceived, even as being the counter-positive of an absolute negation, while *mithyātvā* can be regarded as the counterpositive of such a negation, in so far as the world itself is *Mithyā*. Since utter non-being (*asat*) such as the hare's horn cannot be treated as the counterpositive of any negation, being itself non-existent, the Advaita is justified in distinguishing *Mithyātvā* from *asattva*.

Vyāsātīrtha pricks this bubble with a devastating rejoinder that in the light of the Advaita view that even the *mithyābhūta*

⁵ The *Śruti* *Sad eva idam agra āsit* means Brahman is Sat for all time. The negation of its *sattva* would thus be an utter non-existence. But Brahman's non-existence at any time or place is inadmissible. How then can such an interpretation be sustained ?

‘सदेव’ इत्यस्य ब्रह्मसत्त्वमर्थः । तदभावश्चात्यन्तासदेव । न हि ब्रह्मसत्त्वाभावः कचित् देशे काले वा अस्तीति

(Tg. 23)

is also negated in its suchness (*svarūpeṇa*)⁵, it cannot be seriously maintained that the negation of the *mithyābhūta* has a counterpositive while that of the *tuccha* (hare's horn) is devoid of a counterpositive. Nor would it be possible to make out a distinction between the two on the ground that what is *mithyā* is only other than *sat* always and everywhere, while the *tuccha* (non-being) is negated *as such*.

Na ca mithyābhūtasyāpi svarūpeṇaiva niṣedha iti pakṣe, tadbhāvaḥ sapratīyogikaḥ, tucchābhāvastu niṣpratīyogika iti vaktum yuktam.

There is no substance in arguing against this that the *Asat* being itself non-existent, cannot be the counterpositive of a negation. For, the probans in this reasoning that '*asat*' cannot be the counterpositive of a total negation, because it is of the nature of *asat* would be a contradictory reason (*viruddha*) as it is in the very nature of *asattvam* to be the counter-positive of a total negation :

If "*Asat*" can have the distinguishing properties of (i) being *Asat* (ii) being other than *Sat*, (iii) not being the counterpositive of any absolute negation (as contended by the Advaitin), (iv) being the object of a mediate cognition of it and verbal references to the effect and (v) being the counterpositive of *otherness from Asat* (*asadvailakṣaṇyapratīyogitva*), where is the logical impropriety in its being accepted as the counterpositive of negation with reference to all the three periods of time? It is well established that it is the (as yet) non-existent pot or such other object that has to be recognised as the counterpositive during the period of the antecedent non-existence (*prāgabhāvadaśā*) of the object in question. As this is an accepted fact and as the property of

⁵ Accepted by the author of the *Advaita Siddhi* as already pointed out.

counter-positivity does not necessarily presuppose the *actual existence* of the object of which it is predicated at the time, unlike in the case of properties like color or smell. It is beside the point to argue that in the case of prior non-existence, the counterpositive is *present subsequently*. For subsequent presence does not help *the present predicament*.⁷

It is thus inevitable that if, in the Advaita view, *the world* viewed as *mithyā* is held to be negated in its suchness of essence (*svarūpeṇa*) with reference to all periods of time (including the period of its *appearance*) it *cannot but be* absolutely non-existent in essence - despite all the fencing and verbal juggleries to hide the naked truth and sustain the presentation, by seeming to confer an empirical reality on it for the consumption of the gullible.

This incisive criticism of the Advaita position regarding Mithyātvā as set forth above *unmasks* the real position of that school with regard to the world, *in puris naturalibus*. We have seen how the author of the *Advaitasiddhi* has literally asserted that he endorses the *Svarūpeṇaivaivaṇishedha* of the world. That puts the lid on it. (See the passage quoted from A - *Siddhi* earlier, on this point.) (See p. 28 *ante*)

However, there are some well-meaning “modern” Advaitins influenced by the writings of Vivekananda and others - whose number seems to be growing - who want to revert to the earlier view that the negation of the world contemplated by Mithyātvā

7. Read : अणविषाणादीनां चाभावोऽत्यन्ताभाव इति, स एव प्रतियोगी । अप्रामाणिकस्य कथं प्रतियोगित्वमिति चेत् ? किमिह तस्य सत्तया कृत्यमस्ति ? नहि प्रतियोगित्वं रूपादिवत् धर्मिसत्तायापेक्षम् । किंतु, प्रतीतिमात्रं तूपयुक्तम् । तदसतोऽप्यस्ति

(J. TV. 1)

अभावज्ञानोपयोगिज्ञानविषयताभावात्तस्य प्रतियोगित्वात् ।

(J. Tdy. 1)

is not a *Svarāpanisedha* but a negation of the empirical from the *Pāramārthika* point of view — so that they could have it both ways of eating the cake and yet having it.

It is often thought by Apologists of Advaita that the Mādhva philosophers have *suppressed* this fact. Dr. K. Narain, in his concluding remarks in his *Critique of Mādhva Relutation of Sankara School of Vedānta* (Allahabad, 1964) deplores that “at several places, the Mādhva refutation is grounded in the *confusion between the Pāramārthika and the Vyāvahārika points of view and gives an unfaithful account of the Sāṅkarite position. In not appreciating this difference and in equating the Pāramārthika with the Vyāvahārika, the Mādhva philosophers have often fallen a prey to a gross misunderstanding about the “Vedānta position” (p. 338). - Italics mine.*

This is a very cheap criticism. As I have stated on p. 470 of my *Philosophy of Sri Madhvācārya* (2nd Edn. 1986), “the distinction of the two standpoints may be an important fundamental of Advaita philosophy; but it is *not good logic* to take it for granted and build a superstructure upon its foundation”. The “tri-furcation” of reality into Pāramārthika, Vyāvahārika and Prātibhāsika, of which the last two are classed as “*Mithyā*” is itself dependent on the establishment of the concept of *Mithyātva*. The concept itself and its five definitions projected by the Advaita school is yet *sub judice*. The Advaitin is yet to come of the woods or the labyrinth he has built for himself and *got into*.

Vyāsātirtha makes it clear that he is not oblivious of the familiar contention of some Monists that the negation of the reality of the world predicated by them is from the ‘Pāramārthika standpoint’.—

Nāpi Pāramārthikatvākāreṇa traikālikaniṣedhapratijogītvam iti antyaḥ (Nym. 1.1. p. 37). He lays his finger on the

vulnerable point of this argument - the Achilles' heel, that it involves the patent fallacy of mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*). For, Pāramārthikatva, as defined, consists in uncontradictedness (*abādhyatvam*). Only when one has the correct knowledge of Pāramārthikatva as *not* being liable to contradiction can one understand the nature of "Mithyātva" as "bādhyatvam" or what is open to contradiction. Unless one has a prior knowledge of Mithyātva as consisting in being subject to contradiction or liquidation, one cannot understand that Pāramārthikatva consists in *not* being open to contradiction. The question of the Pāramārthikatva of the *Pāramārthikatvākāreṇa niṣedhaḥ* is also bound to arise, leading to a regression.³ It is in order to avoid catching this Tartar that Madhusūdana opts for Svarūpeṇa niṣedha of what is Mithyā. He clinches the issue by turning his back on the explanation of "Pāramārthikatvākāreṇa niṣedhaḥ" (negation of the Vyāvahārika from the noumenal (*pāramārthika*) point of view held by some of his own earlier schoolmen, by reiterating his earlier stand boldly, that the negation of the Vyāvahārika-Prapañca (world) is, indeed, only in terms of a Svarūpeṇa niṣedha (negation in essence :- Just see ; —

नापि द्वितीयः—अबाध्यत्वरूपपारमार्थिकत्वस्य बाध्यत्वरूपमिथ्यात्वनिरूप्यत्वेन, अन्योन्याश्रयात् । पारमार्थिकत्वस्यापि स्वरूपेण निषेधे, प्रथमपक्षोक्तदोषापत्तिः अतः तस्यापि पारमार्थिकत्वाकारेण निषेधेऽनवस्था इति चेत्—

मैवम् — स्वरूपेणैव त्रैकालिकनिषेधस्य, प्रपञ्चे शुक्तिरूप्यादौ च अङ्गीकारात् ।

(Advaita Siddhi p. 5)

³ अबाध्यत्वरूपपारमार्थिकत्वस्य बाध्यत्वरूपमिथ्यात्वनिरूप्यत्वेन, अन्योन्याश्रयात् रूपवत् तदपारमार्थिकत्वस्यापि अपरोक्षप्रतीत्यन्यथानुरक्तत्वाधीकालेवर्तमानतया, निषेधायोगात् च ॥ पारमार्थिकत्वस्य पारमार्थिकत्वेन निषेधे त्वनवस्था

(Nym. p. 37)

The external world and its experience cannot be proved to be "merely Vyāvahārika and therefore *mithyā*, without a fore-knowledge of the noumenal (its counter position) and the latter cannot be known as *abādhyā* or uncontradictable without a knowledge of the contradictable. Neither is this capable of being known and established independently of the other. The only way out of this stalemate is to accept frankly that the *niṣedha* is a negation of the suchness of the negated : *Svarūpenaiva niṣedhaḥ*. The acceptance of *Svarūpaniṣedha* as such would reduce the world to a nullity. That would be the Nemesis of *Mithyātva*,

If thinking men and women of the present scientific age would have none of such a Nemesis, the Hobson's, choice left to them, says Vyāsatiṛtha, is to accept gracefully that Brahman is eternal in the sense of existing at all times, without change, modification, development or disintegration, while the world of sense-experience has an indubitable existence within its own time-limit, subject to change and modification and is therefore *anitya* (not eternal or unchanging). The contrast and contrariety between Brahman and the world is only in respect of their *Nityatva* and *Anityatva* and not on the basis of the *satyatva* (reality) of the one and the *mithyātva* of the other:

Evam ca Brahma Kālatraye' pi Sat. Viyadādi, rūpyādi ca kadācid eva, iti nityatvānityatvābhyām eva vaiṣamyam. Na tu satyatva-mithyātvābhyām.

(Nym. p. 39)

This should satisfy all level-headed persons - be they laymen or "philosophers". 'Bhaktas' or 'Vedantins' — as some choose to call them !

Third Definition of Falsity

The third definition of Mithyātvā is *that which is open to be set aside only by knowledge as such (jñānatvena jñānanivartya)*. This is applied to the phenomenal world, which the Advaita considers to be a product of beginningless nescience.

The *Nyn* finds this definition to be open to the flaws of over-pervasion, underpervasion and so on, of the probans, in the inference of Mithyātvā. The destruction of a jar in the past by natural causes is *not* due to knowledge (*jñānanivartya*). The misapprehension of the white conch-shell as yellow thro' jaundiced eye is *not* removed by knowledge, as such, but by knowledge free from visual disease. Our experience does *not* bear out that the illusory silver is actually *destroyed* by the knowledge of the shell, its substratum. It attests that there was a *real ignorance* of the shell, that we were under an error, which shows that both the ignorance and the illusion were as real, as the substratum (the shell) itself. Hence, the definition of *Jñānatvena jñānanivartya* is overpervasive as it includes cases of destruction of real entities like ignorance of the presence of the shell and its misapprehension.

The reality of the svarūpa of illusory cognition as such, notwithstanding the sublatable of the object (*viśaya*) is not inadmissible. For, it is conceded in the Advaita school that tho' pain and the sufferings of life are unreal, they are cognised by the Sākṣī, which is real, as it shares in the nature of Brahman the transcendental reality and consciousness.

Even if the definition is modified so as to include under the general term 'knowledge' all forms or types pervaded by knowledge as such and falling within the category of 'knowledge' (*jñānatva-vyāpyadharmā*) there would still be overpervasion of the probans in the case of earlier impressions (*samskāras*) stored up in the mind (obliterated from memory and now recalled). Further, it is admitted in the Advaita school that in the state of Jīvanmukti even after Ajnāna, the root cause of Samsāra, is liquidated by knowledge of the truth (*tattvajñāna*) the residual impressions of Avidyā continue to exist, for the time being, till the body falls off finally. These impressions (*samskāras*) are said to be destroyed by the *samskāras* of the true knowledge and not by the true knowledge itself¹. This gives rise to *avyāpti* (underpervasion) of the probans. It cannot also be argued that these *samskāras* get destroyed by the destruction of the material cause of Ajnāna itself, in as much as the superimposition of Ajnāna (the cause of world appearance) is conceived as *anādi* (without a beginning) and as such the Ajnāna cannot have a material cause (*upādāna*).

To get over these difficulties, the *Advaitasiddhi* explains the definition of Mithyātva viz. Jñāna-nivartyatvam given by the ancients, in a different way - as *Jñanaprayukta-avasthiti-sāmānyavirahapratigṛhitam*. It consists in being the counter-positive of a generic absence of existence (*avasthiti-sāmānya*) of the product of Nescience, caused by true knowledge. Such existence is of two kinds — existence in one's own form (*svarūpeṇa*) as an effect and another in its causal form. This distinction helps it to side-step the difficulty of inconclusiveness of the probans raised in respect of the destruction of the jar by natural causes. Tho the jar as such, is destroyed by a blow, it subsists in its casual state till the dawn of Monistic consciousness which liquidates the causal state root

¹ अज्ञानस्यैव अज्ञानसंस्कारस्याज्ञानत्वाभावेनज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वानुपपत्तेः

(Vijayindra Tirtha, Nym. Āmoda p. 37)

and branch, along with Avidyā, the parent of all phenomenal appearances.²

In his discussion of the third definition of Mithyātvā as *Jñānatvena jñānanivartitvam*, further modified by the author of the *Advaitasiddhi* as *Jñānaprayukta-avisthitisāmānyavirahapratiyogitvam*, the author of the *Tarangīnī* adverts to the position taken by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, earlier, that the *niṣedha* accepted by him is in terms of *svarūperanīṣedha* and observes that in the light of this plain speaking of the *Advaitasiddhi*, the negation of the *Tuccha* and the *Pratibhāsika* would be indistinguishable from each other - so much so that it would be meaningless to single out one of them as *jñānaprayukta* for *Jñānanivartitvatvam* would naturally presuppose the existence of some *svarūpa* of the thing to be negated. If such a *svarūpa* of the thing to be negated is conceded, its negation can only result in nullity :

शुद्धितरजतादेश्च (अपरोक्षप्रतीत्यन्यथानुपपत्त्या प्रतिभास काले) अवास्थित्यंगीकारे, स्वरूपेणैव निषेध इति त्वदभ्युगत-पक्षे, रूप्यादेरत्यन्तासत्त्वस्यावादितत्वेन, रूप्याद्यभावोऽपि शशविषाणाद्यभाव इव ज्ञानाप्रयुक्त इति दृष्टान्तस्य साध्य-विकलत्वमेव । पक्षे बाधश्च ।

Dr. Narain has *not* attempted to reply to this moot - point of Criticism in the *Tarangīnī* against the third definition of Mithyātvā.

ज्ञानप्रयुक्तावस्थितिसामान्यविरहप्रतियोगित्वं हि, ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वम् । अवस्थितिश्च द्वेधा, - स्वरूपेण कारणात्मनाच । सत्कार्यदाभ्युपगमात् । तथाच चटस्य मुद्गरप्रहारादिना स्वरूपेणावस्थितिविरहेऽपि कारणात्मनावस्थिति विरहाभावात् ब्रह्मज्ञानप्रयुक्त एव सः ॥

(Advaitasiddhi p. 8)

Fourth Definition of Mithyāṭva

The fourth definition of Mithyāṭva associated with the name of Citsukha is - *Svāntābhāvasamānādhikaraṇa eva pratiyamānatvam*. It means being counterpositive of an absolute negation located in its own substrate. To explain—the cloth which is perceived as subsisting in the woven threads is *not real*, in as much as its existence elsewhere than in the threads wherein it is perceived is impossible. At the same time, we cannot confer any reality on it, in its locus, as it is only a particular arrangement of the threads and nothing more. This is the corollary from the Advaita thesis of the falsity of change (*vikāramithyātvam*) drawn from the Vācārambhāṇa Śruti. (For M's. interpretation of the Śruti see my *PM* p. 247).

The above definition is more or less similar to the first one and stands refuted by its refutation. Vyāsātīrtha observes therefore that if the absolute negation contemplated here is to be regarded as truly real (*tātvika*), the principle of Monism would be thrown to the winds. On the other hand, if it is regarded as purely Prātibhāsika, the Realist has no objection. If it is Vyāvahārika, and as such liable to Bādha the counterpositive of such an absolute negation (viz. the world) which the Advaitin does not place in the category of the Prātibhāsika, must necessarily be placed in the category of the Pāramārthika (*truly real*).

Further, if the absolute negation here is understood as an utter negation of suchness of the thing (*svarūpeṇa niṣedha*) - as Madhusūdana Sarasvatī has held - it would reduce the counterpositive to an utter non-existence (*atyanta-asat*), instead

of distinguishing it from the *Asat* and glorifying it as a *tertium quid* (*mi-hyā*).

Where the threads and the cloth are in conjunction at a given place, it would be impossible to think of their non-existence. If such non-existence is possible, the threads could not be regarded as the *material out of which the cloth is made*.

The *Advaitasiddhi* rejoins that such coexistence of the counterpositive and its absolute negation in the same locus is possible in space and time on the analogy of the coexistence of the antecedent - non-existence (*prāgabhāva*) in the locus of the absolute negation. The Mithyātva-anumāna and the Śrutis also furnish evidence of such coexistence.

The *Tarangī* rebuts the above contentions. It says that the coexistence in the same locus, of the counterpositive and its *absolute* negation, if it is a negation in terms of the suchness of the counterpositive (*Svarāpeṇa niṣedha*) with reference to all the three periods of time, as contended by the author of the *Advaitasiddhi*, (as we have already seen) it would cut at the root of all opposition between the affirmation of existence and negation of existence of anything in the world, - for such a thesis is being put forward by the Advaitin in respect of everything that exists, in what he is pleased to call the Vyāvahārika reality. For, it must be borne in mind that the doctrine of Mithyātva is applied and is applicable, in the Advaitin's view to the entire Vyāvahārika world in which we live, move and have our being¹

On the same analogy, the Monistic and the Dualistic standpoints should be equally acceptable to the Monist - in which case he could not maintain with any consistency of thought that the Monistic wisdom sublates the Dualistic one. The contention that the Mithyātvanumāna and the Śrutis

endorse the coexistence in the same locus, of the counterpositive and its absolute negation is also untenable, as the Inference will stand aborted by the very conflict between the counterpositive and its absolute negation. The Śrutis are open to other interpretations. The other explanation that the coexistence of the counterpositive with its own absolute negation in the same locus is valid *from the point of view of different orders of reality (viśamasattākatva)* of the two is obviously *premature* as the doctrine of different orders of reality *is yet unborn!* The opposition between *bhāva* and *abhāva*, on the other hand, is well-established in experience and needs no elaborate proof of inference or the like.

—:O:—

¹ Yet, Śamkara himself in his refutation of the Saptabhaṅginyāya of the Jainas rejects the coexistence of Sattva and Asattva in a given *dharmi* at the same time :
Na hyekasmin dharmiṇi yugapat sadasattvādiviruddhadharmasamāveśaḥ sambhavati, śitoṣṇavat.

(S. BSB, II.2.33). See also Chap IV.

The Fifth Definition

The fifth definition of Falsity is given as : *Sadviviktatvam*-something different from reality or existence. This is further to be qualified by the adjunct of while being other than *Asat*" (*asadbhinnatve sati*), to avoid overpervasion in respect of the absolute non-being, as explained by the *Advaitasiddhi*.

Analysing this concept in terms of three possible ways of interpretation, *Vvāsatīrtha* queries if it means that 'Sat' stands for something that participates in the genus of existence (*sattājātimat*) in the accepted terminology of Indian Logic, which would contradistinguish it from what is *mithyā*; or whether it means uncontradictability (*abādhyatvam*); or "Brahman" as such. As objects in the empirical world also participate in the genus of *Sattā* (while *not* being "*asat*") this definition would extend to the *Mithyāprapañca* also. To define 'Sat' as "Brahman" does not carry the Advaitin any far. For, 'Sadviviktatvam' in that case, would only serve to differentiate the world (which is, admittedly, *not* "*atyanta-asat*" in the opinion of the Advaitin also) from "Brahman", - which is readily acceptable to the Realist, so long as Brahman is left undefined in a manner hostile to the Dvaitin's conception of it. The Reality of Brahman is not in conflict with the reality of the world, which depends for its subsistence and functioning on Brahman. Being devoid of sentience and blissfulness, the world is "non-Brahman". Thus the definition of *Sadviviktatvam* as a distinction of the world from "Brahman" is tantamount to reaffirming what is already well-established and is agreeable to the Realist.

The *Advaitasiddhi* therefore tries to overcome these objections by proposing a *new definition* of Sattvam (or *Sat*). To be “*Sat*” is to be established by *Pramāṇa* (means of proof) unassociated with any defects. Thereby *Mithyatva* is established (as in respect of dream-phenomena) as something which is *other than* what is established by *Pramāṇa*,

But the phrase “*Pramāṇasiddhatvam*” is synonymous and concomitant with uncontradictability. To forestall over-pervasion of the definition of *Sadvivikatvam* in respect of the attributeless Brahman and “*Asat*”, it is qualified by the adjunct “*provided*” it is presented to cognition *as existing sattvena pratiyamānatvam*). For, neither the attributeless Brahman nor ‘*Asat*’ is ever capable of being presented in any substrate, in any cognition in terms of existence (*Sattva-prakāreṇa prativivikāyatvam*)¹ .

Clever and resourceful as it is, the above justification of the definition of *Sadvivikatvam*, by *Madhusūdana Sarasvatī* is found to be unsatisfactory by the author of the *Taraṅgiṇī* on the following grounds :

Tho’ ‘speaking in broad terms, the *Advaita* system recognises the experience of bliss or happiness as established by *Pramāṇa* to be ‘*sat*’, material objects established by perception or other *Pramāṇas* are ‘*not*’ recognised to be ‘*Sat*’. This exposes the definition of ‘*Sat*’ (as *Pramāṇasiddhatam*)

¹ प्रमाणसिद्धत्वमेव सत्त्वम् । प्रमाणत्वं च दोषासहकृतज्ञानकरणत्वं; तेन स्वप्नादिवत् प्रमाणसिद्धभिन्नत्वेन मिथ्यात्वं सिद्धयति । प्रमाणसिद्धत्वं च ब्रह्माध्यत्वव्याप्यमिति अन्यतः । ब्रह्माध्यात्मनि निर्धर्मकब्रह्मणि च अतिव्याप्ति-वारणाय सत्त्वेन प्रतीयमानत्वविशेषणं देयम् । तयोः सत्त्वप्रकारकप्रतीति-विषयत्वाभावात् ।

to Avyāpti (under-pervasion of the probans). The first definition of 'Pramāṇasiddhatvam' advanced by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī as what is concomitant with uncontradictability (*pramāṇasiddhatvam ca abādhyatvavyāpyam iti anyad eva*) is not decisive, because the Advaita-Brahman, tho' not amenable to Pramāṇa—because it is 'avedya' as an *object* of knowledge, is yet accepted as 'uncontradicted' (*abādhyam*),—while at the same time the world of experience, tho' established by all the three Pramāṇas, is deemed to be open to contradiction (*bādhyam*). Here Madhusūdana's logic does not seem to be impeccable.

Vyāsātīrtha therefore concludes his critique of Falsity by summing up and pinpointing the vulnerable points in the five definitions examined by him.

अनिर्वाच्येऽप्रसिद्धादिः प्रतीते प्रतिषेधता ।
 स्वाश्रयेऽत्यन्तविरहः सद्विलक्षणता तथा ॥
 इति पक्षत्रयेऽत्यन्तासत्त्वं स्यादनिवारितम् ।
 धीनाश्च त्वे त्वनित्यत्वमेव स्यान्न मृषात्मता ॥

Before concluding, he clarifies that tho' shell-silver (*sukti-rajata*), snake-in-the-rope (*rajjusarpa*) and such others figuring in our illusions *are* indeed unreal (*mithyā*) and to that extent, it is obligatory on the part of the Realist also to *define* the nature of "Mithyātvam", still it should *not* be thought that it is unfair for him to bombard the Advaitin alone with so many questions about the nature of *Mithyātvam*.

There is no room for a *tu quoque* for the Advaitin here, as by "Mithyā", as applied to *suktirajata* and other illusory objects, the Realist understands by the term absolute non-being (*atyanta-asat*) *within the context of the illusory experiences*.²

2. अन्यथात्वमसत्तत्वात् भ्रान्तावेव प्रतीयते

सत्त्वस्यासत् एवं हि स्वीकार्येव प्रतीयता ।

(AV.)

This is a very important point. For an exposition of Madhva's Abhinava-Anyathākhyāti see my *Philosophy of Madhvācārya* Chap. XXI.

But to avoid being misunderstood, the Realist would prefer *not* to use the term “*mithyā*”, which camouflages the real state of affairs and prefers to use the plain and unmistakable term “*Asat*” to designate the silver-in-shell appearing *in the illusion*, relying on the verdict of the correcting cognition *asad eva rajatam pratyabhāt*. The possibility of the presentation of what is totally non-existent *as existent in our illusions* has been discussed and proved to the hilt by Madhva and Jayatīrtha in their works such as *Mithyātyānumānakhaṇḍana*, the *AV* and the *Nyāyasudhā* and by Vyāsatiṛtha in the *Nym* itself, while expounding the Realists theory of Error known as ‘Abhinava-Anyathākhyāi’ or Svābhimata-Anyathākhyāti, as Vyāsatiṛtha refers to it (i. 64).

The *Turangīni* winds up the discussion of Mithyātva in a humorous vein saying with a pun on *Pancatvam* which also means ‘death’ :—

मिथ्यात्वपक्षाः पञ्चत्वं प्रापिताः पूर्वपक्षिभिः ।

दूरं निरस्तास्ते तर्करिति संश्रुण्वामहे ॥

The Status of Falsity - True or False

Vyāsātīrtha next raises the question of the onto - epistemo-logical status of this falsity, predicated of the world - whether it is true or false in itself, whatever may be the definition of Falsity.

This is not an idle question. For, if the world's Mithyātvam is true and uncontradictable, the principle of Monism would be at stake. It cannot be held that though uncontradicted there is no danger to the principle of Monism, as this falsity or negation of the world itself is not something *other than Brahman*, but is one with it and non-different from Brahman, the only reality (Brahmasvarūpam or "*Brahmamātram*").¹ In that case, the difficulty will be that Mithyātva, being conceivable only in relation to the world of name and form, time and space (*prapañcopādhika*) and as its true nature is yet to be ascertained during the state of world - appearance, it cannot be one with the *Suddha - Brahman* whose nature as the ever-self-shining intelligence (*svaprakāśacinmātram*) is always self-evident and un-obscured. If then, Mithyātva which is of the nature of absolute negation of the world for all time should be one with the ever-self-shining *One Reality*, there will be no possibility of the illusory appearance of the world, at any time or place, to bother the heads of Philosophers to explain it or explain it away.²

1. प्रपञ्चनिषेधाधिकरणीभूतब्रह्माभिन्नत्वात्

निषेधस्य तात्त्विकत्वेऽपि नाद्वैतहानिकरत्वम् ।

(A-Siddhi)

2. प्रपञ्चभ्रमाधिष्ठानब्रह्मस्फुरणस्यावश्यकतया

ब्रह्माभिन्ननिषेधस्यापि प्रकाशे, प्रपञ्चभ्रमासंभवात् ।

(Tg. p. 146)

It cannot be contended that the merest shining forth (*sphurapaṃ*) of the Śuddha - Brahman as the substrate of the superimposition of the world - appearance in its bare aspect of "this" or "thisness", does not include the shining forth of the other aspect of the absolute negation. For as the absolute negation is by hypothesis non-different from the Śuddha Brahman which is an undifferented, aspectless unity all over, there is no internal *mechanism in the constitution of Brahman* conceived as "*Nirviśeṣa*" all through, to account for the shining forth of *one aspect* (of thisness alone) and the non-shining forth of the *other aspect* of absolute negation of the world. If there is any such internal dynamics or mechanism in Brahman, it will cease to be "*Nirviśeṣa*" and turn out to be "*Sa-Viśeṣa*", which is unpalatable to the Monist. ³ This disposes of the explanation attempted by the *Laghucandrikā* to get over the difficulty. ⁴

On the other hand, if Mithyatva is *other than* Brahman and contradictable, the Realist wins his point that the world is *not* *mithyā*, but quite true and that the belief that the Advaita Śrutis are truth-declaring (*tattvāvedaka*) is unfounded.

Nor can Mithyatva, which is of the nature of absolute negation of any second entity in addition to Brahman (*dvitīyā-bhāva*), be viewed as an accidental adjunct (*upalakṣaṇa*) falling outside the nature of Śuddha-Brahman, but qualifying it, for the nonce from *outside its being*, like the crow perching on the roof of Devadatta's house, serving as a mark of identification and recognition to mark it off from other houses, to help the casual inquirer.

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3. न चेदंत्वाधिष्ठानप्रकाशेऽपि, प्रपञ्चनिषेधत्वादिना न प्रकाशत इति वाच्यम् । तव मते, प्रपञ्चनिषेधत्वादेरपि ब्रह्ममात्रत्वात् । अन्यथा, निषिन्नेषत्वहानिप्रसंगात् ।

(Tg. p. 146)

4. For details See Dr. K. Narain *Op. cit.* pp. 34-35.

The difficulty is that Mithyātva cannot operate as an *upalakṣaṇa* of B. The function of an *upalakṣaṇa* is to make the unknown known or the insufficiently known better known. But the Suddha-Cit of B. has to be already known as the substrate (*adhiṣṭhāna*) before any superimposition can be made on it. As this Ciamātram is ever-shining as the substrate of all superimposition of Avidyā, which causes the world-illusion, and as it is also the witness of Ajnāna, there seems to be no room for regarding the *Cinmātram* as the *Upalakṣya* and *Prapañcābhāva* or its mithyātva as the *upalakṣaṇa* in making the Brahman known.

Here, the Advaitin argues - Any property of a false entity must be equally false. The falsity of the illusory silver does not make the silver true. Where the subject in question is itself a myth any property predicated or denied of it and its opposite must be equally mythical. The absence of darkness of skin of the barren woman's son does not make him fairskinned. The negation of the dream elephant subsequently in the same dream does not make the dream elephant real!

Vyāsatiṛtha says the difficulty about Mithyātva cannot be so easily dismissed. For, according to the Monist; Mithyātva is counterpositivity to an absolute negation for all time, in a given substratum. But unlike other properties such as color or taste, counterpositivity to an absolute negation does not necessarily presuppose the actual existence of the counterpositive. To be the counterpositive of an absolute negation is merely to be the referent in respect of such knowledge as would enable one to form an idea of such a negation¹. The non-existence of the property in the absence of the subject

1. अभावज्ञानोपयोगिज्ञानविषयताभावस्य प्रतियोगित्वात् ।

applies only to cases where the subject has actual existence in time and space. But falsity or *Mithyātvā* as defined by the Advaitin, is hostile to the actual existence of the subject, as we have seen. If the erroneous silver seen in the illusion and its contradiction are both false, it would be meaningless to talk of the one being contradicted by the other. The analogy of the barren woman's son is *irrelevant*, as the *Vandhyasputra* is a myth—(*tuccha*) having no *svarūpa* of his own,—unlike the *mithyābhūta* which, according to the Advaitin, has the nature (*svarūpa*) of being *asad-vilakṣaṇa*. The *absence* of the dream elephant is not contradicted in the waking state and it (the absence) must therefore be true. Being perceived in a dream is not a sufficient ground of falsity, as the *Ātman* too is perceived in the dream as the percipient.

However, the Advaitin has been pleased to bestow a higher grade of reality on 'empirical' things in space and time as "Vyāvahārika - satya". What contradicts the *Vyāvahārika-satya* must, in fairness, belong to a still higher order of reality, if it should have the power to do so. Even though the shell-silver (*śukṭirūpya*) is *prātibhāsika*, its stultification and *mithyātvam* has been admitted to be '*tāttvika*' by the Advaitin. Surely, what contradicts the empirical, if there is any such experience, must be entitled to a better deal than the barren woman's son! The world of our consolidated experience is certified to be real by flawless perception and other *Pramāṇas*, including the *Śruti* and the *Sākṣi*. The creation and dissolution of the world in an orderly way have been expounded in the *Śrutis* themselves. If the *mithyātvā* of the *Prātibhāsika* silver were purely *Vyāvahārika*, instead of being *tāttvika*, it would be equally open to stultification and such stultification of its *Vyāvahārikatva* would make it "*tāttvika*". For the same reason, the world and its *mithyātvā* cannot both of them be "*Vyāvahārika*". The plea that both the world and its *Mithyātvā* are of the same order of reality (*samānasattāka*) because they are subject to contradiction by

one and the same *Brahmajñāna*, put forward by the *Advaita-siddhi*⁴ is like counting the chicken before they are hatched. For, it is *yet to be established* that the world is *Brahmajñāna-bādhya* (sublated by knowledge of Brahman). That depends on the world being shown to be *mithyā*; for according to the Advaitin what is *mithyā* is *jñānabādhya*. But the question whether the world is really *Mithyā* or *Jñānabādhya* is *still being debated*. It is *still sub judice*.

For reasons already stated, it is as difficult for the Advaitin to equate the world's *mithyā* with *Brahmasvarūpa*, as to treat it as 'Vyāvahārika—i.e. to say 'bādhya'! (sublatable). There is thus no smooth sailing for him either way :

मिथ्यात्वं यद्यबाध्यं स्यात्सद्वैतमतक्षतिः ।

मिथ्यात्वं यदि बाध्यं स्यात् जगत्सत्यत्वमापतेत् ॥

The author of the *Advaitasiddhi* tries to wriggle out of this predicament saying *in the end*, that even though the *Vyāvahārika-satyatva* (empirical reality) of the world is *taken away* by its 'Vyāvahārika-Mithyā⁵ its *imaginary reality* (*kālpika-satyatva*) is *left untouched* (intact).⁶

A Daniel come to judgment! At long last, we are here brought face to face with the naked truth of the matter that in

4. एकबाधकबाध्यत्वं च समसत्ताकत्वे प्रयोजकम्
अस्ति च प्रपञ्चतन्मिथ्यात्वयोरेकब्रह्मज्ञानबाध्यत्वम् ।

(A. Siddhi. p. 10)

Dr. Narain has discreetly avoided discussing this problem)

5. व्यावहारिकमिथ्यात्वेन व्यावहारिकसत्त्वापहारेऽपि काल्पनिक
सत्यत्वानपहारात् ।

(A Siddhi. p. 10.

Advaita philosophy, the high-sounding phrases “Vyavahārika-satya” “empirical reality” applied to the world is a euphemism for *what exists only in your imagination* and nothing more. That being so, one is forced to agree with Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's appraisal of the Buddhist's position and extend it to the Advaitin :

सत्या चेत्संवृतिः केयं मूषा चेत्सत्यता कथम् ?

सत्यत्वं न च सामान्यं मूषार्थपरमार्थयोः ।

वञ्चनार्थमुपत्यासो लालावक्त्रासवादिवत् ॥



Grounds of Mithyāta (Falsity)

(I) DṚŚYATVAM (PERCEPTIBILITY)

The Advaita school has adduced *dṛśyatva* (perceptibility), *Jaḍatva* (insentience) and *paricchinna* (being limited by space, time and other entities) as the grounds of falsity of the world. These are examined by Vyāsātīrtha.

To begin with – the ground of *dṛśyatva* is a leaf borrowed from the Buddhist camp, which holds that all percepts are false.

स्तंभादिप्रत्ययो मिथ्या प्रत्ययत्वात्तथा हि यः ।

प्रत्ययः स मृषा दृष्टः स्वप्नादिप्रत्ययो यथा ॥

While there may be some justification for the Buddhist to hold such a view as knowledge to him is intrinsically *invalid* and validity is thro' external grounds, the Advaitin, who claims that validity is intrinsic to knowledge and that invalidity alone is made out extrinsically :

अतोऽवबोधकत्वेन दुष्टकारणवर्जनात् ।

अबाधाच्च प्रमाणत्वं वस्तुन्यक्षादिवत् श्रुतेः ।

(Suresvara, *Bṛhadāraṇyakavārtika* 241)

has the least justification to make perceptibility of objects the ground of their falsity.

Analysing the concept of *Dṛśyatva* according to the Advaitin, Vyāsātīrtha reviews the possible ways in which it

can be and has been defined : viz. (1) being reachable through a *Vṛtti* (*vṛttivyāpyatva*). *Vṛtti* is the mechanism by which the mind-stuff (*antaḥkaraṇam*) constituted of light (*aiśvarya*) emerging through the sense organs pervades the object and assumes its form. The consciousness reflected in this *antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti* is known as the cognising consciousness. (*pramātreccaitanya*) It draws aside the veil of *Avidyā* (nescience) which has been surrounding the object, which exposes the substrate-consciousness (*adhiṣṭhāna-caitanya*) underlying the object. Thereupon, the consciousness reflected in the *Vṛtti* and surmounting it and the substrate-consciousness (of the object) execute a flash-like identity which results in the judgment - "I have known the object". The fusion of these two forms of consciousness is called *phala* (the net result or fruition). The bare mental *vṛtti* is by itself incapable of destroying the nescience of the object. Pure consciousness too, being only the bare witness of *Ajñāna*, cannot remove it. But when the same consciousness penetrates the *Vṛtti* and takes hold of it, it is competent to remove the veil of ignorance in which the object has been shrouded so far. Such is the outline of the Advaita theory of Perception.

Now, *drśyatva* may be defined as (i) *Vṛttivyāpyatva*, (ii) *Phalavyāpyatva* or (iii) as partaking of some common element of both, which enables the object to be spoken of as coming to be "known", sometimes, and somehow, — negatively, as in the case of *dharma* and *adharma* and other super-sensibles¹ or as in the case of a pot, positively, or (iv) being dependent for any reference to be made to the object as being immediately known on a consciousness which is other than and different from the object itself and falling outside its being, or else (v) as being devoid of self-luminosity (*a-svaprakāśa*).

DRŚYATVA AS VṚTTIVYĀPYATVA

None of these alternatives is sustainable. For the *Ātman* or B. too is knowable thro' *Vṛtti* (psychosis engendered by

1. *Sarvam vastu jñātatayā ajñātatayā vā Sākṣivīṣayaḥ*

study and reflection upon the Vedantic texts relating to B. enjoined in the Śruti. Otherwise, these texts and their injunctions to study them for the attainment of B². would be futile. Teachers and pupils engaged in the arduous investigation of B. with the aid of these texts would otherwise have to lapse into silence and ignorance respectively.

Further, Vedantic injunctions like Brahmajijñāsā (*kartavyā*), the use of the objective genitive form of the compound "Brahmajijñāsā and texts like - "the seeker shall know Him and gain understanding". "It is *perceived* by seasoned intellect, by the subtle-minded" and the gerundial suffix (*ṭavya*) in "Atman should be seen (*draṣṭavyaḥ*). will all of them lose their force, otherwise.

'Dṛśyatva', grammatically speaking, is '*dṛgviśayatva*'. If Ātmic or Brahmic consciousness (*dṛk*) as Caitanya is, in essence, unknowable, the premise of *dṛśyatva* itself as *dṛgviśaya* in regard to the Mithyātva of the world cannot be sustained. For, without knowledge of the qualifying adjunct (*dṛk*—Cit) itself *dṛśyatva* (perceptibility) cannot be defined as *dṛgviśayatva* (objectivity to *dṛk*). For, there cannot be any knowledge of the qualified entity (*viśiṣṭajñāna*) without a knowledge of the qualifying element which, in this case, happens to be *cit* or *dṛk*. Veteran Advaitins like Maṇḍana Miśra have clearly held that it is the B. which is actually known in and thro' all percepts :

Sarvapratyayavedye ca Brahmarūpe vyavasthite

(*Brahmasiddhi*)

It cannot be pleaded that it is only the qualified B. (*Viśiṣṭa*) and *not* the Suddha-B or the Absolute that is revealed in all

2. *Tattvamasyādivākyaṁārthasamyagdhijñanmātrataḥ
Avidyāśramayo mokṣas sā Samsāra udāhṛtaḥ.*

acts and forms of perception (in Advaita). For the second half of Maṇḍana's verse

Prapñcasya pravilayaḥ śabdena praṭipādyate

speaks of this B. as the ground of liquidation (*pravilaya*) of the universe, when Tattvajñāna is attained thro' the Śrutis. This leaves no room for doubt that it is one and the same Absolute B. which is the subject of the first and the second halves of the verse, in keeping with continuity of thought. That apart, in Advaita thought there is no dissolving of the world (*pravilaya*) in the Saguṇa-B, but only in the Śuddha-B.

It is no use pleading also that the said *dṛśyatva* is only Vyāvahārika in respect of the objectivity of the world and that such a kind of *dṛśyatva* is *not* admissible in respect of the Śuddha-B., which is a Pāramārthika - real. The Advaitin has *yet to establish* the distinction between the Vyāvahārika and the Pāramārthika reals and cannot take it for granted, *as he is wont to do*, with his sleight of hands.

Nor can it be submitted that the Śuddha-B. is *not* *dṛśya*' and only the qualified-B. can be so and that all such texts as have been cited by the Realist have reference only to the qualified, as otherwise there will be a clash between them and others like *yat tad adreśyam* (*Mund. Up.* i.6) which speak of B. 's unperceivability.

Unless the Śuddha-B. is knowable and perceivable with the aid of the Śāstras its very existence cannot be predicated. The contention that it is established by self-evidence is going to be refuted. It is also inherently illogical. If self-establishedness is known by its own self-competence, it will conflict with the Advaitic dictum of *karṣṇakarmavirodha* that the subject cannot be the object of its own act of knowing.³ As no attribute or property can be posited or negated of an unknown or un-knowable something, it would be absolutely necessary

3. See page 53 for foot Note 3

that the Suddha-B. should be open to knowledge thro' *some Pramāṇa*, even in order to rule out that it is perceivable.

It cannot be that as the Suddha is self-established on the authority of its own self-luminosity, its knowability thro' *śabdavṛtti* is negated in such texts as *Yat tad adreśyam* (*Mund- Up.* i.6). There can be no self-luminosity of B. unless it is admitted that its Suddhatva is manifested in the Vṛtti produced by the Śabda-Pramāṇa to the effect that the Suddha-B. is Svaprakāśa (self-luminous). In the absence of any such knowledge its being merely open to a general awareness (*sphuraṇam*), irrespective of whether such awareness is by itself or thro' some other source, it may as well be the determinant of its falsity, instead of its factual existence, as in the case of the shell-silver. Such texts as proclaim B.'s existence - *sad eva idamagra āsit, satyam Brahma* could all be explained away, otherwise, as predicating that it is just *other than* non-being, just as the Advaitin would explain the texts which proclaim the real existence of the world of experience as conveying that it is merely '*Asadvilakṣaṇa*' (other than total non-being) without at the same time having a real being of its own - a sort of *tertium quid* between Sat and Asat.

This should make it clear that texts like *Yat tad adreśyam* which speak of B. as "*adreśyam*" (unperceivable) have to be understood in the sense that it cannot be perceived or known *in all the fulness and vastness of its being, powers and majesty*.⁴

3. See S.'s *Bhāṣya* on *Brh. Up.* 1.4.9-10.

4: *Read - Acintyāḥ khalu ye bhīvā na tāmstarkṇa yojayet.*

Prakṛtibhyaḥ Param yacca tad acintyasaya vaibhavam (Mbh)

Paśyantopi na paśyanti Mero rūpam vipaścitaḥ (Skānda)

Also ; Passage from Ralph Cudworth quoted in *Chamber's Encyclopaedia of English Literature* Vol. 1. (1894), p. 373 cited in my *Philosophy of Madhvācārya* p. 342.

If nothing of B. is *at all* knowable, perceivable (thro' proper means) it cannot be referred to by the relative pronoun 'that' (*yat tat*) in the Śruti (*Yat tad adreśyam*) for the pronoun has to fall back upon its own actual antecedent referent.

Śuddha-Brahman Open to Perception in Caramavṛtti

Advaita system speaks of a final psychosis of Brahman known as CARAMA Śākṣātkāra thro' Caramavṛtti produced by intensive study and meditation on the import of the Mahāvākyas. It would thus be necessary to accept that Śuddha-Brahman is the direct object of perception thro' Caramavṛtti. As Śuddha-Brahman is an undisputed reality, the probans of perceptibility (*drśyatva*) would be incompetent to establish Mithyātva.

To get over the difficulty. *A - Siddhi* has taken great pains to contend that it is *not* the Śuddha Brahman or the pure Ātman which is the object of the Caramavṛtti but only the Śuddha-Brahman or the pure Ātman *conditioned by the Caramavṛtti*, which is the object of the Vṛtti. As the conditioned Brahman or Ātman is a composite entity (*Viśiṣṭa*), it is "Mithyā" in status. Hence, there is no fear of overpervasion of the probans of *drśyatva* in the Śuddha-Brahman. Vyāsātīrtha rightly points out that as the probans of *drśyatva* and its probandum of Mithyātva are governed by a clear relation of Anvaya and Vyatireka from the Advaita angle, it would be incumbent on his part to admit the knowability of the Śuddha-Brahman in order to mark off the nature of the unconditioned Brahman or Ātman from the conditioned.

Moreover, with regard to Caramavṛtti itself, it has to be clarified if in its operation it reveals itself to knowledge along with the Brahman or Ātman as its qualifying adjunct (*viśeṣaṇa*). If it does, it will have to be treated as Svaprakāśa (self-shining) which the Advaitin cannot concede on account of *Karīrkar-mavirodha*, in the same act of knowledge.

Secondly, as the composite knowledge (*Viśiṣṭajñāna*) of the conditioned self or Brahman would itself be "Mithyā" (as what is conditioned is Mithyā (in Advaita), the knowledge produced by the Caramavṛtti would be an invalid one (*apramā*)

If the Caramavṛtti excludes itself from presentation as a qualifying adjunct of Brahman or Ātman, the result would be that the pure unconditioned Ātman or B. would have to be recognized as the sole object of the Caramavṛtti. As the unconditioned Brahman or Ātman is *real* and *not Mithyā*, it would falsify the logical concomitance between *dṛśyatva* and *Mithyātva* on which the whole *Mithyātvanumāna* of the universe rests in Advaita thought.

If the object of Vedānta texts in the last analysis of Caramavṛtti is only the Viśiṣṭa-Brahman which is only projected by *Avidyā* and hence "Kalpita", they would all become "A-tattvāvedaka" (not truth declaring). But *Śruti*s like *Tarati śokam ātmavid*" tell us that it is only the true knowledge of the *Suddha-B.* that is the means of attaining release.

Moreover, if there is no possibility of ever knowing the *Suddha-B.* as such, there will be no prospect of the liquidation of original Ignorance (*mūla-avidyā*), which can only be brought about by the knowledge of the Absolute. For, knowledge can sublate ignorance only when both of them pertain to the same object. If then *Brahmajñāna* has no identifiable object (*viśaya*) obscured by Ignorance for its removal, it can hardly deserve the title of "Jñāna".

Here, the Advaitin interposes — It is not the fact of a thing's objectivity to knowledge that determines its power to liquidate ignorance about its true nature, but that of the knowledge being of or conforming to the same contours of the object (*tadākāratva*). *Śruti*s which enjoin on the aspirant the acquisition of knowledge of B. (*Ātmā draṣṭavyaḥ*) mean the

same thing and *not* B.'s actually becoming the object of any knowledge as such (*Tadviṣayatva*).

Vyāsātīrtha following Madhva and Jayatīrtha⁵ brings up three different alternatives in which the phrase *Tadākāratvam* can possibly be understood as : (i) having Ātman itself as its form ; or (ii) being of identical form with Ātman's (*tadākara eva ākārah yasya*) or (iii) having a form resembling that of the Ātman.

None of these alternatives can help the Advaitin. "Form" abides in what possess it. The form of Ātman cannot possibly abide in the *Vṛtti*. The second alternative would place the Advaitin in the company of the Buddhist's Sākāra-vāda. Further, the *Vṛtti* which is *insentient*, void of blissfulness and finite in form cannot be of the form of pure intelligence, bliss and unlimitedness which constitute the essential form of B. If identity of form is to be in virtue of both possessing the same *esse* (*sattā*) it would lead to a travesty. The possibility of a single *esse* running thro' several entities is *not* acceptable to the Realist. We have therefore to accept that correspondence of form of knowledge and its object can not mean anything more than having the given object for its content - *Tadviṣayatam eva tadākāratvam*, in all cases, uniformly. Otherwise, there will be two different criteria of correspondence between knowledge and its object, as between a jar and its cognition and knowledge of Ātman and its function in removing the ignorance shrouding it.

Drśyatva As Phalavyāpyatva

Nor can *drśyatva* be explained as *phalavyāpyatva* or being pervaded by the consciousness reflected in the *Vṛtti* and that consciousness again manifesting the substrate-consciousness, leading to the uncovering of the object, That would not cover

5. See M.'s *Tdy Nahi jñānājñeyayor ekākārāṇā* and its C. by Jayatīrtha.

the case of knowledge of the past and future entities with which there is no possibility of Vṛtti, followed by the reflection of consciousness therein etc., so much so that this cumbersome theory is inadequate to cover all cases of perception of present and past things. If it is said that the perception of the present and future entities too are amenable to Vṛtti as and when they actually exist, the underpervasion of this theory would still be there in respect of knowledge of eternally super-sensuous entities. They cannot be brought under Yogi-pratyakṣa as Citsukha himself has ruled out the possibility.⁷

Moreover, the theory of Phalavyāpyatvam is of no use in explaining perception of happiness, the perception of Avidyā, antahkarāṇa and its properties and the shell-silver in the illustration of the *mithyā*. These are all internal reals and the shell-silver too according to Advaita is a product at the time of the illusion and is therefore *not* "out there" to be reached by the Vṛtti, as in the case of the jar.

The third alternative of dṛśyatva in its general aspect must necessarily be present in B. which is open to Vṛttivyāpyatva in its specific aspect - as the generic is included in the specific.

It is not also of much avail to the Advaitin to argue that even tho' it may be contended that Avidyā, happiness and so forth may be held to be intuitively known by the *Sākṣi-Cit*, either in terms of being known or not known, pure consciousness cannot be perceived in any of the other ways and must therefore be looked upon as *not dṛgviśaya* at any time and that therefore the probans of *dṛśyatva* in the *Mithyātvānumāna*.

7. Citsukhena Na ca Yogipratyakṣagamyatayā aparokṣatvam Dharmādīnām Codanaikapramāṇayogyatvāt (Citsukhi, p. 10. N. S. Press. Edn.) (quoted in *Nym*)
The *A-Siddhi* does not meet this point.

is inapplicable to B. For, in respect of eternally supersensible things, it is possible to speak of them as being known thro' Sākṣipratyakṣa, tho' *not* in the normal way of sense-perception. In the same way, the Suddha-B. hitherto unknown does certainly admit of being described and now known and expressed thro' the Vedānta vākyas. In this sense, then, the probans of *dyṣīatva* is bound to be everpervasive of B.

If B. *is never* to become the object of our knowledge (*cidviśaya*) the fontal ignorance about it which is the source of transmigration from time immemorial would remain interminable for ever³ and the statement of Śrutis like *Tarati śokam Ātmavid* will have to remain a dead letter for all time.

The fifth alternative of perceivability as *Svavyavahāre svātīrīktasamvidapekṣāviśayatvam* is also inadmissible. For, there *is* dependence on knowledge of something other than one's own being in describing and knowing B. as self-luminous, one without a second, which presuppose prior knowledge of an "other" element. Without knowing about the non-existence of a second real or what self-luminosity is, how is it possible to know B. *as it is* in truth?

The answer that Ātman or B. needs such media only in respect of qualified judgments (*viśiṣṭavyavahāra*) about it and that there is no such dependence in referring to its pure Being (*svārūpasattā*) is *not* conclusive, as the same thing can be said of the reference to the bare existence of a jar as well. It may be contended that there is no room for a reference to the bare being of a jar, without involving its association with space and time; while on the contrary there is such a reference to the bare being of the self in itself in deep sleep *Suṣupti*.

8 वृत्तिमात्रस्याज्ञानानिवर्तकतया, घटादाविव ब्रह्मणोऽपि अज्ञाननिवृत्त्यर्थं वृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्यरूपज्ञानस्यावश्यकत्वेन फलव्याप्यत्वात् (Tg.p.41)

This is wishful thinking, for even in deep sleep, the existence of the self is presented only in relation to the happy repose of sleep during the period, in terms of 'I have slept happily so long. "It cannot be rejoined against this, that tho' in a qualified judgment about the self there is dependence on some other fact of knowledge, there is no such dependence in respect of the substantive element of the self *as such* (*Viśeṣyāmātram*) because of its self-luminosity whereas, the jar, even in respect of the substantive aspect (*Viśeṣyāmśa*) is dependent on something else. In that case, the adjunct of "invariable" (*niyati*) qualifying the dependence on some other fact of knowledge, in the definition of the fifth alternative would be superfluous.

If the Advaitin agrees to drop the adjunct from the definition, there will be overpervasion in the bare essence of the *Suddha-B.* For, as the *Suddha-B.* lies shrouded by Nescience from the very beginning of *Samsāra*, the true knowledge of its bare existence has necessarily to depend on a *Vṛtti* produced by meditation on the *Vedānta* texts, for revealing the till then unknown element of its pure unqualified essence, capable of shattering the veil of beginningless *Ajnāna*.

We have already made it clear that there is no knowledge of *B.* other than thro' the *Vṛtti* and such a *vṛtti* is a *sine qua non* of *Ātman* or *B.* in the *Caramavṛtti* ⁹. There is no case for accepting a '*samvid*' (cognition) other than the *Vṛtti* obtained thro' *Vedāntic* texts. The *Caitanya* reflected in the *Vṛtti* and the *Caitanya* of the substrate being manifested by it are all far-fetched and gratuitous assumptions.

The *A-Siddhi* has tried its best to establish that the *Caramavṛtti* produced by the *Vedānta* texts does *not* have the *Suddha-B.* for its objective content, but only *B.* suffused by

9 तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यार्थसम्यग्धीजन्ममात्रतः
अविद्यास्तमयो मोक्षः सा संसार उदाहृतः ।

the *Vṛtti*. This is diametrically opposed to the declared position of earlier authorities like the author of the *Saṅkṣepaśāriraka* who roundly asserts that the Nirviśeṣa (Śuddha) Cit, is indeed both the *content* and the *locus* of Mūla-Ajnāna.

आश्रयत्वविषयत्वभागिनी निर्विशेषचितिरेव केवला ।

Saṅkṣepaśāriraka

The *A-Śiddhi* has also argued that the proposition “the Śuddha-B. is self-luminous” has to be interpreted thro’ Lakṣaṇā (secondary signification) as predicating that *what is non-self-luminous is pervaded by non-Śuddhatva*. Thus, by elimination of non-śuddhatva, the Śuddha comes to be self-luminous just as the negation of difference leads to the acceptance of oneness.¹⁰ It argues further that it cannot be objected that it would be futile to formulate that Śuddha-B. is Svaprakāśa (self-luminous) in so many words, if the Śuddha as such is *not* conveyed to knowledge either expressly or by lakṣaṇā (in the *Caramavṛtti*). It explains that the proposition “Śuddha-B. is Svaprakāśa” can be taken to be meaningful if we go by the ultimate sense. Likewise, the other propositions “Śuddha-B. is *not* perceivable” (*Śuddham na dṛśyam*) “Śuddham is *not* Mithyā” convey nothing more. However, in the final analysis it comes to this that the Śuddha-B stands divested of all *dṛśyatva* and *mithyātva*¹¹.

10 शुद्धस्य वृत्तिविषयत्वं न संभवति अतः ‘शुद्धं स्वप्रकाशम्’ इति वाक्यस्य लक्षण्या ‘अशुद्धं अस्वप्रकाशत्वव्याप्तम्’ इत्यर्थः । तथाच, अशुद्धत्वव्याप्त्या शुद्धे स्वप्रकाशता पर्यवस्यति, यथा भेदनिर्वेधेनाभिन्नत्वम् ।

11 न च शुद्धपदेनाभिधया लक्षणया वा शुद्धाप्रकाशे तत्प्रयोगवैयर्थ्यमिति वाच्यम् । पर्यवसितार्थमादाय सार्थक्योपपत्तेः । एवं च शुद्धं न दृश्यं न मिथ्या’ इत्यस्यापि, अशुद्धत्वं दृश्यत्वमिथ्यात्वयोः व्यापकं इत्येतत्परत्वेन, शुद्धे दृश्यत्वमिथ्यात्वयोः व्यतिरेकः पर्यवस्यति (*A-Siddhi* p.13)

This sort of touching the nose in Prāpāyama by taking the right hand around the head anti-clockwise is often characteristic of Advaita. see the *A-Siddhi's* explanation of the Śruti "*Asad eva idam āgra āsit*" cited earlier. (p. 26)

But it serves no useful purpose. The *Nym-Taranginī* rightly points out in reply that the self-luminosity of Śuddha-B. cannot be established by merely establishing a pervaded-pervader relation (*vyāpyavyāpakabhāva*) between *non-svaprakāśatva* and *non-Śuddhatva*. It can only be established by knowing that *Aśuddhatva* which is pervaded by *A-svaprakāśatva* stands *banished from the Śuddha-B.* In order then to realise that there is the contrary of the pervader in the Śuddha-B. it has *got to be known as such.* The *Vyāpyavyāpakabhāva* between what is *non-svaprakāśa* and what is *non-śuddha* can be known *for certain* only after one realises that there is complete concomitance between *Śuddhatva* and *Svaprakāśatva* (in the *Śuddha-B.*). Thus, the attempt to by-pass the categorical sense of the proposition that *Śuddha B* is *Svaprakāśa* is an exercise in futility — like the cartman driving his bullock-cart by devious routes all night to avoid the toll-naka (octroi) - only to find himself at day-break just in front of the tollgate !

The *Siddhi* also takes the help of Citsukha's definition of *Svaprakāśatva* as *Avedyatve sati aparokṣavyavahārayogyatvam* in embellishing its definition of *Dṛśyatva*.

Avedyatve sati Aparokṣavyavahārayogyatābhāva-drśyatvam api hetuḥ. (A-Siddhi)

The objection to such a definition that such *Aparokṣavyavahārayogyatvam* as is qualified by the absence of *Phalavyāpyatva* is also present in *Avidyā*, *antaḥkaraṇa* and shell-silver with the result that the probans will be open to question is sought to be met by contending that the phrase - *Apāroṣavyavahāra-*

yogyatva is intended to convey such fitness (*yogyatva*) as is embodied in the *Vṛtti* which is competent to liquidate *Ajnāna*. As such competence is *not* found in the *Vṛtti* pertaining to *Avidyā*, *antaḥkaraṇa* and shell-silver, they are taken to be intuited by the *Sākṣī*, by way of *Aparokṣavyavahāra*.

Refuting these arguments of the *A-Siddhi*, the *Taraṅgiṇī* raises a very pertinent question whether the said "Aparokṣatva" in the definition of *Svaprakāśatva* is something different from *Brahman* or is the same as *Brahmasvarūpa*, which is the sole "Aparokṣa" (*Bṛh. Up. iii, 4, 1*) according to *Sankara's* interpretation¹².

If *Aparokṣatva* is *different* from *B.* it could hardly be said to be *not* dependent on any other source for its immediacy, as according to *Advaita*, whatever is *different from B.* is the outcome of *Avidyā* and is dependent on it for its origination. If, on the other hand, *Aparokṣatva* itself is *Brahman*, the final form of the probans of *Asvaprakāśatva* will be what partakes of the nature of a difference whose counterpositiveness (*pratiyogitva*) is limited (*avacchinna*) by *Brahman* (*Brahmāvacchinna-pratiyogitākabhedasvarūpam*). It is obvious that the counterpositive of such a difference is *B.* the *Svaprakāśa* (or the "Aparokṣa") *Yat sākṣād aparokṣād Brahma ...* That being so, the *Aparokṣatva* which is now being considered as *Brahman* itself cannot be the delimiting adjunct of the counterpositiveness constituting the probans (*hetu.*) because the counterpositive of the difference and its differentiating adjunct of counterpositiveness cannot be one and the same. The *Pratiyogi* and the *Pratiyogitāvachedaka* cannot be the same. There would thus be no possibility of any such difference in objects like a jar. The probans of *Dṛśyatva* defined as "A-svaprakāśatvam" as embellished by the *A-Siddhi* will thus be open to the defect of *Asiddhi* (inconclusiveness).

12. For *Madhva's* interpretation of the text "Yat sākṣād Aparokṣam Brahma" (*Bṛh. Up*) See my *Brhadāraṇyaka Up. From Madhva's Perspective* (DVSR Foundation, Bangalore, 1988).

If, in order to overcome this difficulty, "Aparokṣatvam" is *not* regarded as the delimiting adjunct of the counter-positiveness in question and only difference from "Aparokṣatva" is regarded as the probans, it would *still* entail a "Vyabhicāra" (discrepancy) of the probans in Brahman on account of its being "empirically different" and having "vyāvahārikabheda" from the Jivatman, who is also "Aparokṣasvarūpa."

If, in order to get over this difficulty, an *imagined difference (kalptabhedha)* is assumed to exist between Brahman and its Aparokṣatva to enable the latter to be treated as the delimiting adjunct of the counterpositiveness of the difference in question, there would *still* be "Vyabhicāra" of the *hetu*, in respect of "Avidyānivṛtti" (the liquidation of Fonta Ignorance (*Mālavīdyā*)). For, Avidyānivṛtti has been held by eminent Doctors of Advaita-Vedānta like Vimuktātman to belong to a fifth order of predication (*pañcamaparakāra*) ¹³ as being neither Sat, Asat, Sadasat, nor Anirvacanīya (Sadasad-vilakṣaṇa) :

न सन्नासन्न सदसत् नानिर्वाच्योऽपि तत्क्षयः ।

यक्षानुरूपो बलिरित्याचार्याः प्रत्यपीपदन् ॥

(Ānandabodha)

Thus, being "Sadasadvilakṣaṇa-Vilakṣaṇa", Avidyānivṛtti cannot be "Mithyā" (as the Mithyā) is the same as Sadasad-vilakṣaṇa.) As the first order of predication as "Sat" is alone. Brahma-svarūpa, "Avidyānivṛtti" which belongs to the fifth order is necessarily A-Svaprakāśa. But it is nevertheless *not* "Mithyā"

13 सदसत्-सदसत्-अनिर्वचनीय प्रकारेभ्यो हि अन्यप्रकारेणैव ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य निवृत्तिः युक्ता यक्षानुरूपोहि बलिः

(Iṣṭasiddhi, i, 4, pp. 85 - 86)

14 अविद्यानिवृत्तेः पञ्चमप्रकारत्वाभ्युपगमपक्षे, तत्र व्यभिचारवारणाय तत्र ब्रह्मज्ञानकासत्तिरित्वं हेतुविशेषणं देयम् ।

(A-Siddhi p. 13)

as it is not "*Sadasadvilakṣaṇa*" (as the "Mithyā" is, by definition "*Sadasadvilakṣaṇa*". Thus 'the' Vyāpti that whatever is "A-Svapraṁkāśa") is "Mithyā" (like the jar) breaks down here and exposes the probans of the Mithyātvānumāna to a patent fallacy of "asiddhi".

The *A-Siddhi* makes a last bid to plug the loophole by proposing to qualify the probans of "asvapraṁkāśatva" with the adjunct of "subject to its being present at the time of the pendency of "Ajñāna" (*Ajñānakālavṛttitve sati*) - explaining that as Avidyānivṛtti does not and cannot co-exist when Ajñāna is still enduring and hence the Vyabhicāra of the *hetu* is averted.

The *Taraṅginī* rejoins that the difficulty cannot be so easily solved by introducing the adjunct of "*Ajñānakālavṛttitve sati*". For, Advaita philosophy accepts a state of "Jīvan-mukti" for some souls after the termination of their Ajñāna. It also admits that these Jīvanmuktas retain their physical bodies and sense organs and react suitably to their stimuli in the daily commerce of their lives (*śarīrayātrā*). This means that in the state of Jīvanmukti which is subsequent to Avidyānivṛtti, there is "Asvapraṁkāśatva" side by side with the absence of "Mithyātva" (the predicate in the Mithyātvānumāna) This opens the door again to the fallacy of Vyabhicāra of the probans.

The difficulty cannot be averted by the Advaitin's accepting the theory of individual Salvation (*Pratyekamukti*) of different jñānins at different times, who in the state of their Jīvanmukti continue to react to the needs of their daily routine and carry on their spiritual responsibilities of teaching, meditation and spiritual advice,, after their Avidyānivṛtti. For, as "Avidyā" is by hypothesis "*nir*" *amśa*" (aspectless) and *nir-avayava* (partless, there is no question of a small residual "part" of it lingering in the lives of the Jīvanmuktas.

On the other hand, if the Advaitin should accept the theory of simultaneous release of all souls at the same time (*yugapat-sarvamukti*) it would clash with the view of other eminent traditional Doctors of Advaita philosophy that the doctrine of Yugapat-Sarvamukti at the same time is *not* authentic (*prāmāṇika*) as the Śrutis speak only of the release of Jñānins like Vāmadeva. Either way, the stalemate continues, so far as Avidyānivṛtti is concerned with the Jñānin's state of Jīvanmukti.

Dr. Narain has refrained from entering into the intricacies of the problem raised by the Taraṅgī's rebuttal of the Advaitasiddhi's rejoinder in regard to the Vyabhicāra of the probans of "asvaprakāśatva".

—:o—o:—

JADATVAHETU - BHANGAH

The second reason of falsity is Jaḍatva, insentientcy or materiality. The world of experience is the *lakṣya* and it is material and wanting in sentientcy.

But what is 'being insentient'? It cannot be either *not* being a knower or knowledge or non-self-luminous or being non-Ātman or what is acceptable to the Realist as insentient.

1) Jaḍatva cannot be equated with not being a knower, because in the Advaita system knowership (*jñātrtva*) belongs to the ego (*ahamārtha*) which is *not* the true unsullied Ātman. So then, according to the Māyāvādin, the true self is *not* a knower and as such it will have to forfeit 'Ātmatva'. There is no use pleading that the pure self *has* knowership *attributed to it thro'* Avidyā and hence can be considered to be a knower. Overpervasion of a probans cannot be warded off by appealing to the presence of an imagined (*kalpita*) reason (of Jñātrtva) in the pure self. We often say 'I the fair-skinned know this'-attributing knowership to the body, where the apposition between the body and the ego stands for their identity. If the probans of now knowership is to be qualified by the adjunct of not being of the same order of reality of Pāramārthikatva as that of the pure self, such a condition is *not* present in the mind-stuff (*antaḥkāraṇa*) which tho' accepted as Jñātr (knower) in Advaita, is still of a lower order of reality - being but Vyāvahārika (phenomenal). Moreover, knowership of the same order of reality cannot be predicated of pure consciousness also.

2) Nor can Jaḍatva be equated with being other than knowledge (*a-jñānavan*). The Vṛttiñāna of Advaita tho' material in essence is still styled as 'Jñāna'. If it is contended

that the term Jñāna used in respect of Vṛttijñāna is only in its instrumental sense, while the Jñānatva intended in the premise is knowledge in its substantive and radical sense (*Bhāvārtha*),¹ then as a mediate vṛtti like memory cannot remove the ignorance of the object seen long back and permit its being referred to as 'known' - which establishes that such mediate cognitions arising from past impressions are only the outcome of knowledge in its radical sense. This suffices to establish that there can be no outcome of "knowledge" without knowing in its radical sense. Otherwise, judgments-regarding the experience of knowledge of supersensible things like Dharma and Adharma cannot be explained.

Here Dr. K. Narain refers to the view of Kashmiraka Sadānanda in his *Advaita-Brahma-Siddhi* about two kinds of obstructing veils and concludes that "it is therefore clear that neither the operation of the Vṛttis nor the reflection of the Cit in these vṛttis is an essential condition for cognition, whether mediate or immediate and that *Vyāsatīrtha has committed an error* when he criticised that the idea of materiality as A-jñānatva would jeopardise the concept that Vṛtti is knowledge. As a matter of fact by "knowledge" is meant in "Vedānta" that which illumines the object and this definition does not stand in the way of comprehending the character of A-jñāna(tva) so as to be a satisfactory interpretation of materiality" (*Op. cit.* p. 263 *Italics mine*).

This excursion of Dr. Narain into the *Advaita Brahma Siddhi* of Sadānanda is not at all called for, as it was not in existence in Vyāsatīrtha's time and he could not be expected to take note of his views, or be accused of having "*committed an error*" in not taking note of its theory. This is borne out by Sadānanda's references to the views of Nṛsiṃhāśrama and

¹ वृत्तिज्ञाने भागासिद्धेः । यदि च "सांख्य-वेदान्तिनां तु करण-व्युत्पत्त्या बुद्धिवृत्तिः ज्ञानं" इति विवरणोक्तेः वृत्तिरज्ञाप्तिः, तर्हि परोक्षवृत्त्या स्वविषये अज्ञाननिवृत्तिव्यवहारस्मृतयो न स्युः तासां ज्ञप्ति-कार्यत्वात्

Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, in his *Advaiṭa Brahma Siddhi*. There are passages in Nṛsiṃhāśrama's *Tattvaviveka** cited from the *Nym* and Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (1475-1550) the veteran Navya-Naiyāyika; is decidedly later than Vyāsātirtha (1460-1539). Hence, whatever may be the superior merits of Sadānanda's theory of Āvaraṇas and the dispensability of the Vṛtti and Phalavyāpyatva in perception, mediate or immediate, there is no point in blaming Vyāsātirtha for not having considered them. Madhusādana himself makes no reference to Sadānanda's theory and says that of the various definitions of Jajātva referred to by Vyāsātirtha all the rest but Phalavyāpyatva are sustainable. The passage extracted from the *Nym* in the footnote *ante* is ample evidence that Vyāsātirtha is aware of the Advaita position that Vṛtti is not "knowledge" strictly speaking and has also given a suitable answer to it. In the circumstances, the accusation against Vyāsātirtha that he has committed an error, is itself an error of judgment born of confusion of chronology.

Moreover, the probans of 'A-jñānatva' would turn 90 to be overpervasive of the Ātman. For, if Ātman is to be conceived as the essence of knowledge, it will have to be clarified if it has an objective content or has no such content. In the former case, it has to be specified whether this content is its own self or being, as such, or an "other". The former is not acceptable to the Monist for fear of *Svavṛttivirodha* (existing in and operating on oneself as subject and object in the same act) as pointed out earlier. As the Monist does not admit the existence of any other real, there will be no knowledge worth speaking of, in the state of freedom.

It cannot be argued, on the lines of Citsukha that tho' Ātman has no knowledge of its own being as the objective content of such a knowledge, it is open to knowledge in the

2. Written in 1558 AD. See my *HDSV*. p. 513.

sense of such knowledge as has the fitness to lead to a reference (*vyavahāra*) being made about its pure existence by way of direct awareness (*sphuraṇam*). Such awareness which is part of its own nature and essence is capable of facilitating a bare reference to be made about its existence and in that sense only it is spoken of as the content of such awareness (*avedyātve sati aparokṣavyavahārayogyatvam*).

This is not conclusive. The knowledge of a jar is also precisely of the same nature of being the objective content of the knowledge which gives rise to some reference being made about its existence. (*svavyavahārajanakatayā*). It cannot be said that in respect of the knowledge of the jar, it is transformation of the mind-stuff in the form of the object and/or the reflection of consciousness (*citpratīphalana*) that constitutes knowledge in respect of the jar. The spontaneous awareness of personal happiness as and when it is there (*jīataikasat*) and the cognition of the shell-silver in illusions could *not*, in that case, be regarded as the objective content of their knowledge as there is no room for the mind-stuff assuming the form of happiness or of the shell-silver, as a result of the sense organ going "out" to them. For, happiness and shell-silver being *internal* (reals) are not external objects to admit of sensory contact leading to the internal modification of the *antaḥkaraṇa*. But such an objective content in regard to knowledge cannot be barred in the case of the Ātman implicated in the so-called *Carama-vṛtti* of the Advaita. After all, it is the consciousness having the jar as its substrate manifested by the *Vṛtti* that is termed knowledge. Such a knowledge serves no other purpose than that of facilitating the reference to the jar as "now made known". So much so, there is practically no difference between the form of the knowledge in any of these cases. The only difference is that objects like the jar are the content of a knowledge which is other than the knowledge, *while consciousness has its own being as its objective content* (in self-awareness).

If Ātmic knowledge conceived as the very essence of Ātman is *contentless*, it cannot be designated as "knowledge". For, to be devoid of a content must be defined as having no reference to an objective content and not merely the non-existence of the object under reference at the time and place of reference, or as its absolute non-existence. It is thus the inseparable character of knowledge to have a content, past, present or future. Otherwise, in Mokṣa which is accepted as the *Summum bonum* of life, there will be no shining forth of the pure bliss of Ātman. *in Ātmic knowledge.*

If knowledge does not possess the power of illuminating its object, even the insentient jar can be said to have knowledge (of itself). Unless Jñāna is credited with an inherent capacity to illumine its object it cannot be distinguished from the insentient (jaḍa). A Jaḍa needs a Caitanya to illumine it. *If Caitanya needs the help of another Caitanya to illumine its own being to itself, it will be no better than a Jaḍa. How can we call it a 'cetana' or 'Caitanya', if it cannot illumine its own presence, if not of another Cetana or Jaḍa, even supposing with the Advaitin they do not exist!*

Similarly, there can be no Jñāna without reference to a "knower" - just as there can be no eating without some one who eats and there is something to eat. It cannot be held that because Ātman as the essence of knowledge is un-originated it can be said to be without an objective content for its *svarāpajnāna*. If so, a beginningless entity like antecedent non-existence (*prāgabdhāva*), the eternal class-essences (*jāti*), the beginningless distinction between Jīvas and Īśvara, the existence of *anādi-Vedas* and Jñāna itself — should all be conceivable without a counterpositive, the existence of particulars, relation to the *dharmi* and *pratiyogi* of the said distinction, an original speaker of the words of the Vedas and their expressed sense and a base (*āśraya*) and a content (*viśaya*), respectively. Otherwise, the proposition "Brahman exists" can not be formulated, on the basis of the verbal termination of (*tip*) *kartari lakārah*).

Moreover, knowledge of past entities and God's knowledge need not look up to an object in order to come into being or be spoken of as "knowledge".

That apart, if Ātman is pure knowledge without a specific objective content (whether it embraces the whole of finite reality or some particular entity which forms part of it) it can never be spoken of as "knowledge" as they are made known or conceived (*nirūpya*) thro' the medium of some objective content. It must therefore be axiomatically accepted that the intrinsic and inalienable character of knowledge is to be inconceivable without reference to some "knower" and a "known" which *can be its own self* so far as the self-luminous Ātman is concerned.

That apart, again, if Ātman is pure knowledge without a specific objective content, the question will arise if it is to be classed as a valid one or purely illusory. If it is valid knowledge, *Avidyā*, *Antahkaraṇa*, etc., which are intuited by it would turn out to be stern realities. It cannot be treated as illusory, as *Ātmajñāna* is *not generated by flaws (doṣajanya)* as illusions are. The question cannot be parried by merely saying that knowledge reflected in the *Vṛtti* of the mind-stuff is valid while that reflected in *Avidyāvṛtti* is illusory. This is no answer to the straight question as to the intrinsic character of knowledge *as such*. If "knowledge" can be without either of these characteristics it cannot be counted as knowledge *at all*.

'Jaḷatvam' as non-self-luminosity has already been refuted. In the same way, it cannot be equated with 'Anātmatva' or non-Ātmatva or what does not come under the genus of Ātmatva. For Ātman according to Advaita is only one and we cannot speak of the genus of Ātmatva so as to distinguish Jaḷatva as not pertaining to the genus of Ātmatva. Tho' the conditioned Ātman may be different and many in Advaita theory, they fall under the category of the illusory and cannot be taken into account.

Nor can Ātmatva be defined as "blissfulness" as contrasted with Jaḍatva. If worldly pleasures are also treated as identical with Ātmic bliss, as in Advaita³ and 'Jaḍatva' as absence of such bliss, the position would be untenable, as sensory pleasures have origination and as such are un-Ātmic. If they are still identical, with Ātma-svarūpa, they cannot admit of degrees and gradation as has been set forth in the Ānandavalli of the *Taitt. Up.* as interpreted by Śaṅkara.

That apart, being devoid of blissfulness is not necessarily the determinant of falsity.

Nor can Ātmatva be equated with egohood, and 'Jaḍatva' with its absence. For, the Ahamkāratattva which is equally Jaḍa partakes of the nature of egohood (in Advaita). Ātmatva as distinguished from egohood is also without the ahamtva and as such the definition of Jaḍatva as non-egohood will overlap the Ātman.

Nor can Jaḍatva be defined as what is contradicted, as that would be indistinguishable from the probandum of Mithyātva, as what is "Mithyā" is the same as being contradicted (*bādhya*). Nor can Jaḍatva be defined as what is accepted as "Jaḍa" by the Realist. For according to the Realist, Ātmatva is synonymous with Jñātṛtva (knowership) and 'Jaḍatva' is synonymous with "not being a knower".

This disposes of the stand taken by the author of the *Tattvasūddhi* that Jaḍatva is *acetanatva* or absence of sentiency. As Acetanatva is rendered as absence of Cetanatva and if Cetanatva is to be viewed as a genus there will be a plurality of Cetanas which is anathema to the Advaita.

Advaitasiddhi rejoins here that knowledge is not necessarily organically connected with a knowable or a knower. That is not its natural characteristic (*svābhāvika*), just as the *genus* (*jāti*) tho' made out with the help of 'particulars' can exist without them sometimes, by virtue of its possessing a higher degree of reality than the adjuncts which determine their relationship. Being organically connected with a knower and a knowable cannot be defined either in terms of being generated by the knowable or concomitant with it, either temporally or spatially. The first condition cannot be asserted of mediate knowledge or God's knowledge. Temporal concomitance cannot be affirmed of Jaḷas and Vyaktis. Their spatial concomitance is all the more unthinkable, as a rule. Nor can it be insisted that there is such concomitance in our direct sense-perceptions. We do not deny it. But Ātmic knowledge is *not* produced by the senses. It cannot be objected to this that if such Vyāpti is not conceded in respect of immediate knowledge, the perception of the *Anirvacanīya*-silver in perceptual illusion cannot be explained, as the illusory silver is held to be *generated then and there*. The cognition of the illusory silver has been identified by us as "*Anirvacanīya*" for this very reason that its immediacy cannot be traced to any other source.

If being organically related to a knower and a knowable is understood as being due to its being *produced* by the knower, it will not be true of God's knowledge. We shall soon be establishing the transcendental character of knowledge. If it is viewed as concomitance with the knower that is not a necessary condition for just as it can exist without being produced by the knower, it can also exist without inhering in a knower. As jñāna is not a quality or an activity, it cannot be inferred to be abiding in a substance. In the proposition "*Brahman exists*" (*asti brahma*) the verbal termination (*ti*) of the predicate does *not* signify agency in respect of existence as its existence is eternal. The termination *ti* in *as-it* is merely intended to make it conform to the grammatical requirement (*sādhuvārtha*).

In reply to the *Advaitasiddhi*, here, the *Tarāṅgī* points out that tho' the genus as such may endure in Pralaya without the particulars also existing side by side, it still remains oriented (*uparakta*) with the idea of its constituent particulars in the mind of God. So there is no problem here. It is not the Realist's contention that knowledge being inconceivable without an objective content is also necessarily either spatially or temporally concomitant with its object. According to him, it merely consists in the cognition being oriented by the idea of the object of a direct knowledge or inconceivable without being so oriented. It is in this sense knowledge of a negation (*abhāva*) or resemblance (*sādrśya*) presupposes the knowledge of their correlatives. The same holds good in respect of the Advaitin's thesis of Jīva-Brahma-Aikya which is inconceivable without reference to the correlates. But, for that reason it does *not* mean that Aikya is either generated by the Jīva or is temporally concomitant with Jivahood - which will not be true of the state of Mokṣa. Spatial concomitance of Aikya and Jivatva is hardly true here and now. If Jīva and B. are *not* the necessary correlates of their oneness, all the trouble taken to establish it would be love's labor lost.

Pāṇini has defined 'kartā' (the agent) in his *Kāraṇaprakaraṇa* as *Svatantraḥ kartā* - one possessing independence of agency in respect of the action initiated by him to achieve something or keep and develop something. It stands to reason that the Supreme Being as the One Independent Reality is competent and capable of realising all that it chooses to do fruitfully - as the author of creation, maintenance and dissolution of the world of matter and souls.⁴ When it is therefore possible for us to understand the verbal termination in the Śruti's pronouncement *Asti Brahma* (God exists), semantically

4. (*Paramārthataḥ Śāstradṛṣṭyā tu sarvatra Īśvarāpekṣatvam āpadyamānam na parāṇudyate* (S. B. S. B. ii, 2, 3).

also in a deep philosophical sense,⁵ it is hardly proper to treat the termination (*ti* in *asti*) as merely intended to abide by the formal rule of grammar that neither a grammatical base (*prakṛti*) nor a termination (*pratyaya*) should be used without the other.

The author of *A-Siddhi* has further contended that Brahmic or Ātmic knowledge is knowledge *pure and simple* falling *outside* the scope of both valid and invalid knowledge *like God's knowledge in the Nyāya school*.

He has argued that according to the Nyāya system God's knowledge cannot be brought under valid knowledge (*pramā*). As being eternal (*nitya*) it cannot be produced by specific factors of validity called *guṇas*. Nor can it be classed as invalid knowledge (*bhrama*) as it is *not* produced by flaws (*doṣa*). Similarly, what is known as Nirvikalpakajñāna or indeterminate knowledge, arising at the first blush of cognition in Nyāya philosophy,⁶ falls outside the scope of both valid and invalid knowledge, as it does not conform to the definition of *Pramā* or error as accepted by the Naiyāyikas. For *pramā* according to the Nyāya school is what cognises truly the given thing as possessed of modes by which it is qualified. (*tadvatitaprakāraḥ*). And Nirvikalpakajñāna as its very name shows is *niṣ-prakāra* not taking the modes into account). Erroneous knowledge is defined as the reverse of valid knowledge as *Tadabhāvati tatprakāratvam*. This also involves the

5. Cf. Madhva's rendering of *as-mi* as *Asti sarvadā asti iti meyam* and *Meyatve prakārapradarśanāya 'asti' śabdaḥ*, bringing out this truth in his gloss on M's Brh. Up. Bhāṣya ((1, 4, 10) by Rāghavendra. For further details see my *Brh. Up. from Madhva's Perspective* DVSR Foundation, Bangalore 1988).

6. Madhva philosophy does not accept the existence of any Nirvikalpakajñāna - at all. In this it differs vitally from Nyāya Realism.

comprehension of modes, tho' wrongly. Hence, Nirvikalpajñāna is outside the scope of both *Pramā* and *bhrama*.

Madhusūdana continues — we are however prepared to admit that all determinate knowledge produced by the senses and their contact with their objects falls under the category of one or the other of the two types of knowledge, the valid and the erroneous, depending on their contributory factors of *guṇa* or *doṣa*. But Ātmic knowledge, by its very nature is different from both. It is pure "knowledge" all the same.

In its reply to the above, the *Tarangiṇī* points out that Madhusūdana's assessment of the nature of Īśvarajñāna in Nyāya philosophy, as falling outside the scope of both *Pramā* and *Bhrama* is wrong. The Tārkika position is this. "*Pramā*ṭva" as such is *not* delimited by being produced by any *Guṇas* प्रमामात्रे नानुगतो गुणः as the author of *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (Gangeśa Upadhyāya) has categorically put it. This means that it is only each separate distinctive specimen of valid knowledge generated by appropriate means that is produced by relevant *guṇas*. But there is no single *Guṇa* (common to all *Pramās*) running thro' all of them and producing their validity embracing all the different types of valid knowledge such as *Pratyakṣa*, *anumiti* and *Śabda pramā*.⁷

Therefore God's knowlege, in spite of its *not* being produced at all or not produced by *Guṇas*, is entitled to be accepted as *Pramā* in the sense of not being produced by any flaws (*doṣa-ajanyetvena*). It cannot therefore be placed *outside the pale* of both valid and invalid knowledge, as Madhusūdana Sarasvati would have it. It is for this reason that the veteran Naiyāyika Udayanācārya has hailed that Īśvarajñāna is *Pratyakṣa-pramāṇam*, by reason of God being the abode (*āśraya*) of valid

knowledge, which is of the nature of eternal immediacy.⁸ And it is for this very reason that the *Maṇi* has held that the property of Prameyatva (of everything being knowable (*prameya*)) is a univocal affirmative - (*kevalānvayī*) like *abhidheyatvam* (*namability*) because all that is Prameya is open to God's immediate perception.

In regard to Nirvikalpakajñāna the Logicians have held that the definition of *Pramā* (as *Tadvati tatprakarakātvam*) though not applicable to Nirvikalpakajñāna is only a working definition conducive to forth-right unhesitating responsive activity for all pragmatic purposes, as Nirvikalpakajñāna is insufficient for such activity tho' it is valid enough in its own sense. The validity of Nirvikalpakajñāna as *Pramā* therefore consists in being a valid experience *Yathārtha-anubhavaḥ* in the primary sense of the term.

It is therefore the *A-Siddhi's* contention that *Īśvarajñāna* and *Nirvikalpakajñāna* are both outside the pale of *Pramā* (and *brahma*) that is opposed to *Pramāṇas* and is a piece of "logical arrogance"⁹.

The *A-Siddhi* has also contended that the relation between knowledge and its objects can only be a superimposed one and not intrinsic to it. Refuting this the *Tarangīnī* points out that were it so, the *Caramavṛtti* (final psychosis) in Advaita cannot have the *Suddhacaitanya* as the content of its revelation. It cannot be said that the relation of the knowledge in the form of the *Caramavṛtti* with the pure consciousness reflected in it is

8. अत एव नित्यसाक्षात्कारिप्रमाया आश्रयत्वेन ईश्वरज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणं इत्युक्तं उदयनाचार्यैः (Tg.)

9. To put it in the words of Dr. Narain, used elsewhere on p. 127 of his book.

also superimposed and not a real one. For, the reflection of pure *cit* in the *Caramavṛtti* will be absolutely necessary to terminate the Nescience about the *Śuddhacit* (screening it). It is *not* within the competence of the mere *Vṛtti* to remove such *original* nescience. Otherwise, one can dispense with the reflection of the *Cit* in the *antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti* (*phalavyūpyatva*) in the revelation of a jar or the like to perception and let the *antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti* itself account for the perception. If it is objected that any acceptance of the reflection of the *Cit* in the *Caramavṛtti* would make it *mithyā*, there is no other alternative for the Advaitin than to drop *phalavyūpyatva* as one of the grounds of *Mithyātva*. To make the relation between knowledge and its object of content merely superimposed (without being real) would fail to account for the knowledge of supersensible objects through mediate cognition, as the supersensible reals (*being supersensible*) cannot make themselves objects of any such superimpositions.



Paricchinnatva (Finitude)

The third reason by which the world's falsity is inferred by the Advaita school is its finitude. Vyāsātīrtha naturally asks whether the finitude is in terms of time, space and by the existence of other entities, besides. Circumscription by time and space (as will be shown presently) cannot be made out in respect of Time and Space. The Advaitin's Nescience which is considered to be the material cause of all pervasive Space and Time cannot be limited by space and time. Ajnāna as the veil (*āvaraṇa*) enveloping the all-pervasive Brahman as its object of obscuration must indeed be equally unlimited, which leaves us with more than one unlimited entity, so that the Advaita-Brahman is *not the one and only unlimited*. The shell-silver negated in its own substrate for all time by the Apperceiving Self (*Sākṣī*) cannot be limited by time and space, lest it should come back to life. The untraceable *Śruti Ākāśavat sarvagataśca Nityah* : () cited by Śaṅkara in his BSB. II. 3.4, describing B. as all-pervasive and eternal like '*Ākāśa*' ¹ confirms the eternal, all-pervasive character of *Ākāśa*" Texts like "Then the mortal become immortal" (*Katha* 2.3.15) "Sat alone existed in the beginning (*Chāṇ. up.* V 1. 2. 11) "Release is attained only after realising B." *There in the Beyond*, if everything were to be *Ātman* * (*Brah. Up.* ii.4.14) attest the unbounded character of Time and Space and their existence in the released state of the souls.

*Ākāśena Brahma sarvagatatva-nityatvābhyām upamimānā.
Ākāśasyāpi tau dharmanau sūcayati* (S. BSB- ii. 3, 4).

The Śruti "From that Ātman, Ākāśa was born" *Taitt. Up.* ii.1) has reference to the genesis of elemental Ākāśa (*bhūtākāśa*) and *not* to empty space (*Avyākṛtākāśa*)². The existence of two kinds of Ākāśa (*ākāśadvaitam*) has been authentically established by the Sutrakāra in the *Viyadadhi*. (B.S. ii.3. 1-7)³.

Space and Time must *ex hypothesi* be unbounded by themselves. If we deny this, there will be great logical difficulty in conceiving of a boundary to finite space and time. We shall have to recognise more time and further space beyond them - which will lead to a regression.

The very predication, "Here is no space" Now there is no time" will be self-contradictory. The limit sought to be imposed on Space and Time by circumscribing them within certain bounds of space and Time would lead to the conclusion

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2. The distinction made by M. between *Bhūtākāśa* and *Avyākṛtākāśa* is a remarkable advancement of thought in *Vedānta philosophy*, if we consider George Thibaut's comment in the Introduction to his Tr. of S.'s *BSB* that "Vedantins do not clearly distinguish between empty space and an exceedingly fine matter filling all space which, however attenuated, is yet one of the material elements and as such belongs to the same category as air, fire and water". (*SBE Series*, 38, Vol. II, p. 3, fn. 1). See my *BSPC*, Vol III. pp. 125 - 140)
 3. *Nym-Tg* points out that creation of *Avyākṛta-Ākāśa* (empty space) is mentally inconceivable. Texts like *Ākāśas Sambhūtaḥ* (*Taitt. Up.*) have therefore to be understood in a restricted sense of referring to *Bhūtākāśa*. The clear statement of the Śruti likening the eternal and all pervasiveness of B. to that of Ākāśa enables us to restrict the text of the *Taitt. Up.* to the genesis of elemental Ākāśa,

that B. exists at some place and time *where* and *when* there is no space or time, which would be unthinkable.

Time and Space cannot be negated in their own observed *loci*, by themselves as that would be self-contradictory. If to overcome this difficulty, some more time and space is to be assumed as the *loci* of such negation (*niṣedhopādhi*) it would only lead to the assumption of yet more time and space beyond them. If those too are similarly supposed to be limited somewhere and at some time, there will be an endless regression. Hence Space and Time must be recognised as *Aparicchinna* (unbounded) with the obvious consequence that the probans of finitude in favor of Mithyāṭva would be *asiddha* (not established).

Universal experience that space is everywhere, Time is there always and of "prior time" and so on proves that Space and Time are by nature, self-abiding and self-differentiating (*svanirvāhaka*), like knowability (*prameyatva*) which is a universal affirmative and knowable in its turn, as established by *Dharmigrāhakapramāṇa*.

If absolute negation of what is "Mithyā" in its perceived base is not unbounded by time and space, it would lead to the resurgence of the counter-positive.

Limitation by Space and Time, qualifying for Mithyāṭva cannot be the same as existence at one time and place, as that is not sufficient reason to argue that such things are open to negation for *all time*, as required by the concept of *Mithyāṭva* (in terms of *Svarūpeṇa traikālikaniṣedhapratiyogitvam*). A thing may exist at a given place and time, without being there at *all times* and places. Such inability of that thing is not a proof of its 'unreality' where and when it *does actually exist*.

Existence at a particular time and place (*ekakālikatvamātram*) cannot be construed as merely *appearing to be presented to*

cognition, as so existing. Such a presentation is common to the shell-silver also, which will not make it a "real" - like things actually in existence for a time and at a given place. If the qualifying adjunct "only" (*mātram*) in *ekakālādīmātrasattvam* should signify only its cognitive impression to that effect, without involving the thing's *actual* existence at the given time and place, such a position is not acceptable to the Realist — and a probans should be acceptable to both the parties. If being merely open to cognitive impression as existing at a given time and place is to be credited with 'Vyāvahārikasatya' it would not be true of the Prātibhāsika shell-silver, which, in spite of such amenability to figure in a cognitive *impression* as so existing, is not admitted to be Vyāvahārika. If the existence of given things in particular time and place is to be made the sole ground of their non-existence at other times or places, it will be highly preposterous and opposed to Pramāṇas. On the contrary, the *existence* of things at a given time and place may understandably justify presumption of their existence *subsequently also* at another time and place—normally speaking. Otherwise, being void of all characteristics (*nir dharmaka*), Brahman too cannot be said to exist in a Pāramārthika sense or aspect.

The contention of Vācaspati Miśra that what is existent (*Sat*) must necessarily be existent everywhere and at all time and conversely what is sometimes and somewhere non-existent must necessarily be non-existent everywhere and at all times can only be treated as a slavish repetition of a 'Buddhist' stunt.

Some Advaita thinkers have defined limitation by space as being in contact with all tangible entities (*sarvamūrtiadravya samyogitvam*) or not being the substrate of *Paramamahatparimāṇa*. The Advaitic Brahman which is "Asanga" unattached would easily come under this definition. Limitation by other entities (*vastutah pariccheda*) is the same as being different from another. As no real difference is admitted in Advaita, there can be no limitedness so far as the world itself is concerned. It will be

established in its proper context that the insulation of B. from all that is *anyta*, *jaḍa*, *antavat* must be admitted to be real, in which case B. too will come under the category of the *Paricchinna*.

Maṇḍana Miśra has formulated a syllogism to prove that objects like *jas* are all superimposed on the Sat or existential¹ aspect of Brahman, because they are all presented to knowledge as shot thro' with the aspect of 'being' (*sat*) - e.g. the jar *exists*, the cow *exists* - *San ghaṭaḥ san paṭaḥ*) like the reflected images of the moon in the waves of a pond. The analogy is inappropriate. We make predications like 'the maimed cow' the hornless cow' (*Khaṇḍo gauḥ Muṇḍo gauḥ*). But the limbs put in apposition are not superimposed on cowness. Particulars may be shot thro' with the idea of the genus, according to some thinkers. But the particulars (*vyakti*) in themselves are not superimposed on it.

It is impossible to agree with the Advaitin's farfetched theory that a formless Brahman, lying obscured and covered by beginningless nescience and is further held to be knowable only thro' Śāstra is brought within the range of every-body's visual perception (*aparokṣa*) in the day to day perceptions of *ghaṭaḥ san, paṭaḥ san*.

As a matter of fact, that 'Sat' revealed in *San ghaṭaḥ* etc., is not Brahman but the existence pertaining to the particulars themselves connected with those judgments - just as in other judgments such as the jar is impermanent, the cloth is impermanent (*anitya*) the predications are adjudged to refer to the particulars themselves and not to B.

It cannot be argued that though intrinsically not open to perception, it is conceivable that B. is perceived in judgments like *San ghaṭaḥ, San paṭaḥ* just as the planet Rāhu is perceived as delimited by the Moon. By the same token, Ākāśa too as

delimited by the attribute of sound should be open to perception by the ear. The bluish hue of Rāhu, unperceivable due to vast distance from the earth comes to be lit up by its vicinity to the Moon's bright whiteness of light. There is no case for any Adhyāsa in any of these experiences.

Answering the objection raised by Vyāsātīrtha that particulars are *not* superimposed on the universals and that therefore such judgments as the jar exists, the cloth exists cannot be construed as establishing that *it is* the *isness* of B., the substrate of super-imposition of the jar, or the cloth that is exposed to perception there, in terms of the distinct, particularised, the author of the *Advaitasiddhi* goes to the extent of saying that he is not prepared to recognise the existence of any class-essence (*Jāti*) of cowness, horseness etc., abiding in the particulars of the class *per se* (*satsāmānya*). He explains further that even if such class-essences are admitted, there is no need to invest them with such general characteristic of manifesting the particulars. The pure *isness* (*satsāmānya*) of B. as qualified by the particulars can manifest the said class-essence, even as the particulars themselves can do so without participating in a common class-essence, on the basis of possessing similar adjuncts of cows possessing a dewlap etc.

Dismissing this explanation, the author of the *Tarangīnī* points out that there is no justification to reject the existence of class-essences (*Jāti*) running thro' various particulars of a class, to account for referring to them as particulars belonging to a given category. There is no need to replace it by the bare *isness* (*satsāmānya*) of B. The *Satsāmānya* of B. as qualified by the particulars cannot operate as the basis of reference to particular cows or others as participating in a class-essence, unless these particulars are themselves related to different species and act as qualifying adjuncts of the *Satsāmānya* (which is B.). There will be no point in saying that the acceptance of the class-essence is unnecessary. If the *sātsāmānya* is unrelated

to the class-essences according to the exigencies of reference. anything at random can be said to be manifested by the *satsāmānya*.

Rejecting the contention of Vyāsātīrtha that Ajnāna too in its turn will have to be invested with unlimited pervasion in space and time in order to be able to veil the all-pervading B. from the dawn of creation till the end of its disappearance (*āsamsāram*), Madhusūdana Sarasvatī argues that it is not B. in its essential aspect of pure being (*sad-ātmaka*) which is enveloped by beginningless Ajnāna (*Mūla-ajnāna*) but only by the power of that ignorance which is delimited by the particular object such as a pot or a pan (वटाचवच्छिन्नवस्तुज्ञान), so that there is no impediment to Brahman's shining forth after the removal of such particularised nescience thro' such perceptions, as *san ghaṭaḥ*, *san pataḥ*.

The *A-Siddhi* has also argued that there is no difficulty whatever in B.'s *isness* becoming perceivable thro' the visual organ in spite of B.'s being formless (*rūpādihīnam*). For, only objects open to perception by particular sense organs have to depend on their help. But the Advaita Brahman is grasped and is graspable by *all the sense organs*.

Rejecting these explanations, the *Tarangiṇī* points out that as B. has been proclaimed to be *by nature* unmanifested,^a in various Śrutis and Smṛtis, it cannot possibly be known thro' any of our material senses, — let alone the eye. As a matter of fact, even *Sattā* or *esse* of a given thing is known by

2. See : *Parastasmāttu bhāvo'nyo Avyakto vyaktāt-sanātanaḥ*) (Gitā viii, 20)

3. *Nārāyaṇaḥ Paro'vyaktāt* (Ś. GB. Introd)
Na cakṣuṣā paśyati kaścanainam (Kāṭha Up.iii.2.9.)
Na sandṛṣe tiṣṭhati rūpam asya (ii,3,9)

particular sense organs endowed with the requisite capacity to grasp it. Otherwise, if B.'s *sattā* can be perceived by the *indriyas*, there will be no need to make so much ado about *Paravidyā* by which alone B. is said to be knowable. (*Mund. Up.* i. 1. 4).

By making such a claim that B. is graspable by all our *indriyas* (*sarvendriyagrāhyam tu sadrūpīm brhma*) the author of *A-Siddhi* has practically knocked off the bottom of the promise of *perceivability* or *perceptibility* (*drśyatva*) as *drg viśayatva* in favor of the world's 'Mithyātva'. The counter-example of Time being perceived in spite of its being formless is also inappropriate as Time is perceived only by the Apperceiving self (*Sākṣi*).

Adverting to the other argument of the *A-Siddhi* that it is not the *Mūla-Ajnāna* that veils the B. from becoming manifest, but the separate *Ajnānas* whose power is delimited by particular entities (*ghaṭādyavacchinnaśaktyajñānam*) which is lifted after the operation of the *Vṛtti* so that the underlying *Caitanya* is revealed to visual perception in terms of *Ghaṭa san*, *paṭa san*, the *Taraṅgiṇi* shows its inadequacy. For it is admitted in Advaita that the existential aspect (*sadātmakatva*) of B. is *one*, absolutely indivisible, indistinguishable essence with B. (*akhaṇḍaika-rasa*) with its blissful aspect. Consequently, when the veil of nescience over the existential aspect of B. is rent asunder, by the *Vṛtti*, both the existential aspect, and the blissful aspect should shine forth in full blaze after the *Ghaṭādyavacchinnaśaktyajñāna* has been lifted. *But such is not the case.*

This confirms the point raised by Vyāsātīrtha that it is the *Mūla-ajñāna* that is obscuring the true nature of B. in all its aspects and that in order to be able to do so it must also be deemed to be equally coextensive (*aparicchinna*) with B. in time and space and that there is no escaping this conclusion - which

if accepted, would lead to the *asiddhi* (non-establishedness) of the probans of *Paricchinnatva*, in respect of *Ajnāna* itself.*

Another argument of the *A-Siddhi* is that our sense organs are needed only in the perception of substances. B. is not a substance. The *Tarangiṇī* rejects this by pointing out that the *Srutis* which speak of B. as not gross or subtle, only signify that B. has no material dimensions like objects of the world but is not on that account void of its own transempirical measures. This is evident from *Srutis* like—

Mahāntam vibhum ātmānam (Katha II. 1. 4)

Eṣa mahān aja ātmā (Brh. Up. IV. 4. 22)

Eṣa ātmā antarhṛdaye jyāyān

Sarvam samāpnoṣi tato asi sarvaḥ (Gita XI. 40)

Ākāśavat sarvagataśca nityaḥ (q. S. BSB)

It cannot be objected that if B. is a substance it cannot be of the essence of knowledge and bliss. There is no impediment

3. Madhusūdana is bound to accept that *Avidyānivṛtti* in toto leading to liberation cannot be secured by the partial or spasmodic lifting of the veil of ignorance and the manifestation of the pot-limited Caitanya or cloth-delimited Caitanya, but by the final and out and out removal of Mūla-Avidyā. That is the point Vyāsatiṛtha is driving at, when he uses the words *āsamsāram ajnānāvṛtam*. Hence, it is necessary to go beyond fractional *Ajnānas*. And this Mūla-Ajnāna has necessarily to be conceived as unlimited in time and space like B. It is not proper on the part of the *A-Siddhi* to side-track the issue, forgetting the fact accepted by veterans of its own school such as Sureśvara - *Avidyāstamayo mokṣaḥ* (Sureśvara)

to it if we consider Jñāna and ānanda too of B. to be the substance of its being.

The *A. Siddhi* has also contended that even conceding that B. is a substance the visual organ can be said to depend on the object in question having a form (*rūpaṃ*) where its characteristic of *dravyatva* is of the same order of reality as the substance (*dharmi*). But B.'s *dravyatva*, even if admitted, is of a lower order of reality than the substantive. Hence, the visual perception of B. in *saṃ ghataḥ* etc. is not barred by its being devoid of form.

In reply to this the *Taraṅgiṇī* points out that the *dravyatva* of B. cannot be treated as of a less order of reality than B. (the *dharmi*) before it is fully established that the world and its categories of thought, such as *dravyatva* are *kalpita* (imaginary). But the Advaitin has yet to establish the imagined character of the world. So no argument based on higher and lower orders of reality is of any probative value until the thesis of Mithyatva of the world is conclusively established.

Is it not a pity that while claiming to be the *Aupanisadam Darśanam*, Advaita should have been pressurised into rejecting the competence of its Caramavṛtti to reveal the Suddha-Brahman which amounts to an open rebuff of Yājñavalkya's pronouncement in the Brh.Up. Ātmā vā are *draṣṭavyaḥ* srotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ (IV.5.6) proclaiming that intensive introspection is the highest means of direct perception of Ātman. There are a good many other texts in the Upaniṣads which confirm the possibility of a direct perception of the highest Brahman (albeit with its grace).

Cf. *Bhidyate hrdayagranthih chidyante sarvasamśayāḥ tasmin dr̥ṣṭe parāvare* (Mundaka II.2.8)

Dr̥śyate tvagrayā buddhyā sūkṣmayā Sūksmadarśibhiḥ (Katha i. 3. 12)

Jñātum draṣṭum ca tattvena praveṣṭum ca (Gītā xi. 54)

SATTVANIRUKTI :

Criterion of Reality

After the complete refutation of the thesis of Falstiy of the world (Jagan-mithyātvā) in all its bearings, Vyāsātīrtha turns to the exposition of the Siddhānta position in regard to its reality and the relevant issues connected with it. These include : (i) the primacy of Perception (*Pratyakṣa*) culminating in the concept of Sākṣi-pratyakṣa as the basis and final standing ground (*upajivya-pramāṇa*) and the final arbiter of the validity of all knowledge and means of proof including Scriptural deliverances, when and where they appear to be in conflict with tested Pratyakṣa and personal *anubhava* of the Sākṣi, the Apperceiver of all (ii) the question of the future stultifiability (*bhāvibādha*) of consolidated human experience of the vivid joys and sorrows of life (iii) questions relating to the contradictability of sound Pratyakṣa by Inference and by the supposed identity texts (*Ābheda Śrutis*) of scripture and (v) the most interesting and vital question of the competence of Perception (including Sākṣi) to grasp the uncontradictable reality (*pāramārthika satyatva*) of the world and its values and many side-issues connected with the problem.

Criterion of Reality

It must be borne in mind that as the Advaita philosophy does not believe in the factual reality of the world, but only in the sole reality of a single subject-objectless universal undifferentiated (*akhaṇḍa*) consciousness, it has quietly consigned the world of experience to the domain of the "false". However, as

a concession to weak minds and practical life, it has formulated a theory of three orders or levels of reality known as "Sattātraividhya", consisting of the Pāramārthika (the highest truth as such), the Vyāvahārika (truth from the practical angle and common-sense point of view) and Prātibhāsika or the *seeming* truth of illusory objects of dreams and illusions of the snake in the rope type - the last two falling under the wider classification of Mithyātva, as earlier discussed, in the last analysis.

This doctrine of Sattātraividhya has been discussed and refuted by Vyāsātīrtha in the proper context (*Nym.* i. 67.) as baseless and unsustainable. The refutation of the world's Mithyātva in the preceding part will be seen to take away the pith of the so-called Vyāvahārika-real. The Prātibhāsika-real has no practical interest. As the Realist philosophy starts with the foundational concept of "Pramāṇa" as consisting in what is "Yathārtham" (true to its content) and as it believes in the existence of both eternal and non-eternal entities, principles and substances and properties in the economy of the world-structure its conception of "reality" has necessarily to be consistent with these data and what is due to both of them. It should thus be clear that as neither the eternal nor the non-eternal in existence can be "false" and unreal epistemologically or ontologically, its criterion of reality has necessarily to be consistent with those data and what is due to them - irrespective of their eternality or impermanence, sentiency or insentiency, if Philosophy and philosophising should be fair, impartial and true to facts. *Śruti*s, *Smṛti*s and *Sūtra*s like *Nityo nityānām* (Katha up. II 2-13) *Ākāśavat sarvagataś ca nityah* (Q. by Ś), *Ata eva ca nityatvam* (B.S. I-3-29) *Sargepi nopajāyante, Pralaye na vyathanti ca* (Gīta XIV. 2). *Nacai va na bhavisyāmah sarve vayam atah param* (Gīta ii 12), underline this truth.

A just and comprehensive criterion of 'reality' must take note of both these aspects *seriously* and not play hide and seek with its responsibility.

This has been done by the founder of the Dvaita school of Vedānta in terms of *anūropitam (pramittiviśayaḥ) tattvam* — that the “real” and true is what is adjudged to be not superimposed and presented to valid knowledge as existing in time and space *in situ*. It is easy enough to see that what is established by valid knowledge as actually existing in space and time cannot be said to be liable to “contradiction” and be annulled at any other time or place *as not having been in actual existence at the time and place in which it had been experienced as so existing*—*Yāvadāveditasya sattvam* or the actual existence of such aspects as are actually perceived by a person according to the extent of his capacity and understanding and other conditions governing the rapprochement to the object — *Yad yaddeśakālayoh yathā-pratitam tasya taddeśa-kālayoh tathātvaṃ*, or the actual existence of an entity with reference to a spatio-temporal setting in the manner perceived with reference to that setting. It is a different matter if some of them or some of the aspects of an entity do not exist *for ever*. Ceasing to exist at a future date or place *his not to be confounded with “contradiction”*. The term “contradiction” has suffered much abuse and unwarranted manipulation, philosophically, for wrong ends, at the hands of the Advaita school to suit its own objective of pushing the world of experience and its values into the limbo of the unreal, with a flattering label and sugar-coating of Vyāvahārikasatya, But the naked truth is that what is Vyāvahārika is in *principle* and in substance, liable to “sublation” or negation of existence with reference *not only to the future*, but to the past and the *present as well*—as the sublation (*bādhā*) extends to and *includes* the period of Vyāvahāra also in all conscience. This crucial point has been fully *elicited* and brought out by Vyāsatiṛtha from the lips of the author of the *Advaitesiddhi* him-self—in answer to his searching question (as we have already seen).:

कालान्तरभावि यत् बाधकं तदपि किं यत्कालावच्छेदेन स्वार्थो
गृहीतः तत्कालावच्छेदेनैव तन्निषेधति ? उत, अन्यकालावच्छेदेन ?
आद्ये, कथमस्य प्रामाण्यम् ? अन्त्ये, अनित्यत्वादिकमेव स्यात् ।

(Nym.)

इति चेन्न-अवाद्यत्वरूपप्रामाण्यस्य प्रपञ्चे मया अनङ्गीकारात् ।
वत्कालावच्छेदेनैवानेन स्वार्थो गृहीतः तत्कालावच्छेदेनैव तन्निषेधाभ्यु-
पगमात् ।

(A. Siddhi, p. 26)

Whether the stultification which occurs later rescinds the existence of the object *even with reference to the time (and place) at which it was apprehended*; or *only with reference to a subsequent period*? In the first case, how could it be credited with any validity at all? In the latter case, the thing presented to cognition could only be deemed to be *impermanent*, which is *not the same as being false or unreal (mithyā)* !

Madhusūdana's reply to this straight question is *astoundingly breath-taking*. "We Advaitins do not accept any validity in the sense of uncontradictability or uncontradictedness for knowledge of the external world produced by Perception. We *do admit* that the negation (or sublation) — (*niṣedha*), when it arises, applies to the entity with reference to the *very time* also at which it was apprehended. (*Op. Cit.* p. 26). This should make it clear, to the meanest intelligence, that the so-called Vyāvahārika prāmāṇya bestowed by the Advaitin on the world is a *mere euphemism*.

The same point has been emphasised by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa also in connection with his denunciation of the doctrine of two-fold reality adumbrated by the Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna - in his *Mādhyamaka Kārikā*.

हे सत्ये समुपाश्रित्य बुद्धानां धर्मदेशना ।

लोके संवृत्तिसत्यं च सत्यं च परमार्थतः ।

when he says :

सत्या चेत्संवृतिः केयं मृषा चेत्सत्यता कथम् ?

सत्यत्वं न च सामान्यं मृषार्थपरमार्थयोः

वंचनार्थमुपन्यासो लालावक्त्रासवादिवत् ।

1

This does not mean that the Dvaita philosopher has no impeccable criterion of reality applicable to the world and to the supreme Being alike. Since the Advaita has designated the world of experience as *Mithyā* and reserved the title of "real" to B. alone, the aim of Dvaita philosophy has been to establish for the world a criterion of reality which would be on a par with that of B. as their L.C.M. so far as (their) *non-mithyātvā* is concerned. It is not the claim or contention of Dvaita that because the world of matter and souls is "real" and that there is no mistake or error about it, it is also of the same or equal *status* with B. in all respects of its sovereign attributes of infinite magnitude. It has been uncompromising in standing up for the sovereign independence of B. (more than even the Rāmānuja school) as the one and only Independent Reality or principle which is *res completa* - complete in itself, determined entirely by itself and capable of being explained entirely by itself - in the Spinozistic sense of the term. All the rest, be it matter or souls, has been placed in the category of the "dependent reality" (*paratantra-prameya*)—dependence, however, not being equivalent to *unreality*. It is one thing to designate the world of name and form as *Paratantra* and quite another to stigmatise it as "*Mithyā*" in the sense of what has no real existence, at any time or place in the past, present and future (*traikālikaniṣedhapratīyogī*) in its locus.

1. cf. Madhva also.

प्रामाण्यस्य च मर्यादा कालतो व्याहृता भवेत्

कालान्तरेऽप्यमानं चेदिदानीं मानता कुत ?

In his prefatory remarks in the section on the criterion of reality (*satyanirukti*) Vyāsārtha emphasises this crucial point—

Tava ātmani yat satyam tad eveha mama and quotes Viṣṇudāśācārya's words—

यादृशं ब्रह्मणः सत्त्वं तादृशं स्याज्जगत्यपि ।

(*Vādaratnāvali*)

“To us the reality of the world is of the same kind as Brahman's.

The *Advaitasiddhi* resorts to a grave misrepresentation of the meaning and intention of this statement of the *Nym* when it comes out with a piece of *misplaced raillery*² that this would put the Realist in the same unenviable position of the suitor to the hand of a fair maiden, answering the question put to him by her father as to what his *gotra* is when he says “it is the same as yours, Sir”. For, there can be no valid marriage (in the old Hindu law) if the bride and her groom are of the same *Gotra* !!

Apart from his bad joke, Madhusūdana also argues that if the world should have the same reality as B. it would cease to be real.

The *Tarangini* pulls up the author of the *A. Siddhi* for his misunderstanding of the Dvaita stand (*bhāva-anavabodhāt*). He explains—“When we say the world has the same kind of reality (*yādrśam*) as B. (not the same reality - mark it) - as in Dvaita

2. नूनं विवाहसमये कन्यापित्रा निजगोत्रं पृष्टस्य यदेव भवतां गोत्रं तदेव मयापि इति वदतो वरस्य भ्राता भवान् । यतो जामातृश्वशुरयोरेक-गोत्रत्वे विवाहानुपपत्तिवत् जगद्-ब्रह्मणोरेकसत्त्वे जगतोऽसत्त्वमेव स्यात् ।

(*Op. cit.* p. 21)

philosophy no two reals can have the same identical property* but only similar ones) we mean only this that the kind of reality which is opposed to Mithyātvā, conveyed by the designation of Brahman as "Satyam" in the Śrutis and is accepted without demur by the Advaitin, is accepted by us, in respect of the world—in terms of "not being Mithyā" on the evidence of our perception of objects as *saṁ ghaṭah, saṁ patah** (the jar is real, the cloth is real). This should put the record straight.

At this stage, the *A. Siddhi* rejoins that according to Advaita. Brahman's reality consists in being of the nature of pure consciousness. It is self-luminous and one without a second. If such should be the nature of the world's reality, then just as the (supposed) reality of the shell-silver is falsified by the reality of the shell, the (apparent) reality of the insentient (*jāda*) world would be falsified by the self-luminous and secondless reality of Brahman - with the result that *there will be no world left to be designated as 'real'*.

Rāmācārya shows in his *Tg* that this argument too is of no avail, with a penetrating analysis. Self-luminosity and secondlessness are *not* in any way antagonistic to Mithyātvā. For, the knowledge that everything is "knowable" (*sarvam prameyam*) tho' self-luminous (*svaprākāśa*) is still regarded as "mithyā" in Advaita. It also holds that the void of Buddhist philosophy, in spite of its self-luminosity, in the sense of being unknowable and one without a second (*advaya*), is Mithyā in so far as it is *other than Sat* (*sadvilakṣaṇa*). Hence, there is no antithesis between

3. Read : भिन्नाश्च भिन्नव्यभिच पदार्था निखिला अपि । (AV)
No "*anugatasattā*" is admitted in Dvaita.

4. "तवात्मनि यत्सत्यं तदेवेह मम" इत्यस्य यः स्वभावो ब्रह्मणः च एव जगत इति नार्थः । किन्तु, यादृशेन सत्त्वेन मिथ्यात्वप्रतिपक्षेण सत्यसंज्ञा-वगतेन ब्रह्मणि मिथ्यात्वाभावसंप्रतिपत्तिः । तादृशेन 'सन् चट' इति प्रत्यक्ष-समधिगम्येन चटादिगतेन, चटादेरपि मिथ्यात्वाभावसंप्रत्यय इति ।

Svaprakāśatva, Advitīyatva and Mithyātva. Moreover, all that the Advaitin is expected to establish by way of Mithyātva of the world *as against the Realist* is the absence in the world of what determines the application of the term "Satya" to B, in the scriptural statements. That being so, if self-luminosity and secondless existence were to be the determinants in referring to B. as "Satyam", all that the inference of falsity of the world (*mithyātvānumāna*) would succeed in establishing would be that the world of matter (*jaḍajagat*) is *not self-luminous, and not without a second*. That would be tantamount to establishing what is already wellknown and well-established and nothing unpalatable to the Realist. The Herculean efforts of the Advaita in building up the *Mithyātvānumāna* with so much trumpeting would all be love's labor lost.*

So, without surrendering the basic criterion of truth formulated by Madhva as *Yathārtham pramānam* and of reality as objectivity to *valid knowledge*, which carries with it the implicit corollary of its subsequent non-contradiction as part of the content of validity — *Nahi viśaya-abādham anantarbhāvya prāmāṇyam nāma*.

Vyasatīrtha has also propounded a more technically worded criterion to plug possible loopholes in the other pragmatic definitions of reality such as *Artha-kriyākāritvam*, *Asadvailakṣaṇyam* etc.

His own criterion of *Sattā* is *Trikālasarva - deśīyaṇiṣedha - apratīyogitā* (*Adhyastatucche tu tam prati pratiyoginī*) which

5. नहि स्वप्रकाशत्वादि मिथ्यात्वप्रतिपक्षभूतम् । सर्वं प्रमेयं इति ज्ञानस्य स्वप्रकाशस्यापि तत्र मते मिथ्यात्वात् । अवेद्यत्वादिरूपस्य स्वप्रकाश-
रूपयुक्तस्य अद्वितीयशून्यस्यापि सद्विविक्तत्वादिरूपमिथ्यात्वाप्रयुक्तत्वाच्च ।
ब्रह्मविषयकश्रीतत्त्वव्यवहारप्रयोजकसाहित्यस्यैव प्रपञ्चे मां प्रति मिथ्यात्वा-
नुमानेन स्वप्रकाशत्वाद्वितीयत्वादिविरहरूपस्यैव साध्यतापत्तो, सिद्धसाधनतापत्ते-
रिति । तस्मात्, युक्तं—तवात्मनि यत्सत्त्वं तदेवेह मम इति ॥

highlights the criterion of uncontradictability of truth in the Dvaita system *also* thereby showing that it is by no means *the monopoly of the Advaita*.⁶

This means "Our criterion of reality consists in *not* being the counterpositive of an absolute Negation with reference to all time and space. The fictitious and the Mithya are counterpositives of such a negation "

This focuses attention more prominently on the vital element of "non-contradiction", in respect of the 'real'. *Incidentally, it takes the wind out of the sails of the Monist who regards the criterion of "non-contradiction" as his own exclusive contribution to the definition of 'reality' and as his monopoly.*

Against this the siddhi has argued that such a reality is beyond the competence of human perception to grasp, as perception is confined to the present and the counterpositive of such a negation as contemplated by Vyāsātīrtha is beyond the power of anybody's perception and the absence of such a counterpositive of such a negation would be still more so.⁷

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6. Dr. Narain is therefore mistaken in thinking that this definition has been formulated by Vyāsātīrtha as a correction to the original definition of the real as "objectivity to experience" (as formulated by Madhva) "which is extensive to include the facts of illusions, which are, none the less objects of experience" (*Op. Cit.* p. 15), and that "the Mādhva criterion of reality, *originally contemplated as objectivity to experience* has been slightly modified by Vyāsātīrtha" (*Op. Cit.* p. 15). Dr. Narain should know that Madhva's criterion of reality is *not* mere "objectivity to experience" but objectivity to *valid* experience. (See my PM pp 52-57)

7. स्वदेशकालवृत्तिसकलनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वस्य चक्षुर्ग्राह्ययोग्यत्वेन, तदभावस्य सुतरां तदयोगात् ।

Answering Madhusūdana the *Taranginī* points out that tho' the counterpositive of an absolute negation at all times and places is not within the competence of sense-perception, the *absence* of the counterpositive of such a negation is the essence of the 'real' and such absence is within the competence of Pratyakṣa to know.* As an example, it refers to the perception of the absence of *ākāśatva* in the jar, in a perception like *Ghaṭe ākāśatrābhāvaḥ*. If *ākāśatva* were really present in the jar, it would have to be present in many other particulars (jars) also, which would make it a 'Jāti' (genus). In that case, it would be open to perception like the genus of 'ghaṭatva' itself, inhering in several particulars.

That apart, "Sattvam" or 'reality' can also be defined as "being other than or different from the counterpositive of such a negation. For, 'difference' in Dvaita thought is the same as 'reciprocal negation' (*anyonyābhāva*) The perception of reciprocal negation is *not always* dependent on the perception of its counterpositive. In cases where the counterpositive is not amenable to perception, its *absence* in the given locus² can be perceived through elimination by hypothetical assumption of its presence (*yogyānupalabdhi*) in terms of "*Tarkita-pratīyogisattva-prasaṅgita-upalābhipratīyogika-abhāvaḥ*."

The author of the *Tattvachintāmaṇi* has cited the example *Stambhaḥ Piśāco na* (the post is not the ghost) to show that the perception of the absence of X without the perception of its counterpositive by the perception of the locus (*adhiparāma*) itself: *Stambhe Piśācānyonyābhāvaḥ pratyakṣaḥ. Adhikaraṇasya pratyakṣatvāt.* " (Maṇi)

8. सर्वदेशकालवृत्तिनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वस्य चक्षुराद्ययोग्यत्वेऽपि तन्मा-
त्रमसत्त्वस्य तद्योग्यता संभवति (Tg p. 61)

9. यदा, तादृशनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वं सत्त्वं तदस्योन्याभावस्तु प्रति-
योग्यवस्तुतत्वेऽपि स्वप्ने पिशाचान्योन्याभाववत् प्रत्यक्ष एव मसद्-भेदरूप-सत्त्व
प्रत्यक्षोपपत्तेः । (Tg p. 62)

The same principle applies to the present case that if the jar perceived here were the counterpositive of a negation of its presence in all the three periods of time and in all places, it should be so perceived, because the cognition in question pertains to an object otherwise open to perception.

The *Tarangīnī* also cites other examples involving supersensible reals such as *Manas* and the atoms of water, in such perceptions as the absence of "Manastva" in the jar and the absence of "earthiness" (*pārthivatva*) in the atoms of water, where "Manastva" and atoms of water are alike not open to perception.

Such examples are admissible in Sāstric discussions. They cannot be brushed aside as "far-fetched" from the point of view of modern laymen. Dr. Narain also dismisses the analogy of "Prāgabhāva (antecedent non-existence)" cited by the *Tarangīnī*. Prāgabhāva is cognized by *Pratyakṣa* tho' its counterpositive, the jar is not in existence at the time as it is yet to be produced. There is nothing farfetched in these analogies. Dr. Narain speaks of Prāgabhāva as a relation and that as such it must be cognised only thro' the cognition of its relata. He misses the point that "abhāva" in Indian Logic is a "Padārtha" and not a relation, "sambandha".

The Primacy of Pratyakṣa

Judgments like *San ghaṭaḥ* (the jar is) obtained thro' perception in broad daylight are sufficient evidence of the fact that actual existence (*isness*) belongs to the objects perceived and is not merely due to their being shot thro' and thro' or penetrated by the *isness* of Brahman (*Brahmasattānuvedha*) appearing to belong to them on account of superimposition, as in the illusory cognition *idam rajatam* (this is silver) - where, according to the Advaita, the *thisness* (*idamtā*) of the substrate (shell) is passed on to the silver. There is thus no reason to distrust the evidence of Pratyakṣa obtained under normal, healthy conditions. It has already been pointed out that as B. is formless, its *isness* cannot be perceived by the visual organ, in the perception that "the jar is." Otherwise, other judgments such as the jar is blue, the shell-silver is false, hares have no horns, will have to be treated on the same basis of *adhiṣṭhānānuvedha* of B. It is futile to argue that blueness and other attributes belong to the jar etc. while *isness* does not belong to them. Such a distinction would presuppose the prior establishment of the *adhyāsa* of the jar on B., which is still a matter of dispute. By the same token, nothing prevents one from arguing that 'Sad' Brahman is also a case of *adhiṣṭhānānuvedha*. To say that B. alone has *svarāpasattā* (intrinsic existence) and others have only a superimposed *isness* is begging the question.

Checkmated in this argument, the Advaita now tries to question the *bona fides* of our faith in the indubitable, uncontradictability of the evidence of Perception about the real existence of the world presented to us. It is argued that Perception is limited to the present. So why not take it that like the shell-silver it is uncontradicted only for the duration of the perception or the present and is liable to sublation later.

This brings us to the moot point of the problem of the basic strength and superiority of sound Perception, free from defects, ¹ among Pramāṇas, as a rule, - against its falsification by Inference or Verbal testimony - which depend for the correctness of their data on Perception.

Vyāsātirtha therefore raises some pertinent questions in this connection. Is perception, then, inherently invalid; or, if though valid in itself, is incompetent to establish its uncontradictability in all the three periods of time? The second would not deprive it of the validity naturally devolving on it, in the sense of making known its content as it is, so long as it lasts. Its subsequent non-existence by efflux of time or other natural causes cannot *undo* or falsify its factual existence, within the limits of the present.

If that much is accepted in all good faith, philosophical honesty and sincerity by the Advaita it cannot in the same breath talk of the objects of perception being *Mithyā* in the sense of being the counterpositives of an absolute negation with reference to all the three periods of time (*traikālikaniṣedha-pratīyogī*) like the snake in the rope. That will be overshooting the mark. Existence of an object, limited to a given time and place would only signify its impermanence - like the ancient city of Pompei - but not its falsity for all time, as the Advaita would like to have it, in the interest of its definition of *Mithyātva* as *traikālikaniṣedha-pratīyogitvam*. Where then, is the need for it to coin a new term and name "*mithyā*", unless it has no faith in the *actual existence* of objects perceived by flawless perception in broad day light, even for the time being, If not forever?

1. Some of the defects incidental to sound perception being obtained have been listed by Isvara Krishna in his *Sāṅkhya-Kārinā* :
*Atidūrāt sāmīpyāt samānābhihātāt mano' navadhūnāt
 Saukṣmyāt tadanupalabdhiḥ.*

We have already seen that the *Advaitasiddhi* has unequivocally opted for the position that the negation of existence for all time is one of *Svarūpenaniṣedha* (negation in essence) *inclusive* of the being of the object at the time in which it has been "appearing to exist". That would reduce objects of valid perception to an utter non-existence (*atyanta-asattva*) - a conclusion some of our "modern" Advaitins find it difficult to swallow, for fear of landing themselves in the camp of Nihilism. If Advaita is not prepared to go to such length, it is high time that it abandons the talk of *Traikālikaniṣedha* and consequent Mithyātva of the world and accept that it is only *a-nitya* (not eternal). Let it not play hide and seek with "Mithyātva" and sail under false colors. To avoid a show-down some Advaitins have held that the negation contemplated is *not Svarūpenaniṣedha*, or rescinding even the apparent existence *as such* of objects but a negation from the Paramārthika aspect (*pāramārthikatvākūreṇa niṣedhaḥ*). This has already been shown to be untenable, as the concept of the Pāramārthika presupposes the other one of Bādhyatva or "Vyāvahārikatva" and *vice versa**, in a philosophy which swears by a three-tier reality. And we have already seen that Madhusūdana himself swears by 'Svarūpeṇa niṣedhaḥ'.

Perceptual evidence of the reality of objects known cannot be rejected as inherently invalid, without *sufficient reason*. If the reason is that it is sublatable by inference or verbal testimony, or the *possibility* of future stultifiability (*bhāvibādha-kaśankā*), the matter cannot be so settled, *off hand*. Pratyakṣa can be regarded as invalidated only when the superiority of inference or verbal testimony over it is first conclusively established.

2. Read : नापि पारमार्थिकत्वाकारेण त्रैकालिकनिषेधप्रतियोगित्वमित्य-
 * स्पष्टः । अबाध्यत्वरूप - पारमार्थिकत्वस्य बाध्यत्वरूपमिथ्यात्वनिरूप्यत्वेन,
 अन्योन्याश्रयात् (Nym. 1.1.)

Also : दृष्टस्तुतो मिथ्यात्वे युक्त्यपेक्षा, ननु सत्यत्वे (Madhva)

There are good reasons to hold that Pratyakṣa is on stronger ground than Inference or Verbal testimony because the latter are dependent for their *data* on Pratyakṣa, as their "Upajivya" foundation. Pratyakṣa does not have to depend for its validity on the *absence* of conflict with inference or testimony. The lion as the king of the jungles has no need to walk thro' his domain, only when there are no hares running about !

The inherent strength of Pratyakṣa over inference and testimony stems from its ability to grasp minute characteristics of things which cannot be grasped by inference. Confusion of quarters (*dīkṣamoha*) which cannot be corrected by what others may say can only be set right by seeing the Sun rise in a particular quarter. The rule that scripture is entitled to the highest place of honor among the three Pramāṇas³ is mainly with reference to matters which fall within its special and exclusive jurisdiction such as the existence of supersensible values of Dharma and Adharma, God and His nature and attributes, the existence of heaven and hell and so on. It cannot intrude on the province of Perception and discredit its evidence regarding the real existence of objects and falsify it *in essence* (*svārūpa-nāśa*) or in its Pāramārthika aspect, for reasons already gone thro'.

The principle of deference to the voice of the majority would also require us to stand by Pratyakṣa and find suitable ways of interpreting such Śrutis as at first sight appear to do away with all duality and plurality of life. The operation of inference and verbal testimony can be seen to depend and rest upon the data supplied by Pratyakṣa as their *Upajivya* (foundational basis). Inference, as its very name "*anu-māna*" implies, cannot operate in a vacuum or fly in the face of observed facts duly tested and found correct - or what Madhva calls

3. *Prābhāryam āgamasyaiva jñeyā teṣu triṣu smṛtam*

(*Brahma-Tarka*)

dr̥ghadr̥ṣṭam (vividly experienced) or verified Pratyakṣa (*parikṣitapratyakṣa*) as against superficial perception. The inference of fire being cold has no chance of survival against the indubitable evidence of tactile perception that it is *hot*.

Adverting to the topic of the inherent strength of Perception Dr. Narain acknowledges that "from the Mādhva standpoint Perception is *never false*. *Whenever it is false*, it is not Perception⁴ but only wrong knowledge" produced by the association of defects in the normal conditions (*sāmagrī*) of Perception (*Op. Cit.* p. 125). He continues, "For ascertainment of the presence of defects one has to resort to critical examination and thereby depend on reasoning" (p. 128).

However, the correct Mādhva position is that the purpose of *Parikṣā* or what Dr. Narain calls critical examination is *not* (to ascertain the presence of defects or) for the positive task of *establishing the validity* of knowledge but to eliminate chances of contradiction and clearing of doubts where necessary. Moreover, the *Parikṣā* itself may consist in taking a second or a closer *look* at the data (as in the case of perceptual illusions of the snake in the rope or the silver in shell). In cases where on account of vast distance of the object or such other impediments a mere second or third look does not help, other tests may be instituted based on more technical or scientific aids. But in all such cases, the resort to *Pārikṣā* is to eliminate risks and doubts by way of abundant caution. It is *not* to *determine validity* which according to the doctrine of *Svataḥprāmāṇya* of *Pramāṇas*, which is accepted by all schools of Vedānta including Advaitic rests on the intrinsic capacity of

4. This is terminologically self-contradictory. Mādhva himself calls it "*apaṅgu-pratyakṣa*" (Cf. Candraprādeśa-tvādikam tu dūrasthatvād *apaṅgu Tdy.*)

knowledge to be assured of its own validity. Vyāsatīrtha puts this very clearly as follows :-

प्रामाण्यग्रहणशक्तेः सहजत्वात्, प्रामाण्यग्रहणस्य औ-
त्सर्गिकत्वरूप - स्वतस्त्वमिति (T. T. 1. p. 12)

In the context of Svataḥprāmānya or self-validity of knowledge, it is the Sākṣi or Apperceiver of all knowledge that grasps the fact of knowledge and its validity. It is immediate in respect of matters which fall directly within the field of Sākṣi and mediately thro' the mind in regard to knowledge obtained thro' sensory channels. That point has been lucidly explained by Jayatīrtha - "This power of the Sākṣi may be retarded sometimes by doubts caused by mental pulls and vacillation. When these are set at rest by *Parīkṣā*, the Sākṣi grasps the validity by his own innate power just as an elephant whose foot has been pierced by a thorn is unable to walk freely till it is pulled out."⁵

Such tested Pratyakṣa or *Parīkṣitapratyakṣa*, as Mādhva calls it, is recognised and referred to as Pratyakṣa in Mādhva Epistemology and *not merely any sense-perception at random*, under imperfect or inadequate conditions. The definition of Pratyakṣa as given by Mādhva in his *Pramāṇolakṣaṇa* as *Nīrdosa-arthendriyasannikarṣah* should make this clear. The adjunct

5. इन्द्रियलिङ्गशब्दजन्यज्ञानेषु अनादौ संसारे द्वयीं गतिमनुसन्दधत् साक्षी न सहस्रैव प्रमाणमिदमिति निश्चितुं शक्नोति ; किंतु दोषाभावनित्यव्य-
द्वारैव । दोषाभावं च परीक्षासहकृत एव । परीक्षायां च परीक्षान्तरमनुसरक्षि-
यावत्साक्षात् स्वविषये सुखादाववतरति । न च स्वात्मन्येव कदाप्यन्यथाभावो-
ऽवगल इति सन्देहाभावात् परीक्षानुसरणान्निवर्तते । नन्वेवं परतः प्रामाण्या-
पत्तिः । परीक्षायाः दोषशंकात्त्वलक्षणबुद्धिदोषनिरसनमात्रकारणत्वात् परीक्षया
च प्रतिबन्धे निवृत्ते, निजयेव शक्त्या प्रामाण्यमवधारयति । (NS. p. 218)

nirdoṣa (flawless) is applicable equally to the objects and the senses⁶ and their contacts.

In the light of this, it is difficult to see the point in Dr. Narain's finding that "the Advaitin disparages the philosophy of the supremacy of Pratyakṣa by arguing that the theory that *every perception is absolutely valid* is contradicted both by reason and experience. Illusions are the most glaring examples of such cases. If Perceptions are *always valid*, what about illusions and their explanations in a *Text Book of Philosophy*, ? (*Op. Cit.* p. 126). We have already made it clear that Madhva does *not* subscribe to the view of Rāmānuja that all cognitions are veridical (*Yathārtham sarvavijñānam*). Mādhva realism is wide enough to accommodate both valid knowledge and erroneous ones in life. This cheap jibe of Dr. Narain is a case of *Abaddham paṭhitvā kucodyam karoti*.

If as Dr. Narain says "What Madhusūdana Sarasvatī argues is *not* that inference can disprove any Perception, but that wrong perceptions can be set aside by inference or verbal testimony" (*Op. Cit.* p. 127) there is nothing to disagree about it. Only, Madhva would point out that in such cases, the priority rests with Pratyakṣa. Where the superficial perceptions are ascertained to be vitiated by flaws of distance and other defects which are corrected by more accurate observation with better aids, as in the case of the size of the Moon. The superficial perception 'the sky is blue' is ascertained to be an error which is corrected already by perceiving the sky (*ākāśa*) at much shorter range, without indenting on the Śruti. This is confirmed by what Dr. Narain himself has to say that "the Mādhva doctrine of the superior validity of Perception is at best searching in this that the final removal of doubts about a particular cognition

6. *Nirdoṣatvam arthendriyayor viśeṣaṇam* (J. PLI).

rests with experience (*Op. Cit.* p. 128). But he goes off at a tangent when he opines that "the Mādhvas have, in their zealous advocacy of Perception, *overemphasised the capacity* of Perceptual cognition when not associated with any defect. For ascertaining the presence of defects, one has to resort to critical examination and *thereby depend on reasoning. It is here that the Mādhva contention exhibits its weakness*". (*Op. Cit.* p. 128).

We have already shown that the resort to *Parikṣā* according to Madhva is neither necessary in all cases nor is it resorted to grasp validity *as such*. Its function is purely to clear the way in the case of impediments for the primacy of Pratyakṣa and its self-validity to shine forth unimpeded and undimmed. As Vyāsātīrtha rightly points out in his *Tarkatāṇḍava*, if the removal of flaws, which restrain the operation of the general principle (*utsargo*) is also to be counted as the cause of the genesis of validity, there will be no fixity about *which is the rule and which is the exception*.

औत्सर्गिककार्यापवादनिरासरूपस्यापि दोषाभावस्य हेतुत्वे,
इदमौत्सर्गिकं, इदमापवादकं इति व्यवस्थित्ययोगात्
(TT. 1. 15)

In any case Dr. Narain's concluding remark that "the Śruti which imparts knowledge of unity (*aikya*) is nothing but a transcendent and immediate experience" (p. 128) is but a restatement of the familiar Advaita position that the negation of perceptual evidence of reality of the world by the Śruti is only in its Pāramārthika aspect without affecting its Vyāvahārika reality. ⁷

7. पारमार्थिकमद्वैतं प्रविश्य शरणं श्रुतिः
विरोधादुपजीव्येन न विभेति कुतश्चन ।

This plea has been shown to be untenable on the ground of the interdependence in argument by which it is vitiated. (See p. 31 ante). That apart, Madhusūdana's categorical assertion that the sublation of the world is a *svarūpeṇaśedha* puts the lid of *asattva* (utter non-existence) on Mithyātva - as already demonstrated by Vyāsātīrtha :

मिथ्याभूतस्यापि स्वरूपेणैव त्रंकालिकनिषेध इति पक्षे
निःस्वरूपत्वस्य दुर्वारित्वात् । Does Dr. Narain agree with
Madhusūdana or want to let him down ?

If, in spite of all that has been said, Dr. Narain should still find that the "Sankarite contention that the inference of the falsity of the world is *more valid* than the perceptual experience has *such solid foundation* that it can stand the vehemence of the onslaught of the Madhva criticism" (*Op. Cit.* p. 128) we can only leave him to hug his illusion, in the words of Jayātīrtha : *Ca'ksuṣi nimilya tat tatheti vadataḥ kaḥ pratimallaḥ?*

Inference by its very name of "Anu-māna" speaks volumes of its dependence (*upajivakatva*) on sound observation of *vyāpti*, *paksadharmatā*, etc. The entire bulk of the the Karmakāṇḍa of Śrutis, the cosmological disquisitions of the Śrutis on the evolution and involution of the world and the peregrinations of the Jivas in various worlds in the course of transmigration cannot be brushed aside as 'Mithyā' by any serious thinker. The import of the Śrutis also has to depend on the fulfilment of the conditions of textual exegesis in terms of proper *ākāṅkṣā* (syntactic expectancy) contiguity (*sannidhi*) and fitness (*yogyatā*) to be determined by Pratyakṣa. The data of Pratyakṣa are the *upajīvyā* - the foundational basis of inference and verbal testimony. The latter are the *upajivaka*, resting on its foundation. Whatever superstructure is built on their foundation needs must be in keeping with its position.

This is axiomatic. The Mādhva interpretation of the so called "Advaita Śrutis" is in accord with this principle in terms of

*Svāntonye ca viśiṣṭatve sthānamatyaikyavor api
Sādṛśye caikyavāk samyakt sāvakāśā yatheṣṭataḥ*
(AV)

and rests upon the principles of logical exegesis.

In this connection, Vācaspati Miśra has tried to question the *rationale* of the superiority of the *upajīvyā* to the *upajīvaka* as between Pratyakṣa and Śruti by raising a feeble objection that if the *Upajīvyā* (Pratyakṣa) is to be regarded as stronger on account of its priority to the Advaita Śrutis, the subsequent perception to the effect that this is *not* silver (*nedam rajatam*) will have to be rejected in favor of the first illusory perception "This is silver". Vyāsatiṛtha shows that this is all due to a confusion of thought arising from an imperfect understanding of what constitutes the pith of an *upajīvyāpramāṇa*, as against its *upajīvaka*. It is *not* its mere temporal priority. That datum, whose validity depends on the validity of another, either for the ascertainment of its true nature and attributes or for elimination of chances of exception, *that latter* is the *upajīvyā* of the former. In the case of *nedam rajatam* vs *idam rajatam*, there is no prospect of the validity of the subsequent negating cognition in the absence of the invalidity of the earlier one to be negated by it. Or, the *upajīvyā* in respect of its *upajīvaka* may be defined as that without which something else cannot be posited or negated. Here, even though the cognition *idam rajatam* is the basis (*upajīvyā*) of the subsequent one, it is so only in a restricted sense of supplying that part of the datum which is to be rejected (*pratiśedhyārpakatayā*). This does not however upset the principle of the superiority of the *upajīvyā*. For, it is *not* mere *upajīvyatva* in the broad sense of the surface level that makes for the superiority (*prābalya*) of the *upajīvyā* but *upajīvyatva* as duly tested (*parikṣitatvaviśiṣṭa*). This must be conceded by the Monist also. Otherwise, how can he prevent

an illusory knowledge following a correct one, or the Buddhist Āgamas disputing the Vedic ones, from usurping the position of the upajīvyā ?

Anyway, even in regard to *idam rajatam* it is only the aspect of "thisness" and not "thisness" qualified by the adjunct of silverness (*rajatatvam*) which 'strictly speaking' constitutes the *upajīvyā* element as regards the negation.⁸ And there is no negation of the aspect of "thisness" in *nedam rajatam* but only of silverness (*rajatatvam*)⁹.

The Advaitin cannot afford to argue on the same lines that in respect of the identity of Brahman and Jīva it is the bare *essence* of Caitanya (pure consciousness) of B. that is the subject (*dharmi*) shorn of all its properties of omniscience, all-powerfulness etc. and that therefore there is no *upajīvyā-virodha* in positing the identity of the two. It will be made clear in our discussion of the subject of Identity (*Nym.* II. 27) how it is impossible for the Advaitin to drop the essential attributes of Jīva and Brahman in order to predicate their identity or make Cinmātraikya the predicate, as it would be tautologous to do so.

चिता चिदैक्यं सिद्धं नः सार्वज्ञादिविशिष्टयोः

ऐक्यं तु घमिग्राहिभ्यां श्रुत्यक्षाभ्यां विरुध्यते ॥

8. अस्तु वा 'इदं रजत' मिति धीरपि घमिग्राहकत्वेनोपजीव्यम्, तथापि, नेदमित्यत्र इदमंशमात्रं घमि, न तु रजतत्वविशिष्टः इदमंशे रूप्यस्य निषेधेनैव इष्टसिद्धेः । एवं च यदुपजीव्यं तन्न बाध्यम् । इदमंशस्याबाधात् । यच्च बाध्यं रजतत्ववैशिष्ट्यं न तदुपजीव्यम् ; रजतत्ववैशिष्ट्यस्याघमित्वात् ।

(*Nym.* II. 27)

9. परीक्षितत्वं च न तावन् प्रतिषेध्यापंके शुक्तिरूप्याभेदज्ञानां-शेऽस्ति । एवं च यदुपजीव्यं तन्न बाध्यं इदमंशस्याबाधात् । यत् बाध्यं रजतत्ववैशिष्ट्यं न तदुपजीव्यम् । रजतत्ववैशिष्ट्यस्याघमित्वात् । (*Nym.*)

NO CONFLICT WITH APACCHEDA-NYĀYA IN ACCEPTING SUPERIORITY OF PRATYAKṢA

In connection with the topic of the *Prābalya* of Pratyakṣa as *upajīvyā* in interpreting the seemingly monistic texts of Śruti consistent with Pratyakṣa, Vyāsātīrtha deals with the objection raised by Vācaspati Miśra that it violates the Apacchedanyāya of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, which in substance establishes the superiority of the posterior to the prior (*Purvāt Parabaliyastvam*). The first experience of reality of the world thro' Pratyakṣa is over-ruled by the Advaita Śrutis which present themselves to the mature minds.

Pūrvasya Pratyaksasya Pareṇa

Āgamena apacchedanyāyena bādhaḥ ¹

This contention of the *Bhāmātī* is based on the PMS VI.5.54 *Paurvāparya Pūrvadaurbalyam Prakṛtyat*. The matter relates to the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice. As part of the ceremonial the Rtviks headed by the Adhvaryu make their exit from the

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1. This is an *arthānuvāda* of the following passage of the *Bhāmātī* :

ज्येष्ठत्वं चानपेक्षितस्य बाध्यत्वे हेतुः, न बाधकत्वे । रजतज्ञानस्य ज्यायसः शुक्तिज्ञानेन कनीयसा बाधदर्शनात् । दक्षितं च तात्त्विकप्रमाणभावस्यानपेक्षितत्वं । तथा च पारमर्षं सूत्रं पौर्धापि पूर्वदीबल्यं प्रकृतिवत् इति ।

(PMS 6.5.54)

See *Kalpataru* on this (*Bhāmātī* 1.1.1.)

p. 10 - 11, NS Press Edn. 1917).

Yajñaśālā in single file holding one another by the *kaccha* in the order of Prastotā, Pratihartā, Udgātā, Brahmā followed by the sacrificer himself for the chanting of the Bahiṣ-pavamāna stuti.

Different kinds of atonements are prescribed, including heavy fees to be paid by the sacrificer. - in the case of any one of the second, third or fourth Ṛtviks getting himself detached from the one in front of him. Where the Udgātā and the Pratihartā (who precedes him) get detached one after the other, it being impossible to combine the two opposed forms of atonement prescribed in respect of the detachment by the Pratihartā and the Udgātā, severally, the doubt arises as to which of the two atonements, the prior (involving Sarvasvadakṣiṇā) or the posterior by way of performing the sacrifice again but without fresh dakṣiṇā) is to be adopted. The decision given is that as at the time of the earlier detachment by the Udgātā the other one by the Pratihartā is not yet in being and as it cannot therefore set aside the posterior, the posterior form of Prāyaścitta associated with the detachment by the Udgātā prevails. This is extended by the Advaitins to the tug of war between Pratyakṣa and so-called Advaita Śrutis on the basis of which the evidence of Pratyakṣa about the reality of the world is set aside in favor of Aikya and the Mithyātva of the world.

Vyāsātirtha makes a very pertinent observation about the inapplicability of the Apaccheda-nyāya to the issue of Pratyakṣa vs. Advaita Śrutis, on the ground that the Dvaitvādin's claim of the superior strength of Pratyakṣa as against the Advaita Śrutis which are śāvakāśa (open to other interpretations) is based *not merely* on the ground of its being prior to the Śruti but on the ground of its being the Upajīvya with reference to the data of the Abhedā Śrutis. But in the Apacchedanyāya, the prior

prescription is *not* the Upajivya of the posterior² *This moot point has not been met by the Advaitasiddhi*. Moreover, there is no rigid invariability in the order of priority or posteriority of the Apacchedas of the different R̥tviks nor any total Bādha. The Apacchedanyāya is *not therefore applicable to the conflict between Bhedapratyakṣa (or Bhe-dasrutis) and the identity texts*.

2. न ह्यस्माभिः पूर्वत्वमात्रेण प्रत्यक्षस्य बाधकत्वोक्ता । किंतुपजीव्य-
त्वेन । न ह्यपच्छेदे पूर्वमुपजीव्यम् ।

The *Kalpataru* also while introducing the question of Apaccheda writes :

एवं तावदुपजीव्यत्वं प्रत्यक्षस्य निरस्य मुख्यत्वमात्रस्य प्राबल्यहेतुत्वं
निराकरोति—'ज्येष्ठस्य च' इति । (BS. 1.1.1.).

This shows that the question of Upajivyatva is not part of the Apacchedanyāya. The *Śrutaprakāśa* on the *Śribhāṣya* has also held that the Apacchedanyāya is applicable *only* where there is no rigid invariability in the order of priority and posteriority of the Apacchedas. It also points out that the Nyāya is concerned with the conflict regarding Prayogas (performance of rites) while the conflict of the Saṅgūṇa and Nirgūṇa texts (or of Bhedapratyakṣa and Abhedā Śrutis) is concerned with the factual nature of Brahman (or the truth of the matter-whether Bhedapratyakṣa is bādhya or *not* :

अपच्छेदनयो हि अनियतविरोधपौर्वापर्यविषयः । उद्गातृप्रतिहर्त्रोरुभयो-
रपच्छेदे नियमो नास्ति । उभयोरपच्छेदे तस्य क्रमिकत्वे उद्गातृपच्छेदः पूर्वं
भावी, इतरस्तु चरमभावी इति वा, विपर्ययेणेति वा नियमोऽपि नास्ति ।
अपच्छेदन्यायविषयः प्रयोगावधिकविराधः । सगुणनिर्गुणवाक्यविरोधश्च वस्तु-
स्वरूपप्रयुक्तः । (Śrutaprakāśa)

पौर्वापर्यं विरोधश्च पूर्वप्रामाण्यमेव च
नियमान्नास्ति यन्त्रासावपच्छेदनयो भवेत् ॥

(*Nym* i. 14)

The *Taranginī* rejects the explanation of the *A-Siddhi* that (as in the case of alternative prescriptions in *Apaccheda*) *Bhedapratyakṣa* can be accommodated in a *Vyāvahārika* sense, without involving its total *Bādha*. For, it would be premature to indent upon *Vyāvahārika-Bheda* and the two level theory of truth even before the thesis of *Mithyātva* of which it is a corollary, is conclusively established.



Question of future Stultifiability of Pratyakṣa

Another ground of distrust of Perception urged by the Advaita is the possibility of (doubt regarding) its future stultifiability by Āgama (*Śruti*) – *bhāvibādhakaśankā*. This topic in the *Nym.* has been bypassed by Dr. Narain in his Critique.

Since neither inference nor *Śruti* can set aside the evidence of Parikṣita-pratyakṣa, as already clarified, if there should still be any future stultification of it, it can only be thro' another (act of) perception (among the *three* recognised *Pramāṇas*).¹ But as the Advaita has already cut the ground from under its feet by branding Pratyakṣa *as such* as invalid, the contradicting Pratyakṣa too (if any) will be subject to the same distrust and cannot claim any special status or privilege of future unstultifiability for itself.

It cannot be said that all the same, we can think of some kind of general reasoning to the effect that Pratyakṣa which grasps the reality of objects may still be open to contradiction like the dream-elephant in the waking state. The difficulty here is that as the Advaita has condemned Pratyakṣa *per se* as unreliable (as vitiated by *doṣas*), the analogy with the falsification of the dream-elephant by waking perception stands barred. Where none of the three specific *Pramāṇas* can operate, no generic one could be thought of :

1. *Prābalyam Āgamasyaiva jātyā teṣu triṣu smṛtam*

*Sarvaviśeṣābhāve sāmānyasyāpi abhāvena
bhāvibādhakaśankāyā anudayāt.* (Nym)

Any stultifying cognition has necessarily to be a determinate one. But Brahmic cognition in Advaita, being indeterminate, would *not* in any manner be hostile to a determinate one. A stultifying cognition is only a correcting one. It is not seen to deny the existence of the illusory cognition, or the defects which caused it or the perceiver of the illusion. Further, only such cognitions as are liable to be vitiated by flaws can be open to stultification (*bādhā*). Sākṣi-pratyakṣa or the judgment of the Apperceiving self is never open to flaws. It is knowledge partaking of the essence of the self (*Caityanyītmakam*) and is not generated. So there is no question of its being generated by *doṣas*. A stultifying cognition cannot also be stultified in its turn by another, lest it should lead to a regress. It is in the nature of a stultifying cognition to establish as its content an element of "difference" from the content of the *stultified* one. It cannot be regarded as a Bādhakajñāna if it should grasp its content of difference from the *stultified* cognition as *one with* that difference or *is indifferent to it*. The stultifying cognition *Nedam rajatam* would cease to be a stultifying one if it should grasp its content of shell as non-different from the earlier. Caramavṛtti which is supposed to liquidate all difference must also grasp its content viz. Brahman or "Advaita" as "different" from all the difference and duality which is to be negated by it. The thesis of future stultifiability of the world is thus unsustainable. The possibility of future stultifiability can also be raised against such future stultifiability itself leading to a self-contradiction. There is therefore a limit beyond which the possibility of future stultification cannot be pressed. The principle of upajīvyā-prābalya over the upajīvaka between two given Pramāṇas, verified by applying all possible tests has to be admitted as the final arbiter and it cannot be discredited on the frivolous ground of the possibility of future stultification.

Too much scepticism at every step would recoil on one's own stand - as rightly pointed out by Kumārila :

दुष्टज्ञानगृहीतार्थप्रतिषेधोऽपि युज्यते
गृहीतमात्रबाधे तु, स्वपक्षोऽपि न सिद्धयति ॥

The position of the Dvaita philosophers is also the same. 1

यावच्छक्तापरीक्षायां उपजीव्यस्य बाधने
दोषः (नाशोधिते दोष) उपजीव्यत्वमस्त्वलम् ॥² (AV)

If future stultifiability is posited of immediate perceptions alone as of the external world, the 'Advaitasākṣātkāra brought about by the *Caramavṛtti* will also be open to it. If it is restricted to direct cognitions *not brought about by verbal testimony (śabdāgāmya)* the immediate awareness of the bliss of selfhood in Mokṣa which being eternal in its nature and pertaining to the essence of the Self and as such *not* produced or engendered by any other cause may have to come under the scope of the possibility of future stultification. As pointed out earlier, the Advaitasākṣātkāra generated by the *Caramavṛtti* would also be engulfed by a similar doubt that the Sākṣi has somehow fallen into an error of Judgment. For, in Advaita, Sākṣijñāna is susceptible to both error and correct knowledge *Sākṣiṇaḥ bhrama-pramāsādhāraṇyena - pramāṇābādhakatvāt - A - Siddhi*. So it may err in believing what is *not* true realisation to be a true one. For, it admits that tho' Caitanya or pure consciousness as such is *not* tainted by flaws, the Avidyāvṛtti which delimits

2. प्रमाणतया प्रतीतस्य परीक्षायां सत्यां उपजीवकेन बाधने कृते, दोषः
अस्मद्भिमतनियमभंगः स्यात् । उपजीव्येऽशोधिते, उपजीवकेन बाधने न दोषः ।
उपजीव्यत्वमस्त्वलम् । अलंशब्दोऽवधारणार्थः ।

it is tainted by flaws (*anādidōṣa*) and that it is the pure *Caitanya* reflected in *Avidyāvṛtti* which is termed the *Sakṣi* ;

चैतन्यस्य स्वरूपतो दोषाजन्यत्वेऽपि, तदवच्छेदिकाया
अविद्यावृत्तेः दोषजन्यत्वात्, तत्प्रतिफलितचैतन्यस्यैव साक्षि-
पदार्थत्वान्

(A-Siddhi p. 44 - 50)

Such a prospect would bring all Vedantic studies and instruction to a halt as not worth the trouble, in view of the uncertainty of the truth of identity to be produced by it. It cannot be objected to this that in that case, the Śruti which postulates the liquidation of the world by such a *Sākṣātkāra* would be reduced to a mere appearance (*prātibhāsika*). In such - contingency, it will not be liquidated by *Brahmajñāna*.

Our answer to this would be that here also as in the other cases of universal doubt, it may be that the auditory sense has mis-heard the Śruti which really says that the world is not sublated by knowledge of Brahman. Such possibilities cannot be ruled out if the distrust of *Parikṣita-Pratyakṣa* is carried to extremes in respect of the reality of the world established by *Pratyakṣa*.

It is a high-handed liberty to condemn normal healthy perceptions on the dubious plea of possibility of future stultification (*bhāvibādhakaśankā*) on the analogy of untested superficial perceptions or the snake-in the rope variety.

In properly tested and varified perceptions, the specific flaws of too much distance or too much nearness of the object etc., stand eliminated. If in spite of all this, some unspecified defect (*dōṣa*) is to be alleged, similar flaws can be alleged in the case of the Śruti texts also.

Advaita writers have also tried to belittle the value of verification relied upon by Realists in establishing the validity of perceptual evidence of the reality of the world by citing the examples of eating, drinking, bathing etc., in our dreams.

The position that Pratyakṣa comprehends what is intrinsically invalid to be valid, will deprive Advaitavāda of any valid Śruti text which establishes the Mithyātva of the world. For the same ubiquitous doubt would envelop the supposed Mithyātva-Śruti and the sixfold Tātparyalingas in it, grasped by the auditory and visual senses.

The hypothesis of unmitigated doubt of future possibility of stultification of all Pratyakṣa, without any reservation or exception would let loose a reign of chaos and disorder all round. For, like superficial perceptions *there are also cases of deceptive inferences and deceptive verbal testimony*. There is no justification to single out Perception (alone) for condemnation on the such a ground. The dividing line between what is valid (*pramāṇa*) and what is invalid (*a-pramāṇa*) has got to be respected and ought not to be dismissed with scant courtesy by any sane philosopher.

Moreover, according to the Realist, the world's reality is endorsed by the Sākṣi the Apperceiving Self of all knowledge and validity, in the the last analysis. The judgment of the Sākṣi is always veridical and indubitable - being the expression of its eternal self-experience and, *in this it is unlike even the Śruti in not being open to any misconception of purport*.

If Sākṣipratyakṣa is not to be recognised as "Pramāṇa" because it is not generated by the operation of the Vṛttis

in the Advaitic sense of the term, the Srutis too will have to forfeit their validity. For, being *authorless* they cannot be treated as valid (*pramāṇa*) in the sense of their validity not being brought about by the special property (*guṇa*) of being the words of a reliable person (*āptakṛtva*), in the Nyāya sense.

So, not much store can be set on the supposed eternality of the Srutis *from the Advaita angle*. The Sruti is no doubt really an instrument of valid knowledge. But just as from the Advaita point of view the Dvaitin's belief, that its purport is the intrinsic difference of Jivas and Brahman and the reality of the world, is the outcome of a gross mis-conception of its real purport or just as the positions taken by the Pūrvaśakṣa in each adhikaraṇa of the Brahma Mīmāṃsā Sāstra are due to a gross misconception of its true Siddhānta, it is equally possible to argue that the Advaita belief in the oneness of all existence and the unreality of the world is similarly due to a gross misconception of the purport of the Srutis. Similar doubts of the possibility of future stultification can be raised against the perception of the unanimity of the Tātparya-lingas, in terms of "Advaita".

The Advaitin cannot get away with the explanation that the Sruti being eternal is flawless and cannot be stultified like the deliverance of Pratyakṣa. For, in the estimation of Advaita philosophy, the eternality of the Sruti means 'nothing more' than that they exist upto one Brahmakalpa (or a hundred years of life of Hiraṇyagarbha) and are subject to genesis again like Bhūtākāśa and other *tattvas*.

As regards external perception thro' the material sense organs, there is no reason to assume the possibility of future stultification *in all cases*, because such misgivings, when they arise, can be removed by instituting proper verification (*parikṣā*) carried to the point of certainty vouched for by the intuitive experience of the Apperceiving Self (*Sakṣi*)

in terms of its inner satisfaction of self-certification. The ratifying experience of the Sākṣī is the *acid test* of all validity ascertained after sufficient verification, in cases of reasonable doubt. There is no room for any more *Parikṣā* after the Sākṣī level. Once the Sākṣī sets its seal of approval, it is final. ⁴

The best proof of the unerring certainty and infallibility of Sākṣī is furnished by the most intimate and poignant experiences in life of pleasure, pain, compassion, fright, terror, etc. of which none of us has any occasion to entertain the least shadow of doubt at any time :

मुबृढो निर्णयो यत्र ज्ञेयं तत्साक्षिदर्शनम् ।

इच्छा ज्ञानं सुखं दुःखं भयाभयकृपादयः ॥

साक्षिसिद्धा न कश्चिद्धि तत्र संशयवान् क्वचित् ।

(AV III. 4,41)

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भ्रमत्वमभ्रमत्वं च यदेवानुभवोपगम् ॥

एकस्य भ्रमता तत्र परस्याभ्रमता कुतः ?

भ्रमत्वमभ्रमत्वं च सर्वं वेद्यं हि साक्षिणा ॥

स चेत् साक्षी क्वचिद्दुष्टः कथं निर्णय ईयते ?

तस्मात्सर्वप्रसिद्धस्य व्यवहारस्य सिद्धये ॥

साक्षी निर्दोष एवैकः सदांगीकार्य एव नः ।

शुद्धः साक्षी यदा सिद्धः दुःखित्वं वार्यते कथम् ? ॥

(AV)

4. न परीक्षानवस्था स्यात् साक्षिसिद्धे त्वसंशयात् ।

(AV)

स्वप्रामाण्यं सदा साक्षी गृह्णात्येव सुनिश्चितम्

(AV II.3.28)

The whole of rational existence in the world would be made impossible if the verdict of the Sākṣi as the ultimate reference, foundation and criterion of all knowledge and its validation is impugned, questioned or proved to be in the wrong even in one single instance at any time. The entire basis and superstructure of all religion, science and philosophy would be blown up to pieces, as by an atom bomb the moment one *dares to question or doubt the verdict of the Sākṣi* :

साक्षिणो व्यभिचारश्चेत्, आगमार्थानुमाननिर्दोषत्वाद्य-
वसाये च भ्रमः । अतः पूर्वदिक्से अभेदागमस्य भेदोऽर्थः
स्यात्, निर्दोषानुमायाश्च सदोषत्वं, सदोषानुमाया निर्दोषत्व-
मित्यव्यवस्था

(Madhva : *Pramāṇalaksana*)

The case for Sakṣipramāṇya cannot be put more tellingly

In Advaita, as already pointed out, the Sākṣi is *not* the immaculate Caitanya or its flawless Svārūpendriya, which is ever veridical (*niyatayāthārthya*), as it is in Dvaita thought. It is only the reflection of Caitanya in Avidyāvṛtti and therefore shares its taint. Avidyāvṛtti acts as the conditioning factor (*upādhi*) in reflecting pure Caitanya and this reflection is the Sākṣi :

चैतन्यस्य दोषजन्यत्वेऽपि तदवच्छेदिकाया अविद्या-
वृत्तेः दोषजन्यत्वात्, तत्प्रतिफलितचैतन्यस्यैव साक्षिपदा-
र्थत्वात्

(A-Siddhi p. 44 - 45)

Against this the *Tarangini* has argued that if the Sākṣi is only the reflection of Caitanya in Avidyāvṛtti, the same

Avidyāvṛtti which plays the role of a reflecting medium in giving rise to the Sākṣi will have to be placed within the bounds of the subject which knows (*viśayikoṭi*) as participating in the configuration of the Sākṣi ((*Sākṣīśarīrapraviṣṭa*). In the circumstances, the Advaita position that (the same) Avidyāvṛtti is witnessed by the (same) Sākṣi (*Sākṣībhāṣyā*) would be untenable, involving a self-dependence (*ātmāśraya*). If another Avidyāvṛtti is assumed as its Viśaya (object) that would need yet another Avidyāvṛtti in which the Caitanya is to be reflected, so as to function as the witness of Avidyāvṛtti (for its Viśaya). This process will have to be repeated endlessly, to make both ends meet - which is out of the question.

The only way out of the muddle is to directly recognize Caitanya itself as Sākṣi. As Caitanya is admittedly ever-free from flaws (*nirdoṣa*), its judgment about the reality of the external world and its values and of our experience of the joys and sorrows of life would be indubitably veridical.

अत्रोच्यते — अविद्यावृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बित चैतन्यस्यैव साक्षिपदार्थत्वे, प्रतिबिम्बनोपाधेः अविद्यावृत्तेः साक्षिविषयत्वार्थं तस्या एवोपादानं न युक्तम् प्रतिबिम्बनोपाधिभूताया वृत्तेः विषयिकोटिप्रवेशेन, विषयत्वानुपपत्तेः नाप्यन्यस्याः । तस्या अपि विषयत्वार्थं अन्यस्या इत्यनवस्थानात् चैतन्यमेव साक्षीत्यंगीकार्यम् । तच्च निर्दोषमेव ॥ (Tg)

The above reply of the *Taranginī* to the position taken by the *A-Siddhi* in regard to the nature of the Sākṣi as a mere reflection of Caitanya in Avidyāvṛtti and as such not immaculate or always veridical in its judgment and hence open to flaws is notable for its originality and penetration. It is significant

that Dr. Narain has *not* attempted to answer this criticism of the *Tarangini*.

As already pointed out, the conviction of Dvaita thought in the uncontradicted reality of our vivid experiences of the joys and sorrows of life and the reality of the external world rests on the solid foundations of Sakṣipramāṇa⁵ which is (as already made clear) never-erring in its judgments. Constructive logical and philosophical thinking must recognise the wisdom and sanity of equipping human beings with an absolutely reliable 'Mariner's Compass' on its voyage on the ocean of Samsāra, to reach their destination.

सुखदुःखादिविषयं (अक्षं) शुद्धं संसारगेष्वपि (A^V)

Advaita writers have also tried to belittle the value of verification (*parīkṣā*) relied upon by the Realists in establishing the validity of Perceptual evidence of the world by citing counter-examples of such responsiveness and amenability to verification of a sort, experienced in our dreams of drinking, bathing, eating, etc.

Such an argument can be easily turned against the validity of the Advaita Śrutis also. It cannot be contended here that the monistic texts draw their support from the Vedas which are Apauruṣeya and are backed by the sixfold marks of purport and culminate in the attainment of Brahmanhood in Mokṣa. It is equally possible to *dream* of the existence of Vedic texts which declare that Sūnya-Advaita is the truth or that Sad-dvaita (dualism) is the truth and entertain a doubt in the dream state itself that the auditory sense

5. अस्माभिरपि दुःखादिविषयस्य सत्यत्वायां साक्षिप्रत्यक्षनेवो पर्यस्तं इति हृदयम् (NS p. 30) विश्वगतस्य सत्यतामपि तेनैव साध्यतामः (NS p. 210)

somehow, misapprehends their Pāramārthika character to be of a Vyāvahārika nature or their Vyāvahārika character to be one of Prātibhāsika nature-with the result that ṡunya-Advaita and Dualism (*Sad dvaita*) would turn out to be the real truth of the Śrutis. It cannot be contended that such a doubt cannot arise in the face of the existence of "*Ātma-Advaita Śruti*". For we are confronting the Advaitin with his own contention of the possibility of their future stultification by extending it to the supposed existence of the *Ātma-Advaita Śruti*. The point is this - The validity of *Ātma-Advaita Śruti* can be conclusively established only by the removal of the possibility of the misapprehension of its purport as either Vyāvahārika or Prātibhāsika and *that* cannot be done unless the possibility of doubt about the future stultifiability of the *Ātma-Advaita Śruti* is first removed thus involving an interdependence.

If the possibility of such a misconception about the *Ātma-Advaita Śruti* is rejected on the ground that there is considerable difference between the experiences in a dream and in the waking world, the difference is *not less pronounced* between the perceptions of the experiences of eating, drinking and bathing in a dream and the same acts performed in the waking state - so that the analogy of the supposed fulfilment of appetites in a dream with what happens in the waking state falls to the ground. If the wide difference between the dreaming and the wakeful states is *not* admitted, there is no justification for the Advaitin to regard the dream experience as Prātibhāsika and the wakeful state as Vyāvahārika. It is thus baseless to presume to discredit the evidence of Pratyakṣa, especially of the verified type, on the analogy of dreams.

The distrust of verified Pratyakṣa on the ground of *possible future stultifiability* is as farfetched as the supposition of an effect being produced without a cause and the presumption itself is open to a regression without end. As Udayanācārya has aptly pointed out, only such suppositions can be permitted

as would *not* land us in a self-contradiction. Kumārīlabhaṭṭa too has driven home this point with his pungent humor against the Sūnyavādin :

*Īha janmani keṣān cit na tūvad upalabhyate
Yogavasthām gatānām tu na vidmaḥ kim bhaviṣyati.*⁸

Lastly, it is admitted by Dvaitins and Advaitins alike that validity is intrinsic to knowledge in respect of both its genesis and its cognizance. In the case of 1) verified Perception free from defects, which can deprive it of its self-validity in genesis and 2) the absence of contradiction which makes it trust-worthy, it has *got to be admitted* as binding. Vague and idle doubts about its future stultifiability cannot be taken seriously. The Advaitic bogie of *Bhāvibādha-kaśankā* is an exercise in futility.

To put the matter more graphically, it is absolutely necessary that the contradicting knowledge *nedam rajatam* (*this is not silver*) experienced after the illusory perception *idaṁ rajatam* (*this is silver*), in regard to a piece of shell, *has got to be accepted* as valid - as otherwise the latter cannot be rejected as invalid. If then, the Advaitin should condemn all Pratyakṣa including the verified ones, on the ground of a chimerical doubt of possibility of future stultification, he would be reduced to the unenviable position of one who lets go the principal to get the interest ! He must also admit that there is direct experience of the bliss of selfhood in Suṣupti (dreamless sleep). As all the sense organs including the mind are at rest then, *it is the Sākṣi which must be admitted to experience it directly*. If this Sākṣipratyakṣa is to be discredited as essentially invalid, the experience of the essential character of Ātman as blissfulness cannot be regarded as real and true. As for the Śruti which proclaims that the self is of the essence of blissfulness, it can be discounted as being nothing more than a restatement of the bliss which the self *had*

experienced in the Vyāvahārika state and nothing more ! We have also texts in the Śruti and Smṛti referring to Smṛti, Pratyakṣa, Anumāna and various Āgamas as "*Pramāṇa*". It does not stand to reason that the same word "*Pramāṇa*" is used in two different senses of Vyāvahārika and Pāramārthika in the same context. Some of the early Advaitic writers like Sureśvara have also admitted that the Śruti is "valid" like "*Pratyakṣa*" by reason of its competence to produce knowledge and being devoid of vitiating causes, and in *not being open to contradiction*.

Ato avabodhakatvena duṣṭakāraṇavarjanāt

Abādhaḥ pramāṇātmyam Vastunyakṣādivat Śruteḥ

(Suresvara)

The same is the position of Madhva :

Pratyakṣavacca, Prāmāṇyam svata eva āgamasya hi (AV)

COMPETENCE OF PRATYAKṢA TO GRASP THE UNCONTRADICTABLE REALITY OF THE WORLD AS *NOT* "MITHYĀ"

PRATYAKṢASYA PĀRAMĀRTHIKASATTVAGRAHITVAM

Having disposed of the main ground on which the validity of Pratyakṣa as a Pramāṇa has been impugned by the Advaitin, Vyāsātīrtha now takes up the other contention that, *though valid in a limited sense*, Pratyakṣa is *not* competent to be assured of the uncontradictable nature of its data, in an absolute sense - *Kālatraya-abādhyatvarūpasattva-grahaṇa-akṣamam*.

The phrase: "reality consists in *not* being open to contradiction in all the three periods of time" *kālatraya-abādhyatvarūpam snttvam* has some over-tones which are *not* applicable to the Dvaita perspective. It has been *overworked and exploited* to its own advantage by Monism, by reading *too much into it*, of having a uniform and unchanging nature and existence throughout eternity - which is true of the Supreme Being alone, and *not* of the world. The other term "*Bādha*" is also not free from ambiguity which has been pressed to its advantage by Advaita.

Vyāsātīrtha therefore shows how these overtones are unjustified, by reiterating the Dvaita position regarding the true nature of the world's reality formulating a criterion of reality which is applicable *both* to the world and to Brahman in terms of *Trikālasarvadeśīyāniṣedha-apratīyogitā* (Sattā) *as we have already seen*. The only difference is that such a reality

is established in respect of the world by the Sākṣi pratyakṣa while that of Brahman is established by the Śruti.

If "not being contradicted or *contradictable*" in all the three periods of time means *continuous and unchanging existence* for all time, Dvaita philosophy too does *not* claim such a reality for non-eternal entities in the world. The only sense in which the description of "traikalikaniḥedha - *apratiyogitvam*" can be taken to apply *both* to the *eternals* and the *non-eternals* is that of being the counterpositive of *the absence* of a non-existence which endures thro' all the periods of time. And such an absence is *grasped* when the actual existence of a given thing is grasped as such at a particular time and place :

किंतु कालत्रयवति यदसत्त्वं, तदभावः¹ सच कदाचित्
सत्त्वे गृहातेऽपि गृहीत एव, इति प्रतिपन्नोपाधौ सत्वग्राहिणा
प्रत्यक्षेण तदुपाधौ त्रैकालिकनिषेध-प्रतियोगित्वरूपमिथ्यात्वा-
भावसिद्धिः

(Nym i. 18)

When such an existence is grasped by Perception, it would simultaneously be competent to establish that the entity in question is *not Mithyā*, within the meaning of being the counterpositive of an *absence* of a non-existence which endures thro' all time. For, the immediate perception (*sākṣātkāra*)

1. For further clarification of the meaning of the phrase कालत्रयवति यदसत्त्वं, तदभावः in the Nym see the explanation in the Tg : सर्वकालावच्छेदेन सर्वाधिकरणसंसृष्टव्याप्यवृत्त्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगिविद्यमानताकत्वरूपं यदसत्त्वं तदभाव इत्यर्थः ।।

of an entity at the time of its existence at a given place and time (*svakāla*) is bound to *restrain* its negation with reference *all the three* periods of time, as such, and be assured of its not being liable to be *so contradicted* (for *all* time) :

स्वकाले ह्यस्तितां गृण्णन् साक्षात्कारः त्रिकालगाम्
प्रतिषेधं निरुन्धानो गृण्हात्येवात्यबाध्यताम् ॥

Moreover, in the case of the *Sruti* also, it is validity of the knowledge produced by it that determines non-contradictedness of the subject matter and not its position or status as Verbal testimony; or its grasping the existence of its data without reference to any particular period of time ; or its existence in relation to all periods of time. If such an excessively wide margin is given to it, it would be overstepping the function of a *Pramāṇa*. Since validity of knowledge lies in conveying the truth of the matter as it *is* nothing more than the actual existence of the data at the time of knowledge, irrespective of its having been in existence *before or continuing to be, later*. Since then validity of knowledge is nothing but the non-denial of the factual existence of its objective content,¹ such validity has *got to be* conceded to *Pratyakṣa*, as to the *Sruti*.

And this validity is grasped by the *Sākṣi* in respect of *internal experiences* of pleasure, pain, satisfaction, etc. *directly and mediately*, thro' the validity of the sense-perception, in respect of *external* reals. This is in keeping with the acceptance of the *Svataḥpramāṇya* of knowledge in *Vedānta*, which means that the validity of knowledge is grasped by the same agency as grasps the knowledge itself and only a conscious principle such as the Apperceiving Self can be such an agency

1. *Nahi viṣaya-abādham anantarbhāvyā prāmāṇyagrahaṇam
nāma* (Nym)

as *Vṛttijñāna* is *not* self-luminous - *unlike the Sākṣi*. Madhva is therefore within his rights in demanding of the Advaitin -

यदि त्वत्स्वं प्रामाण्ये विश्वसत्ता कथं न ते ?

How could one refuse to accept the reality of the world, consistent with the acceptance of self-validity of knowledge ?

Another important point to be noted in this connection is that validity cannot be circumscribed by *time factor*. It is a question of fact and not of duration of the object. What is (truly) valid now cannot be invalidated the next moment or later.

प्रामाण्यस्य च मर्यादा कालतो व्याहता भवेत्
कालान्तरेऽप्यमानं चेदिदानीं मानता कुतः ?

(AV)

This is an irrefutable truth.

The only difference, as between *Sruti* and *Pratyakṣa* is that whereas B.'s existence is grasped on the authority of the *Sruti* as not circumscribed by past, present and future periods of time, the existence of sensible objects like a jar is grasped by perception as circumscribed by a time limit - "*as now present*". But the fact remains that the validity of that means of proof by which the uncontradictedness of that entity whose existence has been grasped by it is common to both the validity of the *Sruti* and of *Pratyakṣa*.¹

It is *not* the contention of *Dvaita* philosophy that *Pratyakṣa* grasps or is competent to grasp *the eternal existence of things* (which are *not* eternal at all)! Its competence to grasp its

१. यद्देशकालप्रकारावच्छेदेन तु यस्य येन सत्ता गृहीता, तस्य तदवच्छेदेन तथात्वं प्रामाण्यप्रयुक्तं उभयसाधारणम् ।

given data in their given *locus* in terms of an uncontradicted and uncontradictable reality in the sense of their *not* being the counterpositives of any negation in regard to *all the three periods of time*, is what is meant by saying that it is “not-mithyā” :

*Iti pramāṇena pratyakṣeṇa nityatvasiddhāvapi svopādhau
traikālika-niṣedhāpratiyogitvarūpam ātmyantika-abādhyatvam
siddhyatveva* (Nym)

Moreover, the crucial question is whether the “contradiction” which is supposed by the Advaitin to annul the existence of the given object perceived by Pratyakṣa does so *only* with reference to a *future date and time* or, negates its existence with reference to the *very time also at which it was grasped* by Pratyakṣa to be existing at a certain time and place.

In the first alternative, the earlier knowledge which grasped the objective content as existing, cannot be deemed to be *invalid at all* by any serious person. It can only be treated as *impermanent (anitya)* which is not the same as “Mithyā”. In the second alternative, the object will have to come to be reduced to a nullity (*atyanta-asat*), which the Advaitin is *not* prepared to admit *openly*.

If all that the Advaitin wants to convey is that the world is “anitya” (not eternal), why should he rack his wits to coin a *New and misleading designation* for it as “Mithyā”? This recklessness of *traditional Advaita* has in recent times given rise to an earnest call *from within the Advaitic fold itself* for a “Neo-Vedanta” in which the doctrine of “Mithyātva” of the world and its “Jñāna-bādhyatva” stand *banished*. (See *PREFACE* for the views expressed by Svami Tapasyānanda in his latest book *Bhakti Schools of Vedanta*, Madras, 1991.)

Moreover, the Apperceiving Self (Śākṣi) which grasps the existence of future time, must be adjudged to be competent to grasp the all-pervasiveness of Space and other realities which fall directly under its purview, as well as the reality of the external world and the things therein like jars and other things. Tho' not lying directly under its intuitive grasp (as in the case of pleasure and pain) it must be admitted to be able to grasp their (uncontradicted) absence of subsequent "contradiction" (in the sense defined above) thro' grasping their reality on the basis of the evidence supplied by flawless perception itself. For, it must be noted that there is *no grasping of validity without including the uncontradictedness of its data* -

Nahi viṣaya-abādham anantarbhāvyā prāmaṇyagrahaṇam nāma

(Nym)

The Advaitin has perforce to give up his obstinate position that Pratyakṣa is competent *only* to grasp what is present, in principle. Otherwise, he cannot, in reason, establish the "mithyātva" of shell-silver, the snake-in-the rope etc., to be counterpositives of a negation in regard to *all the three periods of time*, which includes the past and the future. (*nāsti, nāsit, na bhaviṣyati*). Such contradicting cognition (*bādhakajñāna*) is *not an inference but a Pratyakṣa*. How is this possible, if Pratyakṣa were incompetent to grasp the future? - it matters little whether it is of existence or non-existence. *If future non-existence can be grasped by Pratyakṣa why can future existence not be?* The terms of the Bādhakajñāna itself give the whole case of the Advaitin away.

The Pāramārthika reality - not subject to contradiction in all the three periods of time, of objects of valid perception follows from the same criterion by which the distinction of the Vyāvahārika from the Prātibhāsika is established by the

Advaita. For, it must be admitted by the Advaita that there is some distinction in the cognition which comprehends objects like a jar to be "Vyāvahārika" from the knowledge which cognises the silver (in shell). That distinction itself is sufficient to bear out the indisputable reality of the former.

If the existence of the world borne out by Pratyakṣa is not truly real (*tāttvika*) how can the *mithyātva* of the shell-silver established by Pratyakṣa be *tāttvika* (true) as distinguished from the other? Surely, there is practically not the slightest difference between the judgments the jar is real, the shell-silver is false. The falsity of the latter must be as true as the reality of the former. If the falsity of the shell-silver should be stultified at a subsequent time, the shell-silver would turn out to be a reality.

If Pāramārthika-satya (in the sense of not being the counterpositive of a negation (for all the three periods of time) is *not* open to perception, the Śrutis which negate it would be negating something which is outlandish and [not "given in evidence". The dilemma is that if Pratyakṣa is not representing what is not real (*atattva*) as *tattva* (real) how can the Advaita condemn Pratyakṣa as not truth-declaring (*a-tattvāvedaka*). How can a Pramāṇa which *grasps* what is vyāvahārika in truth to be "Vyāvahārika" (instead of as Pāramārthika) be treated a "*a-tattvāvedaka*"? It is only when Perception (mis)-presents the world which to the Advaitin is "Vyāvahārika" to be "Pāramārthika" that it can be stigmatized as *a-tattvāvedaka*. The Advaitin is thus forced by his own logic to back out from his position and concede that Pratyakṣa, *after all*, grasps the external world as "Pāramārthika" *regardless of what the Advaitin feels about it*. It is a different question altogether whether Pratyakṣa is justified in doing so. But there is no disputing the *fact* that it *does* cognise the world as "Pāramārthika" and is competent to do

so.¹ The universal experience and judgment of humanity is also in full accord with it. Hence Pratyakṣa must be accepted to be in a position to grasp the *absence of Mithyātvā* in terms of the object of perception *not* being the counterpositive of a negation in all the three periods of time in its own locus. The probans of perceivability etc. as grounds of *Mithyātvā* stand *set aside by sound Pratyakṣa*.

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1. Cf. *Pramāṇāni hi svagocare pravartamānāni tattvam idam ityeva pravartane*
Na punaḥ sāmvyavahārikam naḥ prāmāṇyam iti (Bhāmati)

THE RELATION BETWEEN CONSCIOUSNESS AND ITS OBJECT IS REAL AND IS NOT SUPERIMPOSED

(*Dṛgdrśyasambandhānupapattibhaṅgaḥ*)

Having made perceivability of objects the ground of their falsity, Advaitic dialecticians have naturally sought to find support for it in an indirect mode of reasoning (*anukūlatarka*) which is intended to undermine the foundation of Realism. They contend that it is impossible to find a real viable relation between consciousness (*dṛk*) and its object (*drśya*), or define it satisfactorily. Accordingly, they have concluded that *there is no real relation between the two and that the truth is that objects are only superimposed on one indivisible, undivided universal Ātmic consciousness which is transcendental and its relation to objects as we know them is only a super-imposed one. As the relation of consciousness to its object is thus unreal, the relatum (object) must naturally be deemed to be unreal, in its turn.*

This alleged impossibility of conceiving of a suitable relation between them and the difficulty of defining it in a logically satisfactory manner expressed by the phrase "*Dṛgdrśyasambandha-anupapatti*" is posed as a *reductio ad absurdum*,

Dr. Narain regards this as the *unique* character of Śāṅkarite methodology which seeks to prove the conclusion of the falsity of objects by resorting to the method of *reductio ad absurdum* by eliminating all possibilities of a

satisfactory explanation of objectivity and its relation to consciousness" (*Op. Cit.* p. 60). This is *not after all so original* or 'unique' an argument or a methodology. As Vyāsārtha points out, at the very outset of his criticism of it, it is not only reminiscent of but is actually a *rehash* of the well-known *Grāhyalakṣaṇābhava-tarka*, advanced long before the Śāṅkarites by the Vijñānavāda Buddhists :

अन्यच्चेत्संबिदो नीलं न तत् भासेत संविदि । भासते
चेत्कुतः सर्वो न भासेतैकसंविदि ? नियामकं न सम्बन्धं
पश्यामो नीलतद्वियोः ॥¹

For it stands to reason that if what is perceived is a reality, the consciousness of it cannot possibly illumine it without coming into contact with it. Nor can it do so by contacting it. For, consciousness being *an attribute of the self* cannot enter into any relation (*sambandha*) of Samyoga (conjunction) or of inherence with it and there is *no other relation than these two*.

For a similar reason, we cannot think of their relation as one of Viśaya-Viśayibhāva (subject object relation). For a relation is something *different* from the *relata* and abides in them. This is not the case with the subject-object nexus.

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1. "If what is blue is *different* from its consciousness, it cannot shine forth in it. If it does in spite of its being other than consciousness, why do other colors like redness or greenness *not* do so in it, in the same way? We are therefore unable to find any determinant of objectivity justifying a real relation between consciousness and the objects passing through and across it. Hence the relation must be regarded as a superimposed one". (Tr.)

That apart, it is difficult to precisely define the nature of *Viṣayaviṣayibhāva* or “*Viṣayatva*” (objectivity to knowledge) as such. Most of the definitions offered by Realists suffer from one defect or another. For example, the definition of *Viṣayatva* as *Jñāna-janya-vyavahārayogyatvam* (fitness to objective reference produced by the knowledge) is open to self-dependence and is underpervasive, as such a “fitness” which is also part of its objectivity cannot be known without indenting upon *another* “fitness” about its objectivity.

No viable conception of perceivability in terms of *Viṣayatva* and *Viṣayaviṣayibhāva* between consciousness and its object can be found from the point of view of the acceptance of the reality of objects as such. We have therefore to take it that their relation is *not* a real one but is merely superimposed (*ādhyāsika*) on consciousness.

In answer to these objections, Vyāsatīrtha points out that there is no necessity or compulsion to do away with the reality of objects presented to consciousness on the ground of there being no suitable relation between them, if the objects too should be accepted as real.⁴ For Advaita epistemology has itself adopted the highly sophisticated theory of *Vṛtti* (mental psychosis) in which *the modification of the mind-stuff taking the shape of the object*, after flowing out to the external object thro’ the sense organ and giving rise to the knowledge of the object after passing thro’ some further process of intellection among the threefold distinctions of Caitanya into *Pramāṭṛ*, *Prameya* and *Pramāṇa* (*Caitanyas*).

It is obviously essential that the object be “given” and be “out there” before it can be flooded by the light of the *antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*, in the Sāṅkarite theory of Perception. This

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2. Sankara himself in his *BSB* says : (1.1.4) :
Vastutantram eva tat (jñānam)

necessitates the *prior existence* of the object "out there" for the Vṛtti to act on it. As this Vṛtti itself provides sufficient nexus (*sambandha*) between the already existing object and its subsequent awareness there is hardly any justification to assume the relation between consciousness and its object to be a superimposed one (with the implication that the object itself is unreal).

In this context, Vyāsātīrtha refers to the contention of some Advaitins that the purpose of the Vṛtti is not to serve as a medium (*dvāra*) in regulating the perception of objects superimposed on one ever-shining transcendental consciousness of Brahman, by different persons at different times as determined by their different Vṛttis, but to establish a direct contact between different units of consciousness which are the substrate of the superimposed object when such consciousness is made manifest by the respective Vṛttis.

Against this view, Vyāsātīrtha points out that Advaita philosophy cannot hold a position akin to that of the Vijnānavāda idealism of the Buddhists that the various objects perceived are superimposed on different fleeting moments of a stream of consciousness. As the one pure consciousness which is transcendental is essentially undifferentiated, it cannot split itself into the many. If it is to be differentiated through the conditioning factors (*upādhi*) of particular objects as its adjuncts,, such a conditioned consciousness would also be *Mithyā* and cannot as such serve as the *substrate* of a superimposed relation. For the *adhiṣṭhāna* (substrate) is, in principle, required to be of a higher degree or order of reality than the *āropya* (superimposed)*. Even if the conditioning factor differentiating the all-pervasive consciousness into many is

3. *Upādhivīśiṣṭāyābhede 'pi Ghaṭādivan mithyātvena tadadhiṣṭhānāyogāt (Nym)*

regarded as a mere external mark of identification and passing reference (*upalakṣaṇa*) and may admit of the particularised consciousness being regarded as a substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) for the superimposition of the relation (the object), still, it cannot be treated as a distinct unit of consciousness, as it would cut at the root of undifferentiated oneness of the transcendental consciousness, as taught by the Śruti (*ekam eva advītiyam*).

The only sustainable position for the Advaita to take is thus to accept the undifferentiable transcendental consciousness as the substratum of superimposition of objects. Since that involves the difficulty of regulating the nature of perception of different objects superimposed on it at different times by different persons, differently, the doctrine of each percipient's *Vṛtti* has necessarily to be accepted as the regulating medium or link in the process of individual perceptions. There is no avoiding or by-passing the *Vṛtti*.

The operation of the *Vṛtti* presupposes the prior existence of the objects. There is thus no difficulty in establishing a viable relation between consciousness and its object by means of *Vṛtti* itself. That eliminates the need to put up a superimposed relation between consciousness and the object.

The very fact, that there is no illumination of the object in spite of the existence of a supposed superimposed relation subsisting between them, even before they are brought into mutual relation thro' the *Vṛtti*, is enough to show that the superimposed relation is not the determining factor in the perception of the object.⁴

4. *Vṛttidvāraśambandhāt prāg adhyastatvarāpe
Sambandhe satyapi Drśya-apratiteḥ* (Nym)

In this connection Dr. K. Narain has accused Vyāsātīrtha of having "incorrectly understood the Advaita position which, in reality, seeks to establish the superimposed character of the relation between knowledge and its object only with reference to knowledge which is pure and indeterminate and where there is no *Vṛtti* to accord a linkage" (*Op. Cit.* p. 64) "We find this confusion in this criticism that knowledge cannot be the substratum of superimposition of the object as the substratum must be always of a higher degree in the order of reality" (*Op. Cit.* p. 63-64).

The objection raised by Vyāsātīrtha is with reference to the role of the (*ghaṭādhiṣṭhāna*). — Caitanya (delimited by the object of perception involved in the *Vṛtti*). His criticism that the supposed superimposition of objects in many *adhiṣṭhāna*-Caitanyas would violate the principle that the *adhiṣṭhāna* should be of a higher order of reality than the *āropya* is strictly with reference to such a view and is not directed against the other position of objects being superimposed on the one undifferentenced transcendental consciousness. The misunderstanding is only on Dr. Narain's part. For Vyāsātīrtha has himself made it abundantly clear that in Advaita it is the *anāvṛta-akhaṇḍa caitanya* which is the substratum of the *Adhyāsa* of all phenomenal reality.⁵

If, as Dr. Narain says, Vyāsātīrtha had "incorrectly understood" and represented the Advaita position, in this regard, his relentless critic, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, would have lost no time in taking him to task for his lapse. But no such adverse comment on this point has been made by the *Advaita-siddhi*. So the boot is on the other leg.

5. सर्वस्यापि दृश्यस्य ब्रह्मात्मकदृग्दृश्यस्तत्त्वेऽपि कस्यचित् कदाचित्, कंचित् प्रति प्रकाशाय त्वयापि तत्तत्सन्निकृष्टेन्द्रियजन्यतत्तदाकारवृत्तिद्वारक एव अनावृत दृक्सम्बन्धश्च स्वीकृतः ॥
(*Nym.* 1.23).

It is not fair to say there is no other viable relation between consciousness and its object. Just as it is possible to think of the relation of *Samavāya* between a substance and its attributes even when the relation of *Samyoga* is not possible, it is equally possible to think of a viable relation between consciousness and its object in the absence of both *Samyoga* and *Samavāya*. There are instances of a relation of qualifier and qualified (*viśeṣanaviśeṣyabhāva*) in such cognitions as (i) "this part of the ground has no jar on it" (ii) "the jar that is known", where we cannot think of any relation of *Samyoga* or *Samavāya*, between them. In such cases of qualified cognitions *viśiṣṭajñāna* the relation has to be admitted to be one of qualifier and qualified embodied by them. On the same analogy, the relation between knowledge and its object can be regarded as one of subject-object embodied by them - without being subsumable under *Samyoga* or *Samavāya*. There is no dearth of relations other than *Samyoga* and *Samavāya* in the repertoire of thought and language. The genitive case has been recognised to stand for a hundred and one relations (*ekaśatam śaṣṭhyarthāḥ*)⁶ in the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali. Among these are *Viśayatva*, *Viśayitva*, *Prakāratva*, *Pratīyogitva*, *Nirūpitatva*, *Vṛttitva*, *Ādheyatva*, *Prayuktva*, etc. referred to by commentators. Where then is the difficulty in recognising *Viśayaviśayibhāva* as a viable relation? The formulation of the norms of logical thought should not fly in the face of observed facts established by the evidence of experience. Facts cannot be rejected as fiction or forced into the straight jackets of preconceived patterns. The question of opting for an un-named superimposed relation between knowledge and its object cannot arise until

6. The *Saṣṭhi-daṇḍaka* is a work on Sankrit grammar, now lost to us as stated by Kaiyaṣa in his c. on the *Mahābhāṣya*. The *A-Siddhi* does not answer the point made by Vyāsātīrtha, on the basis of the *Saṣṭidaṇḍaka*, in support of the admissibility of the *Viśayaviśayibhāva* relation.

all the possibilities of finding a real viable relation other than *Samyoga* and *Samavāya* have been explored and exhausted.

Nor can their relation be repudiated on the ground that knowledge as an attribute of the self is *internal* while the object is external. As in respect of *Samavāya* (inherence) the proof of the existence of an intrinsic relation between knowledge and its object has to be accepted as capable of accommodating all the necessary requirements of the relationship by virtue of its own provenness (*dharmigrāhakapramāṇa*). Otherwise, as a relation is normally predicated of only such things as are experienced to be existing separately or together, the fact of a cloth and its threads not so *experienced* ⁷ may have to be considered to be a bar to the acceptance of *Samavāya* as a relation - as, by hypothesis, the relata of a *Samavāya* relation are *Aprithaksiddha* (never found dissociated from each other).

If an intrinsic relation between knowledge and its object is to be rejected because of the inapplicability of the other relations of *Samyoga* and *Samavāya*, the present destruction of a pot cannot be related to its counter-positive (which is no longer in existence) and in the absence of any such relation it would be impossible to know to which object the destruction is to be related. In the same way, the absolute negation (*atyantābhāva*) which forms part of the definition of 'Mithyātva' cannot be related to its counterpositive - in which case, it would forfeit its Mithyātvam. The desire for Mokṣa cannot be related to deliverance which is yet to come, in which case, Mokṣa could hardly be considered a Puruṣārtha. These cases cannot be explained on the basis of a superimposed relation, as there can be no superimposition of the Pratiyogi

7. Cf, *Tantubhyo anyañ paṣas sākṣāt kasya dṛṣṭipatham gataḥ?* (*Brahmatarka*)

(counterpositive) on the absolute negation and similarly, in the other cases.

Even conceding for a while that *Viśayatva* (objectivity) is false like the relation of *Samyoga*, between consciousness and its object, it would *not* necessarily follow that the *drśyatva* (of the world) is also false. For, the falsity of the relation has *not deprived consciousness* of its reality tho' it is one of the *relata*! What is the harm if, by the same token, the object of that consciousness too is *real*, notwithstanding the falsity of the relation in question? The logic of the falsity of the *relata* if the relation is false must apply equally to both. The same yardstick must be applied to both. The same yardstick must be applied to both. The explanation or the plea that objects are open to superimposition, while *consciousness is not* is *not entirely true*! Śaṅkara himself speaks, lustily, in his *Adhyāsabhāṣya* of the mutual superimposition (*itaretara-adhyāsa*) of *Pratyagātman* and *anātman*.⁸

What exactly is the term "superimposed relation" (*ādhyāsikasambandha*) intended to convey? Does it mean some unspecified relation has been superimposed or that the very superimposition is the relation?

In the first case the *Mithyātva* of the perceptible will *not* follow as a corollary, for the *relata* can be real in spite of the falsity of the relation. - just as the jar tho' superimposed need not be *mithyā*⁹. The seco alternative is also untenable. For as according to the Advaita,

8. तं प्रत्यगात्मानं सर्वसाक्षिणं तद्विषयं येनान्तः करणादिषु अध्यस्यति
(S. *Adhyāsabhāṣya*)

9. Read यथा तात्त्विकैकदेशिमते अजन्यसंयोगात् विभुद्वयसंयोगस्या
रोपितत्वेन मिथ्यात्वेऽपि संबन्धिनोः मिथ्यात्वाभावात् । (Com. 20)

like the knowable, its knowledge is also superimposed, there can be *no* super-imposition of the one on the other. Knowledge cannot be superimposed on the knowable which is *mithyā* and cannot serve as the *adhiṣṭhāna* for its superimposition. The knowable too being *mithyā* (*vyāvahārika*) cannot serve as the *adhiṣṭhāna* of the superimposition of *jñāna*, for the same reason - as the *adhiṣṭhāna* is required to be of higher order of reality - even as the *Prātibhāsika* silver cannot be superimposed on *Prātibhāsika* shell but only on *Vyāvahārika* shell. Just as the Supreme Brahman which is known thro' *Sābdavṛtti* is *not* superimposed on it, even so the object of knowledge is not superimposed on it, Similarly the *Viśaya* too is not superimposed on the *Viśayi* (subject) - just as Brahman which is the object (*viśaya*) of *Avidyā*¹⁰ is *not* superimposed on *Avidyā*. There is thus no case for treating the relation of consciousness to its objects as superimposed. It has therefore to be admitted to be very real.

The question of *which then is the relation* is *not* so vital to our discussion. The anomaly involved in Cosmic *Adhyāsa* in regulating individual perceptions in Advaita epistemology are once for all eliminated in the Realistic theory of perception by making out a strong case for a *real world* and *real objects* therein with *real individual selves* taking part in its affairs, in which a viable relation other than *Samyoga* or *Samavāya* has been established between knowledge and its objects thro' contact of the senses with their appropriate objects. There is no purpose to be served by affixing a name or a label with a single word upon the relation to describe it.¹¹

10. आश्रयत्वविषयत्वभागिनी निर्विशेषचित्तिरेवं केवला ।

(Sankṣepa Śāriraka)

11. Cf. *Asamkīrṇavyavahyter yoginam paramānusu* |

Viśeṣakalpane tatra viśeṣecchā Vṛthā Tava ||

Udayana : *Kiraṇāvali*

The establishment of anything for certain has to be done on the basis of definitions and proofs. The proofs of the existence of a true relation have been given in the form of syllogisms (in the Nym). If the definitions could be accommodated within the framework of Samyoga or Samavāya, they may hold good. If *not*, the definition could be in terms of Viśaya-Viśayi-bhāva (subject-object relation). It is not necessary that the relation or its definition should be capable of being couched and expressed in a single term like Samyoga or Samavāya.

Even the absence of knowledge (Jñānābhāva) must have an object other than of 'being removed by the knowledge of the thing in question. Otherwise, it could not be removed by it, in so far as it can be removed only by the knowledge of the object of absence of the knowledge till then. Though, like darkness, "A-jñāna may cover its abode, it cannot be conceived without reference to an object. This has been admitted by the author of the *Sankṣepaśārīraka* when he speaks of the Nirviśeṣa-Brahman as the *abode* and the *object* of original ignorance. If in the case of absence of a thing caused by its destruction, its relation to its counterpositive (which *was* in actual existence before its destruction) some sort of a Svarūpasambandha (intrinsic relation) capable of sustaining a judgment of qualifier and qualified or a counterpositiveness not partaking of the nature of a recognised relation of Samyoga or Samavāya, is admitted to account for fulfilling the function of a proper relation, there is no harm in claiming the same right to "Viśaya Viśayi-bhāva". It would be premature to say *at this stage* that this relation too between *bhāva* and *abhāva*, or between *dhvamsa* (destruction) and its counterpositive (*pratiyogi*) is also a superimposed one. *Until the thesis of the Mithyātva of the universe is proved to the hilt, no superimposed relation can be requisitioned as it would involve an interdependence in argument.*

The criticisms that if the relation between knowledge and its objects should be *different* from the relata it will lead to a regress and if *not different* it could not be termed as "relation" have been shown to be self-contradictory. It is perfectly logical to invest the relation itself with the necessary self-linking capacity with reference to itself and the relata, *just as Dṛśyatva is open to perception without indenting upon another Dṛśyatva to facilitate it.*

As regards the question of the definition of "Viśayatva" in regard to Jñāna, it may be pointed out it is not so very relevant. However, it is not difficult to sustain the alternative definitions put forward earlier, with necessary adjuncts and qualifications to plug loopholes. For example, the definition of Viśaya as —

यज्ज्ञानं यदभिलषन्नरूपव्यवहारकारणं स तस्य विषयः

"the object (Viśaya) of a knowledge is that which is the cause of putting it to practical use" is not disqualified by defects in the auxiliaries of the cause, when the defects are removed. We do not admit that sort of an indeterminate knowledge which is never capable of any practical response in any sense. The other definition of Viśayatva as *Jñānajananyavyavahārayogyatvam* or the fitness to evoke suitable *vyavahara*, the *yogyatā* or fitness is to be defined as the certainty of production of the *Vyavahāra* in the absence of auxiliary deficiencies. The fitness itself is self-linking like *Dṛśyatva* admitting of its own *Dṛśyatva* or the superimposed relation which does not need another superimposition to facilitate its application. The self-dependence here is not a defect as it does not arrest the manifestation of its self-manifestation again, if need be.

In any case, Viśaya can maintain its identity and reality in spite of its not being defined to the core. Its criticism by the Advaita school is self-contradictory, as Advaita dialecticians have themselves recognised its *bona fides* in formulating their

syllogism to prove the existence of Avidyā in terms of *Vivādādhyāsitam pramāṇajñānam svaviṣayāvaraṇa*.... and have also introduced it in the form of *Drśyatva* which is the same as *Dṛgviṣayatva* in the probans of the famous *Mithyātvanumāna* : विश्वं मिथ्या दृश्यत्वान्.

It cannot be contended that the "Viṣayatva" referred to in the *Vivaraṇa-anumāna* is also a superimposed one on *Pramāṇajñāna*, in the form of the *Vṛtti*. Moreover, it is incumbent on the Advaitins too to define *Viṣayatva* in the interest of *Vyāvahārikasattva* as distinct from the *Prātibhāsika*. Hence, there is no point in blaming the Realist for not producing a fool-proof definition of "Viṣayatva"

One wonders how the Advaitins feel bound to define *Mithyātva* in five different ways, while they do not seem to realise their responsibility to define the probans of *Drśyatva*, which is the same as objectivity to knowledge, (*dṛgviṣayatva*), in the last analysis.

The mere formulation of a definition does not guarantee the existence of the defined or the failure to do so annul its existence. For, according to *Sriharṣa* the definition of Brahman in the *Srutis* as the "Cause" of the world is riddled with difficulties. But that does not make Brahman unreal. Advaitins themselves have proclaimed that the *Pratyagātman* defies definition this way or that:

कीदृक् तत्प्रत्यगिति चेत् तादृगीदृगिति द्वयम् ।
यत्र न प्रसृत्येतत् प्रत्यगित्यवधारय ॥ ()

The long and short of it is that what is given by unimpeachable evidence has a right to be accepted as viable, despite our inability to define it beyond a certain limit. The physiognomy of hundreds of human faces encountered every day in our lives defies our powers of exact verbal definition.

The presence of knowledge, reality, bliss and self-luminosity in Brahman does not become false because they are indefinable, in the light of the criticisms of the Khaṇḍanakāra.

It must therefore be admitted that whatever the difficulties in the way of its definition, the reality of the world and the countless objects therein cannot be discarded-like the differences in the sweetness of honey, sugarcane and milk, or the nature of Brahman. The limitations of our understanding and powers of verbalisation have to be recognised - as pointed by Udayana :

नहि नीलं जात्यन्धेन द्रष्टुं शक्यं वा न शक्यत शक्यत इति
अज्ञेयमनिर्वाच्यमेव तत् । दुरवगाहत्वेनाप्युपपेत्तेः

(*Bauddhadhikkāra*)

Just because a congenitally blind man is unable to see and describe what is "blue" it does not become unknowable or undefinable. It merely shows his inability to comprehend it.



CHAPTER XVIII

CRITIQUE OF PRATIKARMAVYAVASTHĀ OR THE DOCTRINE OF PERCEPTION IN ADVAITA

'Pratikarma-Vyavasthā' is the name given in Advaita philosophy to the epistemological theory of perception involving the mechanism and modality by which, in spite of the fact that external objects of our consciousness (*dṛśya*) are, by hypothesis, all of them superimposed on one universal, undivided, indivisible consciousness, the only reality that exists they come to be perceived and revealed to the consciousness of particular percipients only, at particular times, without overlapping.

It is explained that as the water from an irrigation tank flows out of the sluices and spreads itself over each demarcated piece of land and assumes its distinctive form and shape, even so subsequent to the contact of the sense-organs with their given objects the mind-stuff (*antahkaraṇa*) which has its own parts and which is constituted of the element of *tejas* and endowed with great velocity, flows out thro' the senses and assumes, by transformation, the form and shape of the objects. This transformation is called "*Vṛtti*". However, the *Vṛtti* not being self-luminous (as the *antahkaraṇa*, its material cause, is insentient), consciousness (*Caitanya*) has to step in to illuminate the objective content of the *Vṛtti*, after the *Vṛtti* has lifted the veil of nescience and dispelled it. It is now left to the *Caitanya* to illumine the object which has been superimposed on it from time immemorial.

There are however two divergent views regarding the nature and identity of the Caitanya which "lights up" the object. One is that the Jiva-Caitanya itself, which is co-pervasive with beginningless nescience (*Avidyā*), the source of cosmic illusion, lights up the objects of the *Vṛtti* which has been superimposed on consciousness, till then. The other view is that the Jiva-Caitanya, being limited by the mind-stuff, becomes circumscribed (*paricchinna*). In the first position, irrespective of the Jiva Caitanya being covered by *Avidyā* or not, it is able to illumine the object of the *Vṛtti* - the *Vṛtti* being utilised in this case, only to establish the necessary rapport of Caitanya with the object and not to illumine it, which is done by the Caitanya. In the second view, the Jiva-Caitanya being delimited by the mind-stuff and circumscribed by *Avidyā*, it is Brahma-Caitanya which is called in to illumine the object, through yet another special process, which will be explained later.

It is to be noted that in the former view the Jiva-Caitanya, though all-pervasive, being unattached (*asaṅga*) requires the help of the *Vṛtti* to establish the necessary rapport (*Samśleṣa*) with the object. In the alternative of its pervasiveness, the Jiva-Caitanya being obscured by *Avidyā*, the purpose of the *Vṛtti* is only to dispel the veil of obscuration by nescience and the Caitanya coming into its own, directly illumines it.

On the other view, where the Jiva-Caitanya gets "limited" by the mind-stuff, the *Vṛtti* uncovers the veil of *Avidyā* around the Caitanya (the substrate) and enables it to be reflected in the *Vṛtti*, which enables it to manifest its own essential identity with the all-pervasive Brahmācāitanya, which happens to be the substrate of (world-illusion and of) the particular superimposed object (*Viśayādhiṣṭhāna-Caitanya*). The consummation of this flash-revelation of the identity of the two Caitanyas (the one reflected in the *Vṛtti* and the other which is the substrate of the superimposed objects - and the "lighting up" of the object as a consequence is termed objective consciousness

(Viśaya-aparokṣa)—Cf.

Tasmād adhiṣṭhānacaitanyam Svādhyastam bhāsayati iti.

(A—Siddhi, p. 94).

The doctrine of "Vṛtti" has been introduced to explain the fragmentation of individual perceptions of different perceptions of different objects by different persons at different times, instead of by all, of all and everywhere.

The contact of the sense-organs with their respective objects is the first step. Following it, the Taijasa mind-stuff flows out thro' the sockets of the senses and assumes the form and shape of the object. This is Vṛtti which, as we have seen, either establishes rapport of the Caitanya with the object or subjugates the āvaraṇa (obscurator by Avidyā) and paves the way for the reflection of the consciousness delimited by the antaḥkaraṇa, in the Vṛtti.

The second hurdle is that the Vṛtti cannot occur without the initial contact of the sense-organ with the given object. Unless the object is "out there" prior to the Vṛtti, the antaḥkaraṇa cannot, go out thro' the senses and envelop the object and take its form and shape. *There is the rub.* The prior existence of the object makes nonsense of the presumption of the superimposition of all objects on consciousness. A superimposed object has no prior existence, apart from its appearance in an illusory cognition. *It has no before or after.* How then is the contact of the senses with the object prior to the Vṛtti to be explained?

If such a contact is conceded there is no need to dub the objects perceived as superimposed on consciousness. The acceptance of superimposition of objects on consciousness (even before Vṛtti) and its reversal is a farcical way of trying to explain the problem of perception, by disowning it, instead of solving it in a rational way.

For, following the sensory contact with the given object "out there", individual consciousness can directly cognise it, doing away with the Vṛtti going out and taking the form of

the object and the Caitanya reflected in the Vṛtti executing a flash-like identity with the substrate-consciousness!

In defence of the indispensability of the contact of the sense-organs with the object, in the interest of Vṛtti, Advaita philosophers explain that 'empirical objects' like a jar differ from the illusory ones like the snake-in-the rope (*prātibhāsika*), in *not* being merely imagined to exist and having no *esse* of their own, other than the *appearance* of having one (*pratīti-mātraśarīraka*). "Empirical objects", they say, have an "empirical existence", which being subject to sublation by Ātmic knowledge, theirs is a special type of imagined existence (*Kalpītatvāt sakāśād viśeṣaḥ*).

This distinction is itself baseless. For, by the same token of their experience *not* being a matter of mere appearance (*pratītimātraśarīratvābhāvena*), it can logically be established that they are *not* sublatable by Jñāna, for what is negated by knowledge is concomitant with being *Pratītimātraśarīraka*, or whose *esse* is a matter of appearance only.

प्रतीतिभावशरीरकत्वाभावेन ज्ञाननिवर्त्यत्वाभावस्यापि
आपाद्यत्वात्

Here, the *Advaita-Siddhi* makes a feeble attempt to explain that the world of external reality 'tho' established to be *Kalpita* (imagined) on grounds of incompatibility of viable relation between consciousness and its objects (*dṛḍśyasambandhānupapatti*) and Inference of Falsity (*mithyātva-anumāna*), still, its stability (*sthitīritva*) and durability are attested by the evidence of Pratyabhijñā (recollection). Tho' such a seeming recollection of stability and durability is possible in illusory experiences also, as in a dream, the objects of external world pass the test of verification (*parikṣītaiva*) while the illusory appearances *do not* and *cannot* stand the test of *Parikṣā*.

दृग्दृश्यसम्बन्धानुपपत्तितद्गृहीतानुमानात् प्रपञ्चे कल्पितत्वे
स्थिते, प्रत्यभिज्ञावलाच्च स्थायिवे, तत्रैव व्यभिचारात्,

प्रतीत्यविशेषेऽपि, वणिग्दीधीस्थरूप्यशुक्तिरूप्ययोः परीक्षित-
त्वापरीक्षितत्वाभ्यां स्थापित्वास्थायित्वरूपविशेषसंभवात् ।

(*A. Siddhi.*, p. 87)

It may be recalled that it is precisely on the ground of Parikṣita-pratyakṣa certified by the Sākṣi on which the realistic philosophy of Madhva takes its stand on the *unsuperimposed* actual existence and reality of the external objects of the world.² And yet Madhusūdana would have none of it, tho' it does not prevent him from taking a leaf from Mādhva epistemology in calling in parikṣitapratyakṣa to sustain empirical reality, when it suits him here.

When the Upaniṣad says that Brahman after creating the finite world, also enters into it to sustain it (*Taitt. Up.* II. 6.) to educe name and form from primordial matter, thro' Trivṛtkaraṇa (*Chān. Up.* VI. 4.3) the author of the *A-Siddhi* would have us accept that such activities of Brahman are like those of a Magician (*Aindrjālīka*) who creates nothing real or protects or sustains anything, but merely induces an illusion to that effect on the onlookers.³ Such remarks make the absorbing attention given to Cosmology in the Vedic and Upanisadic texts, the details of creation and retraction at the time of Pralaya, the post-mortem peregrinations of Souls thro' different worlds before being reborn here, a supreme exercise in futility. Such is the respect for Apaureṣaya Srutis available in Advaita !

2. Even when a Parikṣita-pratyakṣa is put to a further test, if necessary, it can only be done by another determinate knowledge. But the Advaitin's hopes of dissolving all empirical reality in the nebulous indeterminate Niṣprakāra Akhaṇḍārtha psychosis is self-defeating. (*Nym.* 1.17)

3. मायात्रिंश इव ईश्वरस्य स्वप्रतीतिवपयभूतजीवन्मयितृत्वेन सर्वविरोधनिराशोपपत्ती

(*A. Siddhi.* p. 110)

The contention of Advaita that external objects of perception in "empirical experience" have to be assigned a higher order of reality of existence as "Vyāvahārika", subject to sublation only by Brahmajñāna, rests on a quibble of terminology. Since both the Prātibhāsika and the Vyāvahārika objects are equally superimposed and subject to sublation, there is no distinction in their fundamental essence—except perhaps in the longevity of the world-illusion (*dirghabhānti*) and the short-lived nature of the snake-in-the rope. The terms of the Mithyātvanumāna of the empirical world also rest squarely on the common ground between the Prātibhāsika and the Vyāvahārika—viz. *drśyatva, jaḍatva* and *paricchinnavatva*, which betrays the fallacy lurking in the desperate attempts made to uphold the artificial and unscientific distinction between them in order to make the best of a bad bargain.

Experience (*anubhava*) is immediately related to its object—as desire is to the desired and brooks no intermediation over and above the barest minimum of sensory contact. It is therefore, against all experience to make so many suppositions, such as that there is some unknown bogey of a positive nescience sitting tight over objects till they are made known thro' Vṛtti dispelling that nescience or that in spite of the very existence of such a Nescience being exposed to our knowledge (in deep sleep) by the witness-consciousness, the latter is somehow *not* antagonistic to its continuation and yet has the power to dispel it.

Some Advaitins have tried to find scriptural support to Pratikarmavyavasthā in the *Muṇḍaka* text (II.2.10): *Tam eva bhāntam anubhāti sarvam Tasya bhāsā sarvam idam vibhāti*—“All these (luminaries) shine forth after Him. They shine by the power of His effulgence”. The context here shows that the intended sense is that everything in finite reality draws its power to exist, shine and act from the central source of power and illumination of the Lord. This text has nothing

to do with the theory that objects of perception coming to be known or illumined to knowledge is nothing but the illumination of the Brahma-Caitanya as their substrate of superimposition or that a unitary consciousness other than the intellection produced by the Vṛtti has got to be accepted to explain the day to day, hour to hour occurrence of our perceptual knowledge of things.

The word *sarvam idam* (all this) in the Muṇḍaka text is contextually restricted to the heavenly bodies like the Sun, Moon and stars mentioned there and has no reference to the process of our "knowledge". Indeed, Śaṅkara himself in his Bhaṣya on BS., (1.3,22) which is based on this text refers to the *Gītā* text XV.12, as emphasising the fact that the Sun and the Moon and others owe their powers of effulgence to the Supreme Being. The Upaniṣad speaks of Brahman as the glowing one (*Bhāntam*) which is inapplicable to the Advaitic-B. which is mere "glow" without being a "glowing one" in the active sense of the term. As B. itself is not "glowing" in the active sense of the verb and as it is the only one that exists there is no room for others to *shine "after it" (anu-bhāti)*. As in the usage "the calf follows in the footsteps of the mother cow," the calf too has to walk behind, on its own legs. The prefix *anu* (*bhāti*) cannot be justified in the absence of a difference between the activity of the two, the movement of the latter being guided by that of the former.

Moreover, unlike mediate Vṛtti (*parokṣajñāna*) immediate experience (*aparokṣavṛtti*) can light up its object by its very immediacy, after the Vṛtti has taken the form of the object, instead of going in again for a coalescence with the Caitanya grounded in the Vṛtti. The objection that as the *antaḥkaraṇa* of which the Vṛtti is a modification is insentient (*Jada*) lacking in the quality of illumination (*prakāśa*), the Vṛtti by itself cannot have such a power and has to court the help of Caitanya to do so, is *not* tenable. For, we find that

even tho' the mind-stuff is the material cause (*upādānā*) from which desire knowledge, etc. originate⁴, the properties of desireness, knowledgeness, etc., are to be found only in them and not in the *antaḥkaraṇa* as such. Likewise, *Vṛtti* as a modification of the mind-stuff can afford to have the power of intellection and illumination of the object, tho' its *upādānā* or material cause has no such power or property.

The objection that a direct knowledge of an object must necessarily be different from its *Vṛtti*, as the former is of the nature of "caitanya-jñāna" and is expressed intransitively as "the jar shines" (*ghaṭaḥ prakāśate*) unlike the *Vṛtījñāna* of the same which is expressed only transitively as "I know the jar" (*ghaṭam ahaṁ jñāmi*) is not a very pertinent one. The transitive and intransitive forms of predication of the same experience or activity is a matter of grammatical rule governing the nature of the verb employed in describing the same action, as in *calati* (moves) and *gacchati* (goes) in the Sanskrit language. Otherwise, as the *Vṛtti* itself is a modification of the mind-stuff and the verb 'pari-nam' (to get modified) is intransitive, the statement of the *Vṛtījñāna* of a jar as 'I know the jar' (*ghaṭam ahaṁ jñāmi*) in transitive terms would be unsustainable. Moreover, *antaḥkaraṇa vṛtti* can have both the properties of intellection (*jñāna*) and illumination (*prakāśa*) just as heat (*tejas*) has the power to burn and to illumine its surroundings.

No need for *Vṛtti* to go out of the body

There is no need to make the *Vṛtti* go out of the body in order to distinguish immediate from mediate cognitions. For, in the former, it is the rapport of Caitanya which accounts for immediacy, which is its hall mark. Thus the

4. Kāmas sankalpo vicikitsā śraddhā aśraddhā dhṛtir adhṛtir dhīr bhīr ityetaṁ sarvaṁ mana eva (Bṛh. Up. 1, 5, 3)

rapport of Caitanya with the object can be taken to be established by virtue of the object being in contact with the *Vṛtti* through the sensory contact preceding *Vṛtti* and there is no further need to insist that the rapport of Caitanya must be with the *object itself as delimited by the Vṛtti*.

If Caitanyajnāna alone has the property of illumination and *not* the *Vṛtti*, we cannot account for the experience-the past is illumined (*atītam prakāśite*), as there is no scope for Caitanya to operate thro' *Vṛtti* with objects of the past, in the absence of sense-contact with them. This shows that *Vṛtti* too has the power to light up its object to knowledge. As *Vṛtti* taking the form of the object is common to both aparokṣa and parokṣa *Vṛttis*, in the latter thro' conceptualisation, without the *Vṛtti* going out of the body, it would appear that such Tadākāratva with the rapport of Caitanya which is situate in the *antahkaraṇa* itself would be more than adequate to light up the object.

No doubt, a stream of light removes the darkness surrounding an object by spreading itself over it (*samśleṣa*). But knowledge has a different way of conceptualising the object. That is what happens in mediate knowledge where there is no direct contact with the object. The additional factor in immediate knowledge is the rapport of Caitanya. That makes Tadākāratva or *Vṛtti* taking the form of the object sufficient to uncover the object and Caitanya which is present in Aparokṣa-*Vṛtti* will light it up, without *Vṛtti* having to go out of the body, at all. That is much simpler than insisting on both Tadākāratva and *samśleṣa* or physical contact of *Vṛtti* with the object as such.

The example of tactile perception offers a parallel. The sense of touch being all pervasive in the body has no special socket of exit like the other senses, to go out. Nor can it go out thro' the sockets of any other sense organ, as there is no evidence of one sense going out thro' the socket of any other.

The Role and Identity of the Caitanya as the Illuminating Principle

The role of Caitanya in the Advaita theory as illuminating the object has its own difficulties. There are two views on the subject, one given in the *Upadeśasāhasrī* (attributed to Śaṅkara) and the other propounded by Sureśvara and Bhāratīrtha. The former holds that the Caitanya reflected in the *Vṛtti* which has transformed itself into the form and shape of the object finally lights it up, while the cognisedness of the object (*jñātatā*) is brought about by Brahmacaitanya as the witness-self, *Saksi*: *Ghaṭaṭkāro dhiṣṭhā vid ghaṭa-meva prakāśayet; Ghaṭasya jñātatā Brahmacaitanyena prakāśyate*

The first view is untenable because the cognition represented by the Caitanya reflected in the *Vṛtti* which has assumed the shape of the object is a composite one (*viśiṣṭajñāna*) and is as such *Mithyā*. It cannot, therefore, serve as the substrate of the superimposition, as the substrate of a superimposition has to be of a higher order of reality than the superimposed. The acceptance of any superimposition on a *Viśiṣṭa-caitanya* would annul the fundamental hypothesis behind *Pratikarmavyavasthā* that all finite reality is from the beginning superimposed on one transcendental consciousness, through beginningless Nescience and this veil of nescience is lifted to some extent by the *Vṛtti* as and when it occurs in different persons.

The second view is that it is the substrate-Caitanya (*adhiṣṭhāna-caitanya*) which illumines the object as the nescience surrounding the object is removed by the *Vṛtti* coalescing with the object (*samśleṣa*). The same Caitanya reflected in the *Vṛtti* can as well illumine the object, once it is rid of the nescience surrounding it. It is, therefore, quite unnecessary to go in for a further manifestation of the substrate-Caitanya by seeking the identification of the *Vṛtti*-reflected Caitanya and the substrate-Caitanya to be made manifest by such an identification. The power of Caitanya must be the same

irrespective of its situation. If Jiva-Caitanya as qualified by the object is to be the substrate, its conditioned nature would make it *mithyā* and make it impossible for it to be the substrate of the superimposition, for reasons already given.

Nor can Śuddha-Caitanya (Brahman) the unconditioned, be the substrate, as it is much *more Asaṅga* (relation-less) than either the conditioned-Brahman or the Jiva-Caitanya. If Śuddha-B. needs the help of *Vṛtti* to illumine the objects which have been superimposed on it from time immemorial (as the Advaita theory has it), it cannot be *intrinsically omniscient* and all-illuminating, as it has to take the help of *Vṛtti* to do so. For, Śuddha-B. is by hypothesis, enveloped by Nescience all thro' the duration of the world cycle. Hence, there can be no chance of anything glimmering or coming to light anywhere in the cosmos until this primal Veil of Nescience is removed from the face of the Nirviśeṣa - Brahman — the substrate of universal illusion. There would thus be a complete black-out of all cosmic life.

Advaita Siddhi intervenes here to say that even though without the eradication of *Mūla-Avidyā* or fontal nescience, there is no dispelling of universal nescience, still there is no fear of black-out of cosmic life on that account. For, there will still be the illumination produced by the removal of the veil over the Caitanya delimited by the jar or other objects (in everyday life) through the *Vṛtti* pertaining to them.⁸

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5. मूलाविद्यानिवृत्त्यभावेन सर्वज्ञावरणाभिभवाभावेऽपि, षटाद्यव-
च्छेदेऽवरणाभिभवसंभवात् आन्ध्रविरहोपपत्तेः

(*A-Siddhi*. 90)

This explanation fails to satisfy. For, Brahma Caitanya delimited by an empirical object such as a jar, being Mithya on account of its being qualified, thereby (*viśiṣṭa*) cannot afford to be the substrate of the superimposition, without offending the principle that the substrate must be of a higher order of reality than the superimposed.

That would be equivalent to saying that Śuddha-Brahman which is delimited by an object when it is freed by the Vṛtti from the veil of such nescience (to that extent) is the illuminer of the object. But the difficulty would be such a Brahman delimited by that object cannot be the substrate of its own superimposition - for reasons already given. Otherwise, it would lead to a self-dependence if Brahman-Caitanya delimited by the object is also regarded as the substrate of the superimposed object. It would also render the hypothesis of Ādhyāsika sambandha subsisting without a beginning between consciousness and its objects, superfluous.

Here, the *A · Siddhi* explains that only Śuddha-B. is the substrate of superimposition. The delimiting factors such as Ajnāna or the object do not constitute the body-politic of the substrate, so their being of an inferior order of reality does not pose any problem. This explanation overlooks the fact that Śuddha-Brahman, *im puris naturalibus* can never be conceived as the substrate of a superimposition as it is absolutely devoid of all generic and specific properties alike of any kind--which an *adhithāna* (substrate) needs *must have*. If to avoid this difficulty, it is argued that Śuddha-Nirvisesa B. is the substrate of superimposition in its *āvṛta*-state, there will be complete black out of all cosmic life till the world-cycle continues to be unliquidated.

The explanation, that Śuddha-B. being the *upādāna* (material cause) of all phenomena will be non-different from all of them and as such it will be in a position to illumine all else as being identical with its own being, — even as it illumines its own being, is not well-founded. For a transforming B. cannot be 'Śuddha' but only conditioned and the "conditioned"

would be Mithya and cannot again be the substrate of any superimposition for reasons already stated.

If to avoid this difficulty, *upādānatva* is interpreted as being the substrate of a super-imposition, without self-transformation in the form of phenomena, then *not* being of identical essence with phenomena, it cannot illumine them as its own self. Hence, it will have to forgo its Sarvajñatva. The doctors of Advaita Vedānta too have agreed that B.'s *sarvajñatva* presupposes that it is Avidyā-oriented and is not opposed to its influence.⁶

Advaitasiddhi here rejoins that there is no redundancy of Caramavṛtti, if there is Caitanyaprakasa in the wake of every Vṛtti of external objects. Brahman revealed by the final psychosis called *Caramavṛtti* is the one unfettered by any kind of adjuncts, unlike in other cases of its illumination thro' object — delimited Caitanya thro' appropriate Vṛtti. The Sruti — *Ekadhaiva anudr-āṣṭavyam* (Brh. up IV . 4 . 20) also says the highest form of Brahman — realisation thro' Caramavṛtti generated by the rumination of Vedantic texts is in terms of an *akhaṇḍa* impartitive experience, unitary and differenceless. Jñāna and Ajñāna must have reference to the same subject matter. Since Brahman is an undifferented being, the Caramavṛtti realisation cannot include within its content any mode or adjunct, positive or negative, either attributively or as an accidental mark (*upalakṣaṇa*). The content of Caramavṛtti is, therefore, a bare undifferented Caitanya while the Caitanya implicated in the normal Vṛttis connected with objects of perception is delimited by them as *upādhis*. The Caramavṛtti is,

* *Sarvajñatvam api Avidyāvatvam ākṣipatyeva natu pratikṣipati* (Ānandabodha)

therefore, in no way rendered superfluous by the illumination of Cit in the other Vṛttis of objective experience.*

The *Tarangini* points out in reply that the Caramavṛtti engendered by the intensive study and reflection over the import of the Vedānta texts in terms of an Akhaṇḍārtha has to depend on getting rid of all doubts and misconceptions regarding the nature of B. That can only be achieved by dispelling all such doubts and misconceptions by the correct knowledge of the nature of B. based on a specific and distinctive knowledge of its characteristics (*sa-prakāra-ka-jñāna*) which alone can put an end to doubts and misconceptions and not a vague nebulous knowledge of bare being (*nis-prakāra-ka-jñāna*, that *Akhaṇḍārtha* will be. The Śruti *Ekadhaiva anudrastavyam* only means that the essential properties of B. such as its omniscience and blissfullness are all of a uniform nature without any trace of their opposites of nescience or imperfection (Cf. *Nirāṇiṣṭoniravadyah*). The modal suffix *dhā* (in *eka-dhā*) suggests this. The principle that knowledge of a given thing and the absence of it, must have reference to the same subject matter (*Viśaya*) relating to it does not rule out the presence of several other characteristics of uniform nature in the given entity.*

7. उपाध्यविषयकब्रह्मस्फुरणस्य चरमवृत्तिप्रयुक्तत्वेन तस्याः साफल्यत्, प्रकाशस्फुरणस्य तु तस्याः भूषणमेव । इदानींतनस्फुरणस्य सप्रकारत्वेनोपाधिविषयत्वात् एकध्ववानुद्भूतव्यम् इति श्रुतिबलात्, स्वसमानविषय ज्ञानादेव चाज्ञाननिवृत्तेः, अखण्डचिन्मात्रज्ञानस्यैव मौल्यहेतुत्वावधारणात् ।

(A . Siddhi. p. 90)

8. ब्रह्मविषयक सप्रकारक ज्ञानस्यैव ब्रह्मविषयसप्रकार संशयादिविरोधात् । तदज्ञाननिवर्तकतायां हि तद्विषयकत्वं तन्त्रम्; न तु तदितरविषयकत्वम् । (Tg. 157)

Impossibility of reflection of Caitanya

Even supposing that Vṛtti is necessary to bring about rapport of Caitanya with the object to illumine it, it is difficult to see how consciousness can ever get itself *reflected* in Vṛtti, since Caitanya is *not* amenable to perception. The Antaḥkaraṇa too has no visible form (*udbhūtarūpa*) to be able to reflect anything. Nor can reflection be taken in the sense of modification into the form and shape of *antaḥkaraṇa*, like molten gold in a crucible, as Caitanya is unmodifiable. Nor can it be in the sense of "abiding in", as Caitanya being all-pervasive cannot "abide in" anything else, save in its own self.

A. Siddhi explains that it is not grossness or visibility of the reflecting medium, but its transparency which makes reflection of an object in the medium. *Taraṅgiṇī* points out that transparency of the medium is also an expression of its visibility.

Answering the criticism of the *Nym* that 'Tadākāratva' of the Vṛtti taking the form of the object cannot be construed by the Advaita as objectivity to knowledge (*tad-viśayatvam*) as the concept of *viśayatva* has been rejected by it as undefinable on account of *Dṛgdrśyasambandha-anupapatti*, the *A. Siddhi* has propounded an improvised definition of 'Tadākāratva' as :

*Asti ityādi tadviśayakavyavahārapratibandhaka-
ajñānanivartanayogyatvam*

This means : Tadākāratvam of the Vṛtti consists in the fitness to dispel the nescience which has been preventing the object superimposed, from being spoken of as existing ..'' In plain words this could only mean that the mode of speech (*vyavahāra*) about the existence of the object is dependent on the removal of the nescience which stands in the way of the

object being so spoken of in Vyavahāra or common parlance,—without necessitating the acceptance of its real unsuperimposed existence, in its own right. The clear stand taken by the author of the *A. Siddhi*. on the scope of the sublating knowledge of both empirical objects *and* objects of illusion that sublation in both the cases is *inclusive* of the apparent existence of them, in essence (*svarūpenaniṣedhaḥ*) inclusive of the time and place of their apparent existence⁹ leaves no room for doubt that the difference between the Vyāvahārika and the Prātibhāsika is more terminological than substantial, due to the length of duration or the shortness of the continuation of the misconception about the actual existence of the object.

The *Tarangiṇī* points out that there can be no relation of what is determined and what determines (*prayajyaprayojakabhāva*) between the removal of Nescience of empirical objects and the fitness to do so as the terms embodying the definition of this “fitness” (*yogyatvam*) includes within its terms and meaning the dissolution of the nescience as a *fait accompli*.¹⁰

The rapport of Caitanya with the object cannot be one of conjunction or other relations except one of superimposition in Advaita as Caitanya is Asaṅga. As there is already a

9. *Svarūpenaiva traikālikaniṣedhapratīyogitvasya*

Prapañce Suktirūpye ca angikārāt (A. Siddhi p.5)

10. तादृशाज्ञाननिवर्तनयोग्यत्वं तदाकारत्वम् । तथा च तन्निवृत्ति-जननरूपं फलं भवतीत्यङ्गीकारात् इति ।

(A. Siddhi)

मेवम् । उक्तयोग्यत्वस्य तादृशाज्ञाननिवृत्तिवदितत्वेन अप्रयोजकत्वात् । लोपविषासोपशमनसामर्थ्यस्य तु परस्परवदितत्वादिति भावः ।

(Tg. p. 156)

beginningless superimposed relation between *drk* and *dṛśya* to justify Pratikarmavyavasthā previous to the *Vṛtti*, one of the two would be superfluous. Other relations are not the determinants of *Dṛśyatva* (perceivability) of objects which is the ground of their falsity (*mithyātvā*) in the interest of Pratikarma vyavasthā.

Nescience one or many ?

The indispensability of *Vṛtti* to remove the veil of nescience which is standing in the way of the illumination of the object to perception, is open to question. If this nescience acts as a film obscuring the vision of the perceiver and resides in him, its removal would enable him to get over his disability and see the object. If this veil should, however, be around the object itself its removal would enable everyone within reach to see it. On this analogy, one man's *Vṛtti* should usher in universal illumination of all phenomena,—which is not the case.

Here, Advaita thinkers have propounded two different views about the nature of *Ajñāna*. According to the Vivaraṇakāra there is only one universal positive Nescience, which has its locus in the self but its *viśaya* is all that is not-self. There is no evidence to hold that there is a distinct and different positive *Ajñāna* enshrouding each and every object. *Vimuktātman* author of *Iśṭasiddhi* has, however, opted for as many Nesciences as there are cases of true knowledge. Both the positions have their own difficulties.

Eka - Ajñāna Vāda

On the first view, there will be the contingency of instantaneous, Mokṣa by the eradication of the one *Ajñāna* by any single *Vṛtti*. If the right knowledge of shell arising

after the stultifying cognition (*bādha*) does *not* liquidate Avidyā *root and branch*, there can be no talk of *Bādha*, *as defined by the Vivaraṇa*, as the termination by Jñāna, of Ajnāna along with its offsprings, whether still lingering or which have merged in their source.¹¹

It cannot be contended that in cases like this the termination of Ajnāna and its non-termination are both sustainable. In the case of the illusion of silver in shell, the former is merged in its casual stuff of nescience, but the casual stuff as such is *not* liquidated. That is brought about only by knowledge of Brahman engendered by Carama-vṛtti. In other words, in such cases only the power of veiling exercised by nescience is removed, but nescience by itself is *not* liquidated in its entirety of essence.

But it does not stand to reason that knowledge of shell destroys only the product of Ajnāna (silver) without destroying its cause viz. Ajnāna. It is an established principle that Jñāna as the liquidator of Ajnāna destroys *through it*, its products also. This makes it clear that Jñāna is antagonistic to the *products* of Ajnāna quite as much as it is to Ajnāna *as such*. It would be illogical to say that Jñāna destroys the effects of Ajnāna without destroying their *parent*. The Realist's objection that it would be meaningless to talk of stultification (*bādha*) of 'Śuktirajata' without the liquidation of Ajnāna as such, stays.

If the purpose of Vṛtti is only to remove the veil of nescience covering the object, there will be no prospect of the illumination of the shell (in an erroneous cognition) even after the stultifying cognition has set in, in the absence of manifestation (*abhivyakti*) of Caitanya. It cannot be that there is possibility of a partial manifestation of Caitanya after a particular removal of Ajnāna thro' the Vṛtti in a given case —

11. *Ajñānasya vartamānena pravilinena vā svakāryeṇa saha nivṛttir bādhaḥ (Vivaraṇa)*

just as there is a removal of darkness, to ever so slight an extent, even in utter darkness, when a small glow-worm glimmers. The analogy is irrelevant — for Caitanya and Ajnāna are both beginningless substances and are *partless*. So, Caitanya either manifests itself *in toto or not at all*. Ajnāna stays in its entirety; or is dispelled *outright*. There is no halfway house between the two.

If the successful removal of the veil of nescience around the substrate-Caitanya (the *Viśeṣya-Caitanya*) is accomplished by the *Vṛtti* pertaining to the shell, the riddance of the veil of nescience should be able to usher in Mokṣa, *here and now*, which does not happen.

Avidyā cannot have the insentient (Jaḍa) object for its abode (*āśraya*), as the latter is itself imagined to exist, by Avidyā. The insentient being cognitally devoid of any illumination (*asvaprakāśa*) will have nothing to gain or lose by the removal of the veil. Avidyā cannot, therefore, have any power to veil an insentient entity, as it serves no purpose. Nor have Advaitins claimed any such possibility.¹²

It comes to this then that neither the Jaḍa object nor the Caitanya as such can be the *Viśaya* of the veiling. The veiling of the composite entity (the Caitanya qualified by the object) cannot also be mooted as a solution — in conformity with the principle of interpretation of significant negation or predication — *Saviśeṣaṇe vidhinisedhau Viśeṣaṇam upasankrāmataḥ sati viśeṣye bādhe* — that a qualified injunction or negation when found to be incompatible with the substantive element in a proposition is to be restricted in its application to the adjunct-element *alone*. This principle would apply with equal force to its counterpart where a qualified injunction or prohibition is

12. सा च जडेषु वस्तुषु न स्वरूपावभासं प्रतिबध्नाति, प्रमाणवैकल्यादेव तदग्रहणसिद्धेः । (Vivaraṇa)

नार्थनिर्णयं जडस्य स्तां नातोऽविद्यास्य युज्यते । (Istasiddhi.124)

found inapplicable to the *qualifying adjunct* — in which case the restriction would be to the substantive element. That would lead to the undesirable contingency here that the removal of the veil of nescience over the shell and its subsequent illumination would at once lead to the illumination of the *Suddha-Brahman* as the substantive element with reference to the shell-delimited *Caitanya*. For it would be utterly impossible for the veiling power of *Avidyā*, which does *not* admittedly veil the qualifying *Jaḍa* element of shell but only the self qualified by the shell — that is to say the “*Viśiṣṭa*” or the composite whole, to remove the veil surrounding the composite entity *without removing it from the substantive “Viśeṣya” entity*.

Nānā-Ajnānavāda

The difficulty is no less in the other view that there are as many Nesciences as there are correct cognitions (*Jñāna*). Here the many “*Ajnānas*” are regarded as the expression of different “*States*” of the original *Mūla-Ajnāna*, acting as the material cause of particular superimposed objects and these “*states*” alone are dispelled, severally, along with their *Vṛttis* and the superimposed objects projected by them.

Of course, this would bar the immediate dawn of *Mokṣa*, as *only* the nescience pertaining to the shell has been dissolved.

But then, if these “*states*” are different form of *Ajnāna* there would still be many *Ajnānas* and such a position has its own difficulties, as we shall see.

If they are *not* different forms of *Ajnāna*, they cannot be liquidated by *Jñāna*, as *Jñāna alone can liquidate Ajnāna*. As being “other than *Ajnāna*” (that is, different from it) and still being the material cause of respective illusory knowledge caused by superimposition, they will invite the fallacy of

overpervasion of the definition of Ajñāna as the source of all Bhrama (error).

The acceptance of many Ajñānas will have to face other difficulties also. The question would naturally arise if a particular Vṛtti pertaining to the shell, would destroy *all cases of its nescience* elsewhere also or only one specific one of its kind, when it arises. In the former case, there will be no possibility of any shell-silver illusion, afterwards, anywhere else. In the latter, there would be no illumination of the shell, even after the particular shell-nescience has been dispelled. as there are bound to be numerous other layers of Nescience of the same object, obscuring it at other times. This contingency would also arise in the other view that different nesciences are "states" of the same Nescience.

Moreover, it is difficult to see how objects like the shell which have a beginning in time and Caitanya which only *afterwards* comes to be delimited by such objects can at all be considered to be the Viśaya (objective content) of a "*beginningless Nescience*". How could there be a beginningless veiling in the absence, *as yet*, of something *un-born* ?

It cannot be explained away that tho' there is, in reality, only one amorphous beginningless Nescience and its veil which *has* the beginningless Caitanya for its Viśaya, *this veil remains without becoming delimited by particular objects* till they actually come into being and that the same Nescience is spoken of as the veil obscuring the Caitanya delimited by the object in question. This will open the door to immediate Mokṣa by the correct cognition of a shell after its illusory experience as silver. For, here, the Nescience which, by hypothesis, is veiling the un-delimited (*anāvṛta*) suddha-Caitanya from time immemorial *is the same Caitanya* as has become delimited by the shell. That being so, when, after the direct perception of the shell as such by right cognition, the nescience veiling the Caitanya delimited by that shell is

removed, the removal of that veil surrounding the Śuddha-Caitanya must follow as a matter of course and that would be the realisation of Mokṣa.

Answering this point, the *A. Siddhi* argues¹³ that a Vṛtti is competent only to remove the veil of nescience of the Caitanya delimited by its particular adjunct at the time. It cannot, therefore, be expected to remove the veil enveloping the Śuddha-Caitanya when it remains undelimited (*anavacchinna*). This argument sets great store on the ground of delimitation (*avaccheda*). The *Tarangini* therefore, turns to the familiar analogy of the preposition *Vṛkṣaḥ kapisamyogi* (the tree is in conjunction with the monkey), where the monkey is seated on one particular branch and not on any other or on the entire tree. The 'Kapisamyoga' is no doubt *not* extensive with the tree. But as the supporting base (*ādhāra*) of the animal's physical contact, even with a limited part of the tree, the *Tree as such is indeed one and the same*. Even so, Caitanya whose veiling as delimited by a particular object is the same Śuddha-Caitanya and not different. Hence the contingency of immediate Mokṣa by the illumination of Śuddha-Caitanya even as delimited by the shell, is inevitable.¹⁴

Parallel of Jñānaprāga-bhāvahāsa refuted

The Vedānta-kaumudī has tried to overthrow the criticism against the non-termination of all other states of nescience

13. अनाद्यज्ञानविषये अनादिचेतन्ये तत्तदागन्तुकपदार्थावच्छेदाभ्युपगमात् । यदवच्छिन्नगोचरा च व्यक्तिः तदवच्छेदेनैवावरणापसरणात् नानवच्छिन्न चेतन्यावरणभंग प्रसंगः ।

(*A. Siddhi p. 94*)

14. मैवम् । साध्यावच्छेदेन संयोगाद्याधारस्य वृक्षत्ववत् षडावच्छेदेन भग्नावरणस्यापि शुद्धत्वात् मोक्षप्रसंगो दुर्वारः ।

(*Tg. 162*)

by the liquidation of any one particular nescience *from the standpoint of the theory one Unitary Nescience*, by bringing up a counter argument based on the non-termination of all but one Jñānaprāgabhāva (antecedent non-existence of Jñāna by the genesis of its counter positive (*pratiyogi*) and its illumination to knowledge. To explain-It is accepted by all that the termination of the prior non-existence of a jar brings its counterpositive into being. But Prāgabhāvas are *anādi* and countless with reference to each counterpositive. If all such Prāgabhāvas of the knowledge of a jar are terminated by the knowledge of one particular counterpositive jar, there will be no *non-illumination* of other jars thereafter. On the other hand, even if the knowledge of one object terminates only the Prāgabhāva of that knowledge, there will still be no Prakāśa or illumination of it, as the numerous other Prāgabhāvas would remain unterminated-in which case, the object will have no chance of emerging into being and be illumined to knowledge.

The analogy of Prāgabhāva is irrelevant. For, unlike Ajñāna, Prāgabhāva is *not* conceived as an '*avarāṇa*' (veil) covering the object or an object-limited Caitanya. Its role is that of a cause in the production of the effect, like the staff of the pot-maker in whirling the potter's wheel. It is the physical presence of the cause which determines the genesis of the effect and *not* at all the termination of the *entire family* of its kindred antecedent non-existences, past, present and future, which is absolutely impossible of realisation.

Technical legerdemain, verbal juggleries and hair-splittings apart, sound logic and universal experience tells us that the knowledge of the substrate of an illusory experience puts *an end* to the existence and continued experience of the illusory object *superimposed on that substrate till then*.

The Advaita theory of Pratikarma Vyavasthā, on the other hand, *asks us to believe* that the substrate-Caitanya when

it comes into its own from its veiling by nescience, lights up (*prakāśyāti*) the object superimposed on itself, along with its own shining forth :—

*Tasmād adhiṣṭhānacaitanyam svādhyastam bhāsayati
iti siddham* (A. Siddhi p. 94)

This is not only mystifying but topsy turvy. Madhva raises this point in his criticism of the Advaita interpretation of *Ekavijnānena Sarvavijnānam* that the true knowledge of the substrate of a super-imposition *terminates* the knowledge of the super-imposed object till then prevailing and *does not* “illumine” it.

*Nahi śuktijñā rajatajñā ityucyate. Virodhat tayor
jñānayoh* (Madhva, VTN)

The elaborate attempt to establish and defend the theory of Pratikarma-Vyavasthā in Advaita epistemology is thus an exercise in futility,

CHAPTER XIX

ANTINOMIES INVOLVED IN THE ADVAITA INTERPRETATION OF NEHA NĀNĀSTI - ŚRUTI

As a last resort, Advaita has to pin its faith on the *Neha nānāsti* Śruti to establish the absolute negation of all empirical reality in the interest of its thesis that there is only one real in existence and no second or "other", positive or negative. This is not possible. For, the body of texts called Śruti is also *other than* Brahman. The authoritativeness of the Śruti as a flawless means of proof and its fitness to establish its meaning is also an in-built property of the Śruti, which cannot be taken away from it. If what that Śruti says is Paramarthikasat, the Śruti text as its vehicle must be equally Paramarthika. By denying the existence and reality of any second, whatsoever, the *Śruti will be denying its own existence* and right to speak anything worth believing, *and falsify its own verdict*. The case of a verbal testimony, its self-validity and fitness to convey its meaning are all its in-built characteristics, which cannot be whittled down. Even the prophetic words of a Devata appearing in our dreams and forecasting something good or bad have been credited with validity as intimations of what is going to happen or as marks of import by way of correspondence, tho' not as "sabda-Pramana" as such, whose claim to absolute validity rests on *Apti* in the end.

It cannot be that the Neha-nanasti text stands for the absolute falsity of all else but Brahman. Some restriction has to be made in terms the normal requirement that a valid utterance should have the same status, order of reality and fitness to establish its truth, as the enunciation itself. In the Vidhivakya 'Svargakamo yajeta', the right to offer a sacrifice is restricted to the members of the three Varnas only, as having the qualifying right of tending the sacred fire and Vedic study, which is the Upajivya pramana or pre-requisite in respect of the person to offer the sacrifice. This applies to a Vidhi or a Nisedha alike.

If a restriction is to be made in the import of the Nehananasti text it can only be in regard to an imaginary world, which, according to Advaita philosophy, is the subject of the creation texts (*Sṛstisruti*)¹ and *not* the real one in which we live, move and have our being. Otherwise, the absolute negation of the empirical world and the affirmation of the sole reality of Brahman, in the same breath would be open to an interdependence. For, it is only after it is firmly established that there is no impediment to setting aside the logical requirement that the status of a verbal testimony, its meaning, validity and fitness to convey its truth shall be of the same status and order of reality as that of the enunciation of the absolute negation of all else but Brahman, that the Nehanānāstri Śruti can pass muster. And it is only after *that* is conclusively established that the question of restricting the scope of the Nehanānāstri text so as to *exclude itself* from the sweep of the proposed negation *can arise*. It comes to this that if the Nehananasti text should also negate the *esse* of a second as part of its meaning, it would stultify itself, as the Śruti itself is *other than Brahman*—the one reality and must share in the falsification of all else but Brahman. If the Śruti is to be *exempted* from the scope

¹ See ŚBSB II.1.33.

of the negation, the thesis of the falsity of *all but Brahman* would be buried alive.

Apart from that, if the negation of all else but Brahman contemplated by the Sruti is a negation of all empirical reality *in essence (svarupena)* in all the three periods of time, it will *contradict* the claim that what is Nithya as defined by the Advaita is quite different from "*Asat*" or total non-being. (*Asadvilaksanam*).

If the negation contemplated is of the Pancamaprakara or fifth order of predication, such a negation would be equally applicable to Brahman which is, by hypothesis, Nirdharmaka or devoid of all attributes, including the property of being Paramarthika.

Nor can the negation be from the Vyavaharika angle. For, the Advaita is never tired of claiming that what it and the Srutis deny is the Paramarthika reality of the empirical world and *not* its Vyāvahārika reality. It would therefore make *no sense* to deny that the empirical world has no Vyāvahārika reality.

Moreover in regard to the *Tat tvam asi* text, Advaita has opted for a liberally diluted identity based on the secondary sense (*lakṣana*) of *Tat* and *Tvam* (Brahma and Jiva) in terms of a pure consciousness (Cinmatraikya) to steer clear of conflict with perceptual and other evidences. For the same reason, it would be incumbent upon it to explain the falsity of the world (said to be) contemplated by the Nehananasti text as directed towards an imaginary world such as what, according to Advaita, Brahman is supposed to create² and *not* the actual one in which we all live, move and have our being and strive to have our aspirations fulfilled. Otherwise, it would lead to the undesirable conclusion that the distinction of the present world in which we live from what is utterly non-existent (*asad-vailakṣanya*) is a myth.

Vyāsairtha argues that the acceptance of the total negation of all but Brahman in the Nehananasti text as an indubitable fact and truth, side by side with the affirmation of the sole reality of Brahman would lead to a collapse of the principle of Monism, in addition to the risk of the negatory text involving itself in a self contradiction in the process (as being *other than Brahman*).

In reply, the *Advaita Siddhi* contends that there is no danger to the principle of Monism or fear of self-immolation of the Sruti. The reason is that in Advaita philosophy, the entire domain of the non-existence of all duality (*dvaitābhāva*) is included in the very *being of Brahman*, which is its locus (*adhikarana*). And such a Brahman has been spoken of in the Sruti as reality, consciousness and infinitude, and further as *Tat Satyam* (that *alone*³ is real). That being so, the Nehananasti text cannot be restricted in its application to some imaginary world of duality and must be taken at its full face value as referring to the world of duality established by Pratyaksa.

The *Tarāṅgiṇī* repulses this argument as follows. The panoramic wonder and variety displayed by the world as we see and experience it attest the unspeakable richness and variety of its causal potency and the greatness of its creator.⁴

Moreover in regard to the *Tat tvam asi* text Advaita has opted for a diluted identity between Jiva and Brahman in terms of the Secondary meaning (*lakṣaṇā*) of the words "*Tat*" and "*Tvam*" denoting *consciousness pure and simple* (*Cinmā-raikyam*) to avoid conflict with Pratyaksa and other evidences

³. See fn. 1 *ante*.

³. Note that Madhusudana Sarasvati here twists *Tat satyam* to mean *Tadeva satyam*.

⁴. See S. on B.S. 1.12.

in the event of *Viśiṣṭaika* (identity between two composite entities). The principle of *Upajivya*prabalya is true equally of affirmative and negative propositions. For the same reason, then, he should be prepared to agree that the falsity of the world believed to be taught by the *Nehananasti* text has reference to an imaginary world, which according to him is the subject of the creation texts in the *Upanisads*.⁴ Otherwise, he will have to face the inevitable conclusion that if the universe of our experience is denied absolutely, in deference to the *Nehananasti* text, it *cannot* be held to be *distinct* from utter non-existence (*asadvilaksanya*) as he would like to have it but only as *Sadvilaksanā*va.

Here, the author of the *A. Siddhi* contends that there is no need to concede that the fitness of words is a proposition to convey a consistent meaning such as in *Nehananasti* must necessarily be a real and true fitness, though the case is different in respect of the text '*Svargakamo yajeta*'. In the present case, it is necessary to insist on the condition that the fitness in question must be a real one. For, competence to convey the true meaning is determined by fitness as such-not fitness qualified by the condition of its being real (fitness)-(*tāttvikayogyatā*).

The *Tarangiṇī* points out that the two texts *Nehananasti* and *Svargakāmo yajeta*, as verbal testimony are on the same par. They are sacred texts, highly authoritative and must make proper sense. We are not dealing with mere gossip of the streets here. In dealing with serious problems raised by the *Sruti* texts the fitness of the words to convey a viable sense capable of ensuring the validity of their statements must be equally true and real and *not a make believe*.

⁴. *Na ceyam paramīrthaviṣayā Śṣṭisrutih. Avidyākalpita nāmarupavyavahāragocaratvāt Brahmātmabhāvapratiṣṭādana paratvācca ityetaḍapi naiva vismartavyam.* (Ś.BSB.ii i.33)

Take the *Sruti Parāśya Śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate svābhāviki jñānabalakriyā ca* (*Svet. Up. VI. 8*). It refers to Brahman's creative powers as vast and intrinsic to its nature (*Svābhāviki śaktiḥ*) and *not* the projections of Maya. That belies the contention that the negation of the reality of all duality is the real purport of the *Nehanānāsti* text.⁸

The argument of the A.Siddhi that the negation of duality is conceived as identical in essence with the Brahman as its locus is also untenable. The negation of duality is *Sopādhika* (conditioned) and Brahman is *Nirupadhika*. The former cannot be part of the essence of the latter. Nor can it be admitted on the ground that the negation of duality has been taught by (that part of the *Sruti* which is truth-declaring : *tattvavedaka*). Such an argument is open to an interdependence in thought and reality. The text which negates the reality of all duality can be claimed to be truth-declaring only after it is first of all established that it is truth-declaring by virtue of the negation of duality being identical in essence with *Brahmasvarupa*. It is only after *that* is established that it would follow from it that the negation of duality taught by the *Nehanānāsti* text is of identical essence with *Brahmasvarupa*.

Moreover the vital difference between the two contentions is that the question whether the *Nehanānāsti* text really means to establish the utter negation of all else but Brahman as a viable fact and truth is still under discussion and debate

*. According to Dvaita philosophy the *Nehanānāsti* text denies that there is any internal distinction between Brahman and its mataphysical attributes of *Jñāna*, *ananda*, etc.

See my E. T. of Jayatirtha's *Nyāyasudhā* Bangalore 1993 p. 48-50.

whereas the fact that the creative powers of Brahman are intrinsic to its nature and that the world is, therefore, the outcome of the exercise of that power stands already well attested and accepted in so many words by the *Svetasvatara Upanisad*. (VI 8). That should make a decisive difference in favour of accepting the Dvaita position that the *Nānā nāsti* text cannot be forced to convey something which would be suicidal to its own credibility as a *Pramāṇa*.

As it is impossible to shut one's eyes to the reality of the absence of a second to Brahman (*dvītiya-abhava-sattva*) which is embodied in the very terms of the negative proposition (*Nānā nāsti*) the Advaita is hard put to it to somehow circumvent it. It tries to do so with the following explanation. Though it follows as a corollary from the negation of any "other" besides Brahman that the absence of such as "other" is a philosophical fact and truth (which will affect the principle of Monism), still there is no fear of any such adverse result. For, notwithstanding the negative form of the enunciation of the proposition : *Iha nānā nāsti* - its purport is only affirmation of the sole reality of one (Brahman) and nothing else besides. This has the support of the Mimamsa principle of interpretation "*Na vidhau paras sabdarthah*" that the meaning of the words of a proposition is the purport intended to be conveyed by them and *not* their echoes or what is got by reading between their lines.

In reply the *Tarangini* points out that a *Vidhi* (injunction) or a *Nisedha* (negation or prohibition) cannot have its purport elsewhere than in the expressed sense of the words except on three grounds : (1) that the expressed sense of the proposition is already well - known or is made known to us by another *Pramāṇa*; or (ii) its being opposed to a stronger *Pramāṇa*; or (iii) if it leads to a splitting of a single proposition into two on account of

the said predication or negation being applicable to the qualifying adjunct of the subject of the proposition (*uddesya visesana*) as in the well-known Vidhi *Graham sammarsti*. Here, the singular number (in *Graham*) happens to be the qualifying element of the sacrificial vessel (*graha*) which according to the Vidhi is to be cleaned with a piece of cloth, before it is filled with Soma juice to be offered in the Jyotiṣtoma Yāga. There are many such vessels (*Grahāḥ*) to be cleaned and filled and offered. If then, the oneness (*ekatva*) of the *Graha* is also taken to be *vidhiviṣaya*- (subject of the injunction) it will lead to the splitting of the Vākya into two by necessitating the injunction to clean (*sammarjana*) to be applied severally to the *Graha* and its oneness (singular number) - the later being impossible, Nor can the Vidhi be understood as a *Visistavidhi* or a composite injunction applicable to the *Graha* qualified by its oneness. For, in that case, by the operation of the rule that what applies to a *visista* (composite whole) would be equally applicable to its qualifying adjunct *Visistasya yat bhavati tat visesana syapi bhavati*, the injunction to clean the *ekatva* of the *Graha* (and the *Graha* as such) will be opposed to the other injunction that the Rtviks shall clean all the *Grahas* with a piece of cloth.⁷ Hence, it has been declared in the Siddhanta of the Sammargadhikarana of the Purva Mimamsa that the *uddesya-visesana* in a Vidhi is to be treated as *not* intended to be included for purport of the Vidhi.

The present Nehanānāsti text does not fall under any of the three categories listed above, *As a Monistic text, it is not looked upon as repetitive of something already known* by any other Pramāna. (Such as the reality of an *other* thro' Pratyakṣa). Only Bheda-Śruti is accepted in Advaita as *anuvāda* of the differences known thro' (Vyāvahārika) Pratyakṣa; while Advaita Śruti is credited with Apurvata (novelty). As the ultimate purport of the Advaita Śruti is an *akhaṇḍārtha* of pure Caitanya. the existence of the absence

⁷ Sোধaniyaḥ Grahāḥ sarve Vāsāḥkhandena Cartvijā.

of an "other" as a reality and a truth cannot in any way be *opposed* to it. An *akhandārtha* - judgment is by its nature indeterminate. (*nisprakaraka*). Only a determinate proposition (*saprakaraka*) can be in conflict with another *saprakaraka* one. A *Nisprakaraka*-judgment will be innocuous.

An ingenious argument has been introduced to get out of this difficulty created by the express negation of an "other" in *Nehanānāsti* and the tacit admission it carries of the reality and truth of the absence of such an "other" on the ground of a self-contradiction, to which the *Nehanānāsti* text will be exposed, if it concedes the reality of the absence of an "other" while negating the very existence of an "other". The truth of the absence of the negation of an "other" does not contradict the negation of the "other" but only confirms it.

But negation and its negation cannot be placed on the same order of reality. If this is not accepted, there will be no need for Advaita to assign *Avidyāntvṛtti* (annihilation of Avidya) to a fifth order or predication, while Avidya itself is classed under the fourth order of predication (*sadasadvilaksana*).

To avoid self-contradiction in making the *Nehanānāsti*. Śruti deny the absence of an other, *postulated by itself*, the Advaita thinker now turns to some other texts like *Ekō draṣṭa advaito bhavati* (*Brh. Up. W. 3.3.*) that there exists only one perceiver without, a "second", to sustain his position, of the absence of any other second - be it a second or absence of a second. But as all Advaita Śrutis are, by hypothesis, committed to a bare consciousness (*cinmatram*) in terms of an indeterminate psychosis (*nisprakarakajnana*) the existence of an "other" or its non-existence as a fact and a truth will in no way be *opposed to pure consciousness* as there can be an opposition only between two determinate cognitions of opposing content. The self contradiction of its own words by the *Nehanānāsti* text in denying the reality of the absence of an "other", postulated by itself, by saying that it is not the

import of the Śruti is also open to mutual interdependence. It cannot be avoided by maintaining that there is no self-contradiction *because* there is no import (in respect of the absence of an other - *dvitīyabhava*) and that *because* of there being no such import there is no self-contradiction.

The argument that the "other" (*dvitīya*) is itself *mithya* and that, therefore, there will be no self-contradiction on the part of the Nehanānāsti text if it denies both the existence of an "other" and the absence of its existence in the same breath is not acceptable. For a negation and its counter-correlative cannot be placed on the same par or order of reality. If this is *not* accepted, there will be no justification for the Advaita to place the liquidation of Avidyā (*Avidyānivṛtti*) in a fifth order of predication (*pañcamaprakāra*) while the liquidated Avidyā is placed in the fourth order of predication as 'Sadasadvilakṣaṇa' or *Anirvacanīyā*.

Moreover, it is incumbent on the seeker of truth in Advaita to acquire true knowledge of Brahman as the one without a second, transcending hunger and thirst (*aśanāyādyatita*) and as *Satyam*, *jñānam*, etc, which is knowledge of a very *determinate kind* (*saprakaraṇa*). As already pointed out, the modal suffix *dhā* in *Ekadhaiva anu dr̥ṣṭavyam* in the *Nehanānāsti* text lays stress on the mode of the knowledge of Brahman to be acquired. Hence, it would be against the spirit and letter of the text to rule out the knowledge of the absence of an "other" as out of bounds of the import of the Nehanānāsti Śruti. Otherwise, even the Vyāvahārika reality of all others than Brahman would have to be taken away.

It cannot be said that a subsidiary import (*avāntara tātparya*) of the Nehanānāsti text can be admitted in terms of the absence of an "other", without prejudice to its Mahatātparya, to avoid the difficulty. For (from the Advaita

point of view) the absence of an "other" looms large both at the commencement and at the conclusion of the Chandogya text, in the context of the promissory statement of *Ekavijnānena sarvavijnānan* (at the beginning) and in the concluding words '*Aitadātmyam idam sarvam tatsatyam*'* leaving no room for doubt that there lies the Mahatatparya of the discourse. Moreover according to Advaita philosophy the state of Niṣprapañcā (worldlessness) of which there is a foretaste in our dreamless sleep (*Susupti*) is deemed to be a *Purusārtha* or *summum bonum* of life. Hence the knowledge of the absence of an "other" (*dvitīyābhāvajnāna*) cannot be denigrated as a subsidiary truth or import of the Śruti (and not as *primary one*).

There can be no justification for holding that the Nehanānāsti text sublates the Vyāvahārika reality of the world established by Pratyakṣa, if the existence of an "other" has only a subsidiary import. For unless the absence of an "other" (besides Brahman) is a fact and a truth, the existence of an "other" cannot be dismissed as untrue and as falling outside the import of the Śruti. As the Advaita seeks to dismiss both the "other" (*dvitīya*) and its absence (*dvitīyābhāva*) as equally untrue, and belonging to the same order (of unreality) there will be no possibility of any relation of what is negated and what negates it (*nisedhyanisedhakabhāva*) between Pratyakṣa and Śruti. For if the absence of an "other" exists in Brahman as its qualifying adjunct or as a qualification *per accidens* (*upalakṣaṇa*), the principle of Monism will be compromised. If such absence is Mithyā, the Śruti which teaches the absence of an existence (in terms of *Nehanānāsti*) will forfeit its truth-declaring character (*tattvāvedakatva*).

For all these reasons, the Neha nānāsti Śruti cannot be cited as evidence of the falsity of a "second"

CHAPTER XX

DOCTRINE OF FALSITY OF THE WORLD IRRATIONAL

The thesis of the falsity of the Universe can hardly stand the test of reasoning and has to be rejected lock, stock and barrel. An illusory phenomenon will have to satisfy the following conditions. It must have a real substrate (*adhiṣṭhāna*) with its own identifiable character. There must be a real prototype (*Pradhāna*) of the object superimposed on the *adhiṣṭhāna* and there must be a real resemblance between them which accounts for the illusion. There must be real defects (*doṣa*) of environment and visual or other defects, a real ignorance of the true nature of the object, for the time being, a real contradicting knowledge, a real perceiver who is the victim of the illusion and he must have his own real body, and sense organs. Not one of these requirements is satisfied in the Advaita theory of cosmic illusion.

Just See - The Ātman or the Advaita-Brahman which is said to be the *adhiṣṭhāna* (substrate) of this cosmic illusion, being void of all identifiable characteristics (*nir-dharmaka*) and uncharacterisable (*nir-viśeṣa*) can have neither a generic nature nor any distinctive features of its own. An illusion about the nature of a given substrate can arise only when there is a knowledge of its generic nature and an absence of knowledge of its special features. These two are impossible in Ātman or Brahman which by hypothesis, is devoid of all generic and specific attributes, alike, being *nir-dharmaka* and *nir-viśeṣa*. It should be obvious then that no illusions can arise where the substratum is known or unknown in its

entirety. And there is no room for any distinction of being known partly and partly unknown in a being which is partless and aspectless. (*nirviśeṣa*)

It can not be contended that a knowledge of the generic feature and absence of knowledge of the specific features of the given substrate are *not* the determinants of being a substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) and that it would be much simpler to say that knowledge of the bare essence of the thing in question and absence of knowledge of specific attributes would be sufficient to account for the illusory experience and that these two requirements are fulfilled in the Advaitic position,—as Atman (or B.) being self-luminous is “known” in its barest essence and being “Nirviśeṣa” it has no specific attributes.

Vyāsātīrtha points out that the difficulty cannot be so easily got over. For, in the Advaita view also, there are three things which go to produce an illusion. (1) the absence of knowledge of such specific attributes of the object of the illusion as will preclude the illusion (*sad-viśeṣaṇa*) (2) Samskaras or residual impressions of the superimposed object deposited in the mind and their contact with the *adhiṣṭhāna* and (3) *real defects* of environment and of the visual apparatus etc. The residual impressions which are latent cannot be brought to the surface in the absence of knowledge of the generic nature of the object of superimposition. As for *absence* of such characteristics as do *not really exist in the superimposed object* (*asad-viśeṣaṇas*) it will be equally true at time of the contradicting knowledge also, arising after the illusion is got over. They cannot therefore be regarded as the *determinants* of the illusion.

It cannot be objected that it is not the knowledge of the absence of the specific attributes of the *adhiṣṭhāna* that gives rise to the illusion but only the absence of such knowledge as is hostile to the illusion. In Advaita, it is *not* the pure Caitanya which is hostile to fontal nescience which is the material cause

of the illusion but the final *Vṛttijñāna* (the *Caramavṛtti*) which reveals the pure self alone as its content and is produced by the intensive pursuit of *Sravaṇa*, *manana* and *dhyāna*. The absence of knowledge of the special features of the *adhiṣṭhāna* of Cosmic illusion viz. the *śuddha-Cit* which is by hypothesis, "Nirviśeṣa" is not, therefore, in any way hostile to its being the *adhiṣṭhāna* of cosmic illusion.

Here, Vyāsātirtha raises the objection that according to the Advaita view that the purpose of *Vṛtti* is only to bring about the rapport of Caitanya (*Caitāṇyoparāga*), it cannot be deemed to be the liquidator of the nescience and that in the last analysis, only Caitanya can be the liquidator of Nescience. If it is explained that what is meant to be conveyed by saying that *Vṛtti* removes the nescience is that it is a determinant in doing so, by bringing about the necessary rapport (*Sambandha-apādakadvārā*) with Caitanya it would only confirm the ultimate position that it is the Caitanya which is primarily responsible for the removal of such nescience and that it is therefore hostile to it. Otherwise, there will be no prospect of its removal.

Moreover, in Advaita, it is only the transcendental Self which is of the nature of pure consciousness (*jñaptirūpam*) in the true sense of the term, while *Vṛttijñāna* is spoken of as 'knowledge' or 'consciousness' only in a secondary sense of being the *Means* (*karanam*) of manifesting pure consciousness. Hence, *Vṛttijñāna* cannot be deemed to be hostile to the absence of knowledge of the specific features of the *adhiṣṭhāna* (substrate), but only pure Caitanya. This Caitanya being "Nirviśeṣa" can have no generic or specific characteristics and so cannot be the substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of universal superimposition at all. Moreover as the Self and the not-self as consciousness and its object are universally known to be different from each other, there can be no superimposition of the one on the other as their difference of nature is so patent to all as recognised by the Advaitins themselves :

*Tattedamte vastānyatve tvattāmatte parasparam
Pratidvandvitayā loke prasiddhe nāsti samsayah*

There can be no superimposition without *some* obscuration of the substrate. As the Ātmic consciousness is always self-luminous, there is no possibility of its obscuration wholly or in part to admit of a superimposition of non-self on it due to the operation of Avidyā. Further Avidyā too being Prātibhāsika whose existence is intuited by the Sākṣī cannot be revealed and manifested to the Sākṣī as superimposed on it, if the said sākṣī-Caitanya itself is under superimposition and therefore not shining. As the self is partless, *upādhis* cannot obscure a *part* of it, leaving the other part untouched. If the *upādhi* should obscure and envelop the *whole* of Ātman there will be no Ātman left to be self-shining.

If the substrate itself should appear in the guise of the object in our perception, like its aspect of "thisness" appearing as "*this* is silver", it should take the form of being so impressed (*anuviddha*) as "the Atman is the pot (*ātmāgatah*)". But it does not do so. Hence the theory of *Atānuvedha* of objects of perception is far-fetched. When the jar is revealed to perception as "existing" why should such a simple fact be construed to mean that it is the Atman that is revealed in that presentation as underlying the jar? or some other object? How can the self which has no form be revealed to visual perception of the jar as the self?

Advaita dialecticians have argued - It is not necessary to assume the real existence of a Pradhana (prototype) of the object superimposed to account for its residual impressions (*samskāras*) contributing to the illusion. These *Samskāras* can go back on earlier ones and they upon still earlier ones, stretching to the dawn of cosmic illusion in the beginningless past. The fact that even when *Samskāras* are present their not having been generated by valid knowledge does not seem to prevent the onset on illusions. This shows the *Samskāras* need

not refer to the real existence of a prototype and be derived from it.

Moreover, the Dvaita philosophers are *not* committed to the view of the Nyāya-Realists that the object of an erroneous cognition, such as silver (in shell) is *bodily existing* at some other place and time. Hence, the real existence of a prototype (Pradhāna) of the superimposed object is a gratuitous assumption and can be dispensed with.

Vyāsātīrtha replies - At this rate, in the name of simplicity of assumption it may be predicated that the mental impression or idea of the substratum itself may be regarded as the Cause of the illusion without committing ourselves to the actual [existence of a substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) as such. This idea may be stretched back to remote past without landing on an actually existing (real) *adhiṣṭhāna* at all, as in Śūnyavāda Buddhism. By the same token, the reality of consciousness too may be dispensed with as the substrate of cosmic superimposition. The Advaita vādin cannot reasonably contend that the substrate *must be* accepted as real as it is not contradicted by a subsequent cognition. The same applies to the *Pradhāna* (prototype) too.

When the shell-silver is disproved as *mithyā*, it presupposes the existence of real silver which is capable of fulfilling practical needs, as a corollary. In the same way, when *this world* is dismissed as *Mithyā*, it should naturally lead to the assumption of another real world behind it to satisfy the practical needs. And such a world, whose genesis has been described in detail in the Śrutis (*Śṛṣṭīśrutis*) cannot be sublated in its own substrate, like the self itself.

The Advaitin himself recognises that the negation of the Pratibhāsika silver with reference to all the three periods of time *has reference to the Vyāvahārika silver (ābhāsasya prasaktyā anābhāsasya niṣedhaḥ)*. By the same logic it must follow that the absolute negation of what is regarded as the Vyāvahārika —

world by the *Neha nānāsti* — text should be considered to be a negation of a Pāramārthika world as the counterpositive of its negation.

If the negation of the world contemplated by the *Nehanānāsti*-Sruti is only in respect of its Pāramārthika-aspect, the world could still be regarded as having an *essential reality* of its own without possessing Pāramārbhikatva as an attribute—just as the Advaita Brahman retains its essential reality (*Sadrūpatva*) without the *attribute* of Pāramārthika Satyatvam, since it is by hypothesis *nir-dharmaka* (without any attribute whatsoever). The Sadrūpatva of the world would thus remain intact.

The self and the not-self (objects) as “consciousness” and “jaḍa-objects” are experienced to be intrinsically different. The self cannot be the substrate of a superimposition of the not-self as their difference is so patent and glaring—even as recognised by the Advaitins :

*Tattedante svatānyatve tvattā mattā parasparam
Pratidvandvitayā loke prasiddhe nāsti saṁsayah.*

There can be no superimposition without the obscuration of the substrate. The Atman is, by hypothesis, of the very essence of pure self-luminosity and cannot be made the substrate of any superimposition with its self-luminosity intact. If, in spite of it, there should be such an obscuration, how could there be any manifestation of cosmic Avidyā which is said to be intuited by the Sākṣi, as superimposed, if the Caitanya itself has been obscured? As Caitanya is partless, it cannot be said to shine forth (for purposes of being the *adhiṣṭhāna*) and *not shine forth* in part, for purposes of superimposition. The interposition of *upādhis* to conceal a part of Caitanya and keep the other part self-luminous, would necessitate acceptance of parts in the being of Brahman (or Atman, which by hypothesis is *akhaṇḍa Nirviśeṣa*). This crucial difficulty has been highlighted by Madhva himself when he says :

Nirviṣeṣe svayam bhāte kim ajñānenāvyūṭam bhavet (Madhva)

In any case, cosmic illusion cannot be stretched back indefinitely to avoid the acceptance of a real prototype of the superimposed — beyond the present Kalpa, to facilitate the carrying over of Samskāras without reference to the existence of a real Original Prototype (*Pradhāna*) to start with. No Samskāras of a Prototype can be carried over from a previous Kalpa to the present. The acceptance therefore of a really existing *Pradhāna* (prototype of the superimposed object of illusions) cannot be dodged or evaded by taking shelter under the argument :

Aropyasya pratītirūpam yujyate na vastusattā (Bhāmati)

The philosophical theory that the cosmic appearance is an illusion of distorted imagination due to inexplicable Avidyā is totally opposed to the spirit and letter of the Śrutis Smṛtis and Sūtras (which) even as interpreted by Śankara in his commentaries — without the intrusion of his Parenthetical comments to explain them away) solidly endorse the reality of the world and its values. Under the Sūtra *Janmādyasya yataḥ* the Śruti *Yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante* is referred to. Under *Ikṣater naśabdām* according to Śankara, the Śruti speaks of Brahman's creative activity as the result of conscious effort. (*ikṣāpūrvakam*)

If the world were the outcome of an Adhyāsa instead of being a reality, it is difficult to see the *rationale* of the Sūtra *Lokavattu līlā kaivalyam* (B.S. II.1.34) and the Śruti *Āptakāmasya kā spṛhā* saying that tho' the Supreme Brahman has no personal motive or purpose to serve in creating the world which is deemed to be a mere effortless sport of the Lord. Under the Sūtra *Vaiṣamyanairghṛṇye...* (II. 1.35) the charges of partiality and cruelty, in placing different souls under conditions of glaring inequalities of opportunities equipment and endowments has been answered as the result of taking into account the previous Karma of Souls. The orderly evolution of various Tattvas like

Akāśa, Vāyu, Agni from one another is referred to in *Tejo atas* (II. 3. 10.) and the involution of these in the reverse order during Pralaya is referred to in *Viparyayena*. B.S. (II. 3. 14.). It would be absurd to talk of any actual genesis and development of Tattvas from one another or their involution later into one another is the reverse order, or a conscious effort in the process of creation on the part of the creator or his freedom from partiality and cruelty in ordering the world as we see it, or the emergence of one imaginary world from another imagined one of a previous kalpa or its involution in a definite order !

Dhātā yathāpūrvam akalpayat (R. V.)

If the Śrutis and Sūtras are intent upon serious philosophising, they would *not* be indulging in weaving picturesque cobwebs of an imaginary world, its origin and development and the careers of countless souls therein and their peregrinations thro different worlds of heaven earth and hell.

Nor can God the creator be treated as a *Magician who deludes others* for the fun of it. The irony of it is that in Advaita the Creator God is Himself superimposed by the Jivas themselves. If He is not imagined and superimposed by the Jivas, He must either be imagined and superimposed by Himself or by pure consciousness (*Cinmātra*). The idea of self-superimposition is impossible as one cannot Pre-exist one's own being to superimpose oneself on oneself. Pure consciousness (*Cinmātra*) being without body and organs can make no such superimposition.

The doctrine of Cosmic Illusion has thus no leg to stand upon. *It creates more problems than it can ever hope to solve.* consistent with experience, (Pratyakṣa) reason and revelation. Realism is thus the only viable alternative and the right view of the world for any sane philosopher to take.

Anantadoṣaduṣṭam ca heyam Māyāmatam Subhaih.

APPENDIX — I

KRISHNADEVARAYAKRTI by Emperor Krishna Jevarāya of Vijayanagar. From a Telugu Palm leaf MS. (incomplete) preserved in the Govt. Oriental MSS Library, Madras (D. 18299)

१. श्रीरामभोषितपःफलेन महसा नीराजितोरस्थलः
ताराषीशबिनाधिनाथनयनो धाराघरश्यामलः ।
यो वेदान्तगिरामलक्ष्यमहिमा देवेशमुख्यैःस्तुतः
सोऽयं तिष्ठतु मामकीनहृदये श्रीवेङ्कटेशाभिधः ॥
२. सान्द्रानन्दघनः समग्रकरुणासम्पूर्णनेत्राञ्चलः
मन्दाकिन्याधिवासमञ्जुलजटाजूटो . . . तः
चन्द्रालंकृतमौलिरद्वितनयाशृंगारिताङ्गुःशिवः
कल्याणामलकार्मुकः कलयतां कल्याणमभ्याहतम् ।
३. ब्रह्माण्डान्यखिसानि चेन्न सततं व्याप्नोति तत्तादृग-
प्याकारं शब्दमात्रतामुपगतं यस्पैव सत्यात्मनः ।
तं वेदान्तवचःप्रपञ्चितगुणं लक्ष्मीमहोदत्तमं
नित्यानन्दमजं निरस्तदुरितं वन्दे मुकुन्दं विभुम् ॥
४. श्रीमानभूत् तुर्वशवंशमौलिः श्रीतिम्मभूपो जगदेकवीरः
स देवकीनाम्नि कलत्ररत्ने प्रासूत वीरं सुमतीश्वराख्यम्
५. स कर्तुमीशः सकलानकर्तुं तथान्यथाकर्तुमपि क्षितोन्ब्रान्
यथार्थयन् ईश्वरनामधेयमेकातपत्रामर्वाणि प्रशास्ति ।
६. स बुक्कमान्बां परिणीय तस्यामीदायंगाभीर्यत्रिवेकशौर्यैः
दाक्षिण्यकारुण्यनयैश्च युक्तं लेभे तनूजं नरसक्षितीशम्
७. स बाह्य एवावनिमर्णवान्तामाक्रम्य शौर्येण निरंकुशेन ।
मान्धातुमुख्यान् महितान्महोपान् यशोविशेषैरखिलानजैषीत् ॥

८. बाह्योर्बलेनाजितवित्तजानः कृतार्थयित्वाक्षितमयिंजातम् ।
काशीप्रयागादिमहार्हतीर्थैः महान्ति दानानि मुहुश्चकार ।
९. कुलेन शीलेन गुणेन भक्त्या प्रेमानुकूलेन च संयुतायाम् ।
नागाश्विकायां नरसक्षितीशः प्रासूत मां न्यक्कृतबेरिवर्गः ।
१०. सोऽहं स्वतन्त्रानर्धगुणान्वितायां तिष्मांशिकायामिह तिम्मभूपम्
उत्पाद्य नामास्य सहार्थजातैः समार्पयं ब्रैकटशैलभर्त्रे ।
११. एवं च चेतस्यनवाप्य तृप्तिं वाचापि पूजां कलये कथं दुःखा ।
श्रीवैकटेशाधीक्षितुरित्युदारं वित्ते विचारं कलयन्तवात्सम्
१२. उत्साहं मम वीक्ष्य मदगुरुरथ श्रीग्यासतीर्थो मुनिः
पर्यालोच्य पुराणशास्त्रविविधाभ्यायेतिहासादिकान् ।
लब्धास्तत्र कथा हरेः पशुपतेः साम्यं निरस्याधिकं
विष्णुं कीर्तय सर्वदेत्युपविशन् मह्यं मुदा वत्तवान् ॥

Transcript by courtesy of G. Kalyanasundaram Curator-in-charge Govt. Oriental MSS. Library Madras.


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APPENDIX II

Guruparamparā of Vyāsātirtha

Sri Madhvācārya



CAITANYA (Vide *HDSV*. Chapter XXXIX).

A BRIEF SKETCH OF THE LIFE, PERSONALITY, CAREER AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF VYĀSATĪRTHA

The period of Vyāsātirtha was the age of the Renaissance in the West. The renaissance in Indian thought brought about by him in the XVI century was chiefly responsible for putting the system of Madhva on the philosophical map of India, as one to be reckoned with. His treatise on the assessment of the relative merits of the Dvaita and Advaita systems of philosophy in his *Nyāyāmṛta* was directly responsible for the birth of Neo-Advaita as it came to be formulated by Madhusūdana Sarasvati in his *Advaitasiddhi*, who found it necessary and expedient to modify or depart from many of the rigid positions of the Prācinās. Many discerning scholars have shown that the Śankara school of Vedānta would have suffered an irrecoverable set-back, if not total collapse, but for the timely defence put up by Madhusūdana. The various shades of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thought ending with the period of Udayana had been meticulously studied and reviewed in the writings of Madhva and Jayātirtha. The *Pramāṇa-Lakṣaṇa* of Madhva to all intents and purposes was an implied corrective to some of the theories adumbrated by Gaṅgeśa in logic and epistemology. However, it was left to Vyāsātirtha to undertake an exhaustive study, analysis and assessment of Gaṅgeśa's work, along with the commentaries of Pakṣadhara, Rucidatta and others in the light of the corresponding positions of his own school, as set forth in the works of Madhva and Jayātirtha, to which he makes it a point to align his exposition and criticism. While his *Nyāyāmṛta* provoked a counter-attack within a reasonable time, the custodians of Navyanyāya school from Mithila and Navadvīpa have observed a studied silence over the strictures of the *Turkatāṇḍava* on their logical

system. They contented themselves with hailing the publication of Vyāsātīrtha's *Nym.* and expressing their stern disapproval and displeasure at his assailing them by proclaiming :

Nyāyāmrtārjitā kīrtih Tāṇḍavena Vināś'itā

Indeed, Vyāsātīrtha's work was meant to be a friendly criticism, unlike in the case of the *Nym.* from the point of view of a realistic metaphysics (as the common ground) to shake off its fascination for the theory of Parataḥpramāṇya in the interest of meaningful Realism and improve the status of their Iśvara and accept the Apauruṣeyatva of the Vedas as the ultimate source of the saving knowledge.

Prof. Bagchi (*Inductive Reasoning*, 1953) has presumed that the absence of any positive reaction to Vyāsātīrtha's *Turkatāṇḍava* from the Navya-Naiyāyikas of Mithilā and Navadvīpa upto date, is (or was) probably due to absence of publicity of the Dvaita works in those parts. This is *not* well founded. The contemporary biography of Vyāsātīrtha shows that he had, very early in his Pontifical career, travelled in the North. Logic being his *forte*, he would not have failed to visit the great centres of Navya-nyāya, which he had already mastered under Śrīpādarāja and exchange thoughts with the stalwarts there. The tradition about the encomium paid to him by Pakṣadhara himself in the following terms :

Yad adhītam tad adhītam yad anadhītam tad apyadhītam
Pakṣadharavipakṣo nāvekṣi vinā Navina Vyāseṇa

probably dates from the period of their first meeting, before he had written his major works.

In the Introduction to his edition of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (1973) with two commentaries, Pandita Ramanuja Tatacharya, retired V. C. of the Kendriya Vidyapitha, Tirupati, quoting the above verse interprets it as a compliment paid by Vyāsātīrtha *himself* to his adversary Pakṣadhara Miśra, in

appreciation of his unparalleled learning, instead of the other way about, as accepted in the tradition of the Dvaita school.

A little reflection will show that the natural trend of the verse is much more consistent with the other view. If Vyāsātīrtha had been the speaker of the verse, he would have worded the second line more appropriately as :

Pakṣadharaśamo vipakṣo nāvekṣi hi Vyāṣena

Suffice it to say that it would be the height of impropriety and a stigma on the saintliness of a Paramahansa and a true devotee of the Lord such as Vyāsātīrtha, who has been described in the inscriptions relating to him as absolutely free from self-conceit (*nirahankāracitta*) absorbed in the meditation of the glory of the Lord (*Purāṇapuruṣadhyānapuṣyatpuṣkalamūrti*) and so on, to think of him as ever venturing to call *himself* as Navīna-Vyāsa (a new "Veda-Vyāsa"). It would be tantamount to an act of Bhāgavata-apacāra to think of Vyāsātīrtha as susceptible to such odious self-conceit. One wonders what made Pandita Ramanujacharya to think of offering such a preposterous interpretation of a Verse preserved only in the Dvaita tradition.

Madhva philosophy and its texts had been propagated in the north and in Bengal from as early as the days of Rājendra Tīrtha and his pupil Jayadhvajā, who have been reckoned as the precursors of the Caitanya Sampradāya. Vanamālī Miśra who participated in the Nym-Advaitasiddhi controversy was a Mādhva from the North. The biography of Somanātha records at least two spectacular disputations in Navyanyāya to which Vyāsātīrtha was challenged by Visiting teams of scholars. It is specifically stated by Somanātha that in the great debate in the court of Narasa in Vijayanagar which lasted thirty days the rival team consisted of Veterans from Aṅga, Vāṅga and Kaliṅga besides Chola and Kerala and was led by Basavabhaṭṭa of Kaliṅga.

We learn from Somanātha that Vyāsātirtha *commenced* writing his three great works in the reign of Vīra Narasimha (1504 - 09). The first was the *Nym*, the *Candrikā* the second and the *Tarkatāṇḍava* was the third. All these were probably completed by 1520 in the reign of Krishnadevarāya. Now Pakṣadhara's date has been given as 1450 - 1510. As a typical Tārkika, Vyāsātirtha would certainly have arranged to send copies of his *Tarkatāṇḍava* to the famous centres of Mithilā and Navadvīpa for comments, as the very purpose of his writing it was to compel the attention of those scholars to it. In the circumstances, the theory of absence of publicity of his work in the north cannot be accepted. In fact, subsequent to Vyāsātirtha, another intrepid Dvaita Logician Satyanātha Tīrtha (1648 - 74) has challenged the views of the famous Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, in his *Abhinava-Tarkatāṇḍava*, which has also been published. If the Navya-Naiyāyikas are still maintaining their silence, the reason can only be that they feel unequal to the task of a confrontation on the issue. It is to be earnestly wished that modern research scholars will come forward to profit by the discussions initiated by the *Tarkatāṇḍava* in the interest of further advancement of Logical studies.

Till the days of Vyāsātirtha, the thinkers of the Advaita school too had taken very little notice of the deeper layers of vitality of Dvaita system. They had neglected the great works of Jayātīrtha too, probably under the impression that they were only routine commentaries on the works of Madhva with his own thoughts intertwined with the words of the originals which were addressed to the followers of the school. Apart from their self-complacency, they might have been put off the scent by this circumstance and missed a great deal. Vyāsātirtha, therefore, chose *the direct line of attack* and wrote *independent works to compel the attention of his contemporaries*. In this he succeeded remarkably, as the results have borne out.

LIFE

Born in 1460 A. D. in an affluent Kannaḍa-speaking Vaiṣṇava Brahmin family of Bannūr in the Mysore district of Karnataka, Yatirāja as he was named had his Upanayana and early Vedic studies followed by a course of liberal education in Kavya, Nāṭaka, Alamkāra, Grammar and Logic. After spending some years with his parents on return from the Gurukula, he was taken to the seat of the family Guru, Brahmaṇya Tīrtha at Abbūr (near Channapatna), in fulfilment of a promise made by his parents before the birth of the child and was left with him. A year or so later, Yatirāja was inducted into the Sannyāsa order under the name of Vyāsatīrtha and later succeeded Brahmaṇya Tīrtha, as pontiff of his ancient Mutt (for Pedigree See Appendix II).

We are fortunate in having an *authentic historical* biography of Vyāsatīrtha in an ornate Campūkāvya in six Ullāsas, *Vyāsayogicarita*, written by an accomplished Poet (published in 1926 Reprint Edn. 1993 D.V.S.R.F. Bangalore). The author Somanātha was a younger contemporary and came from an orthodox Smārta Brahmin family of Kāncimaṇḍala. It was a family of Somayājis and belonged to the Vatsa Gotra.

This full-length biography gives us an absorbing account of the early and later life of Vyāsatīrtha, his progressive rise to fame and name and the venerable position he attained in the estimation of the people and the successive Rulers of Vijayanagar as the Royal Preceptor, to his last days. Somanātha makes a specific reference to the Portuguese ambassadors to the court of Vijayanagar calling on Vyāsatīrtha with valuable presents and seeking audience with him : *Dvipāntarabhūpāla - sampreṣita - pradhānapuruṣair - asakṛtsamarpyamāṇāni bahuvīdhopahārapūjanāni ca vīkṣāviśeṣa* ... (Text p. 65). The Portuguese travellers Paes and Nuniz knew him well. The report of Nuniz that Krishnadevaraya was "every day washed by

a learned Brahmin whom he held in highest esteem and "*Who had never married or had touched a woman*" (which can only refer to an ascetic) which Sewell finds it difficult to believe, is not really so. It refers to a ceremonial bath with water from consecrated vessels, administered to an idol or to one's Śiṣya, as provided for by Ācārya Madhava in his *Tantrasāra* (For details see my *HDSV* p. 291.

The biography has vividly portrayed Vyāsātīrtha's winsome personality, his even temper, his amazing erudition in all the branches of learning studied in his days, his courtesy and good humor and generous patronage of scholarship wherever found.

His literary style is graceful without being ostentatious. He had the ability to compress a vast quantity of factual material and ramifications of thought in a few telling phrases which stood him in good stead in his debates with rival scholars. The biography refers to two major polemical contests he had to face from jealous rival scholars. The first one took place in the early days of his stay at Chandragiri and the second, the more acrimonious, which took place in the reign of King Narasa in Vijayanagar itself.

The latter has been described in great detail by Somanātha. An irate team of doughty scholars from Anga-Vanga-Kalinga-Malava-Chola and Kerala led by Basavabhaṭṭa of Kalinga, Somanātha says, the team of irate scholars burst into the Assembly Hall of the King's palace shouting slogans and pinning their Birudas (titles and certificates of scholarship) to the Pillars there and challenging Vyāsātīrtha to a debate and that King Narasa himself, tho' knowing the calibre of Vyāsātīrtha, was shaken for a moment. The debate lasted for *thirty days* according to Somanātha and ended in a stunning victory to Vyāsātīrtha. The team of abashed scholars was richly and generously rewarded by the victor.

The Biographer has thrown new light on the beneficent role played by Vyāsātīrtha in the social, political and cultural life of

the Vijayanagar Empire, especially during the period of the second and third dynasties. So far, this has remained unknown to our modern historians who were inclined to dismiss the traditional accounts of his eminent role as a pious fabrication. But with the publication of the *Vyāsayogicarita* in 1926, there is no more any justification to plead want of historical materials. The indifference and apathy of accounts given in the *Madras University Historical Series XI and History and Culture of the Indina People Vol. VI* of the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, are for this reason most disappointing. The *Vyāsayogicarita* deserves to be treated not only as the major source of authentic information about his life and achievements but as a *major source of Vijayanagar history as well, of the period*. Not even Vidyaranya, who is accounted to have played a leading role in the foundation of the Hindu state, has had the advantage of an *authentic contemporary historical biography of such merit*.

The sixth Ullāsa describes the spectacular *Ratnābhiṣeka* (bathing in gems) performed by Krishnadevarāya to Vyāsātirtha, seating him on his own golden throne, as his Saviour and the Protector of the Kingdom during the dreaded period of Kuhuyoga in the king's life.

cf. *Deśādhipage banda kleśaṅgala kaledu*
Simhāsanavaneri meredi jagavariya

(Purandaradāsa).

As early as in 1515 A. D. the King had hailed Vyāsātirtha as his *Guru* in the stone inscription in the Viṅhala temple. His own work *Krishnadevarāyakṛti*, in Sanskrit of which a fragment is preserved in the Madras Government O. Library, refers to Vyāsātirtha by name as "My Guru" (See Appendix I Verse 12). The accounts of the Portuguese travellers Paes and Nuniz also confirm this. Nuniz has referred to the King listening everyday to the preaching of a learned Brahmin whom he reverences and who "*never married nor had touched a woman*". This can only refer to an ascetic and there is no other

personage of that eminence associated with the life of Krishna-devarāya, as we know from the history of the times and the evidence of the King's own inscriptions. (See also the phrase : *Nṛpendramukūṣīratnanirājitanijāṅhraye*).

Among the public benefactions of Vyāsātīrtha mention must be made of the building of the great irrigation lake in the township of Vyāsa-samudra in the drought-stricken area of Rayalasīmā, which still irrigates hundreds of acres. Somanātha gives a thrilling penpicture of the discourses given by Vyāsātīrtha, of his great works, to his numerous ascetic disciples during his stay in the sylvan retreats of the lake, around 1524 A.D.

According to Somanātha, soon after his succession to the Pīṭha, Vyāsātīrtha went on a pilgrimage to the South and made a long stay of some years at Kāncīpuram, to study the top-ranking works of Mimāṃsā and other Śāstras with the most eminent experts there. This must have stood him in good stead in writing his great treatises later on. He then moved on to Mulbāgal, the seat of the great scholar-Saint of Mādhva Philosophy of the times, Lakṣminārāyaṇa Tīrtha, under whom he studied the great classics of Madhva Śāstra, as he himself tells us in his *Mandāramanjari* : *Lakṣminārāyaṇākhyād Dvaitikulatīlakād adhita-Madhvaśāstrāsmṛtena Vyāsayatinā*.

Later, at the instance of the Vidyāguru, he goes to the seat of Sāluva Narasimha at Chandragiri and stays there for some years, highly honoured by the Ruler. Somanātha tells us of the great debates to which Vyāsātīrtha was challenged at this period by veteran scholars of Nyāyaśāstra trained in Navya-Nyāya of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi* of Gaṅgeśa of Mithilā.

Later, Vyāsātīrtha migrates to Vijayanagar at the invitation of the Ministers of Narasa and thence onwards made it the headquarters of his "Viśvapāvana-Maṭha" for the rest of his life. The ruins of this Maṭha can still be seen near

the Vijaya-Vithala temple. During this period, he again went on an extensive tour of the North and the South of India. He must have met there many Veteran scholars of Navyanyāya. Advaita and other Darśanas on his tours and exchanged views with them. His north Indian disciple Laksmipati was probably initiated into the Śuddha-Vaiṣṇava line, then.

Most of the buildings of the Vyāsaraja Maṭha especially in the South are to be found either in front of the premier Viṣṇu temples there or flanking them, as at Kāncīpuram, Kumbakoṇam, Srīrangam, Tirumalai and Triplicane (Madras). Tradition associates his name with the worship of Sri Venkaṭeśvara at Tirumalai-Tirupati during a period of the crisis caused by an act of high sacrilege by the Archaka families there. Some special honors to his Mutt have been accorded for this reason.

Somanātha reports that Vyāsātīrtha had a *very large number* of ascetics, as his disciples : (*Aparimitaśiṣyayatikulair upāśyamānaḥ* — Text p. 75). Tradition puts it at twentyfour such as Lakṣmikānta, Vijayīndra, Vādirāja, Govinda Tāpasa Nārāyaṇa Yati. The last two are mentioned by name in Somanatha's work.

Vyāsātīrtha was an intellectual and a Mystic of the highest order at the same time. He poured out his heart to the Lord of the Universe in many a soulful Pada, in chaste Kannaḍa, his mother-tongue. His devotion to the Lord springs from both the head and the heart. After his Guru Śrīpādarāja he took up the leadership of the Haridāsa Order of Karnāṭaka and inducted such great Saint-composers as Purandara Dāsa. Kanaka Dāsa and Vādirāja. The influence of the Haridāsas of Karnāṭaka on the rise of Bhakti Pantha in other states like Maharashtra and Rajasthan, in the subsequent centuries is indicated by many facts. (See my *HDSV*, Chap. XXV p. 296)

The Biographer informs us that Vyāsātīrtha *began writing his monumental works like the Candrikā, Nyāyāmṛta and*

Tarkatāṇḍava in the reign of Vira Narasimha (1504 - 1509) : Tena Vasudhādhipena pratyahamupasevyamānah bhagavān Sa taponidhiḥ sakaladharmajivātave tattvamatasthāpanāya Tātparyacandrikā — *Tarkatāṇḍava* — *Nyāyamṛta* pramukhāni alikavādimatabhanjanāni mahiyāmsi bhūyāmsi *krameṇa vyarīracat*. (Text pp. 64 - 65)

This is enough to disprove the story derived from some later-day accounts of the Uttarādi Mutt, quoted by M. R. Gopalacharya in his Introduction to C. R. Rao's work *Srimad Uttarādi Mutt*. 1984. p. 28) that "after Vyāsarāya had written his *Candrikā* and *Nyāyamṛta*, he was taken by his Vidyāguru Śrīpādarāja to the presence of Raghunātha Tīrtha and that he presented them to him for his esteemed perusal". In the first place, it is very doubtful if Śrīpādarāja was still living when Vyāsatīrtha had written his major works. That apart, according to the records of the Uttarādi Mutt itself, Raghunātha Tīrtha had died in Dundubhi 1502 A. D. As Vyāsatīrtha, according to his authentic biography, had only begun to write his works in the reign of Vīranarasimha (1504 - 09) and as it would have taken several years to finish such monumental treatises amidst the numerous other engagements and commitments of Vyāsatīrtha such as we have seen, these works would in all probability have been completed in the early years of Krishnadevarāya's reign between 1511 - 20. The story of their submission to Raghunātha Tīrtha is thus *entirely anachronistic and has to be dismissed as a pious concoction of unscrupulous zealots*.

Internal evidence of the works of Vyāsatīrtha shows that he had authored two other (short) works in addition to the eight current in his name. The names of these have been given by him in his *Mandāramanjari* as *Sattarka-Vilāsa* and *Bhedasanjivini*. One of them probably was the one in reply to an Advaita work forwarded to him by the Kalinga King Vidyādhara Pātra, as mentioned by Somanātha. (See my *HDSV*, pp. 291 - 92 for details). No Mss. of these have so far come to light.

To ensure the stability and prosperity of the great Hindu Empire for the resuscitation of Mānavadharmā and promote a sense of unity, cohesion and cultural integration among the people all over the country, Vyāsātīrtha conceived the project of installing 732 images of Vira-Hanumān all over the land, to infuse the sense of values embodied in the life of Hanumanji. The first of the kind was the Yantroddhara-Mukhyaprāṇa, installed by him in Hampi in 1532. This beautiful figure of Hanumān in diminutive form is seated in Dhyāna posture, within two triangles placed one across the other one upside down and both encircled by a legend (*mantra*) in a script which has not so far been deciphered. The Yantroddhara Hanumān is evidently an iconographic representation of Mukhya-Prāṇa in the Śīśu-Brahmaṇa of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*; as interpreted by Ācārya Madhva. The other images of Hanumān including many Vira-Ānjaneyas are still to be found worshipped in many towns and villages in South India. Those in the north could not now be easily located, for obvious reasons of political upheavals in the North in the succeeding centuries. One such Vighraha of Hanumān appears to have been consecrated and installed by Vyāsātīrtha in the course of his North Indian tour, within the precincts of the Badarināth temple. A communication about the event is to be found in a letter of 11th October, 1979 by the Chief Executive Officer of the Badarināth-Kedāranāth Temple Committee, to the visiting Head of the Vyāsārāja Mutt.

Somanātha's biography of Vyāsātīrtha has not come down to us in its entirety. It terminates with the account of its public recital in the presence of Vyāsātīrtha, by two gifted experts of recitation in an open assembly in the immediate presence of Vyāsātīrtha himself, who is described as already *quite old and wearing spectacles*. Somanātha says he was introduced to Vyāsātīrtha by one of his favourite disciples, Nārāyaṇa tīrtha (of the Kūdli Akṣobhyā Tīrtha Maṭha) in the reign of Acyutadevarāja. If Somanātha's biography of Vyāsa-

tirtha included an account of his last days also, it has not come down to us. The only Palm leaf Manuscript of the work had been found in the family of the priest worshipping the Brindāvana (tomb) of the tenth successor of Vyāsātīrtha at Tirumukūḍlu. The last *ullāsa* ends rather abruptly, the concluding pages of the incomplete part being *repeated*. There are no Mangalācaraṇaslokas to indicate the conclusion, corresponding to the large number of *introductory* and *benedictory* verses numbering *twentysix* in all. The editor has valiantly grappled with the numerous *lacunae* in the Mss. It is high time this unique historical biography of one of the greatest luminaries of the Vijayanagar period and no less a personage than the Guru of its greatest Emperor Krishnadevarāya is *thoroughly revised* by a team of expert Sanskrit Scholars and *republished*. The Introduction provided by B. Venkobarao is a mine of historical research. The Head of the Vyāsarāja Mutt should lose no time to republish this work.

After a long life of seventy-nine years of manysided activities and achievements of which *sixtyone years had been spent on the Pontifical seat* of the Madhva-Sampradāya, the venerable Vyāsātīrtha passed away at Vijayanagar in the cyclic year of Vilambi (1539 A.D.) The date is recorded in a song of Purandara Dāsa (*Cittaisida Vyāsarāya...*). His mortal remains were laid to rest in the island on the Tungabhadra river near Ānegondi (the ancient capital) alongside the Brindavana (tomb) of Padmanābha Tīrtha (the first disciple of Ācharya Madhva from the land of Godavari). As befitting the resting place of the mortal remains of the great Rājaguru of the greatest of the Kings of Vijayangar, his Brindāvana stands majestically adorned, with royal honours in the form of artistic sculptural decorations and the royal elephant engraved on the front side, at the orders of the King Acyutadeva Rāya himself.

APPENDIX IV

Select List of Dr. B.N.K. Sharma's Writings

(1) RESEARCH PAPERS

1. Pranahuti — Indian Educator, Madurai, 1928
2. Samkara's Authorship of Sarvasiddhantasara-sangraha — Annals BORI Poona, 1930
3. Grammar of the Gita—A Vindication — Annals BORI Poona, 1930
4. New Light on Gaudapada—Karikas — RPR Poona, 1931
5. Further Light on Gaudapada—Karikas — RPR Poona, Vol.II. 1
6. Madhva in Saura Purana — ABORI Poona, 1932
7. Indra and Panini — I.H.Q. Calcutta, 1932
8. Date of Srikantha and Brhatsamhita — ABORI Poona, 1932
9. Still Further Light on the Gaudapada Karikas — RPR Poona, 1933
10. Date of Bhagavata Purana — ABORI Poona, 1933
11. Samkara's Authorship of the Gita—Bhashya — ABORI Poona, 1933
12. Life and Works of Vadiraja — P.O. Poona, 1933
13. Critique of Sankara's Rendering of 'Yeyam Prete' — AUJ, 1933
14. Rejoinder to Criticism of above — AUJ, 1934
15. Life and Works of Trivikrama Pandita — AUJ, 1934
16. Madhva-Vidyasankara Meeting A—Fiction — AUJ, II. 2

17. Date of Madhva — AUJ, III 2
18. Date of Madhva and His Disciples (A Reply to Rajapurohit's Paper in the *Pracinakarnataka*) — AUJ, V. 1
19. Bhaskara A Forgotten Commentator on the Bhagavad-Gita — I.H.Q. Calcutta, 1933
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Till now no one has done so much service to Dvaita Vedanta thro' the English language, as you have done, during the last half a century. Your name will live for ever in the history of Dvaita Vedanta. May Sri Hari and Vayu enable you to render still greater service and work in the field.

—Sri Vishvesha Tirtha,
Svamiji of Sri Pejavar Mutt,
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I congratulate you on completing the comparative study of the Commentaries of the three Acharyas on the Brahmasutras. You have paid back, with compound interest, the debt you owed to the great Guru Srimad Anandatirtha Bhagavatpada and at the same time freed yourself from the debt of the Rishis (rishirina). Very few have the good fortune to achieve so much in their lives.

—R.R. Diwakar,
Chairman, Gandhi Peace Foundation,
New Delhi

I have great respect for Dr. B.N.K. Sharma and his profound scholarship.

—Prin. N.G. Sura, Pune

Dr. B.N.K. Sharma is a great scholar, a deeply religious thinker and a very humble devotee of the One Lord of All.

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I received my copy of my book "Vadiraja's Refutation" from my Publishers. I was pleased to see your generous Foreword, immediately preceding the Table of Contents. Your encouragement from the start and your scholarship from which I have borrowed so heavily, have meant so very much to me.

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California State College, Backersfield.

You have indeed brought out a monumental work of which every Madhva should be proud. You have successfully demonstrated the superiority of our Acharya's Bhashya on the Sutras. I do not think any Madhva among Vaidiks or Laukiks to date has made so deep a study of almost all our extent literature as yourself. I am looking forward to the publication of your son's book on the Gitabhashya and Tatparya and their commentaries, in the near future.

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It is a thrilling experience even to handle Vol. III. of your 'Brahmasutras and Their Principal Commentaries'. It has surpassed infinitely, all other works on the subject. Radhakrishnan is a poor competitor. I find an astounding uniformity of clarity and depth. Anybody else would have given up such a task, in sheer despair. You deserve the Jnanapitha Award for this. I will write to Delhi, in this regard.

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I consider Dr. B.N.K. Sharma a modern Jayatirtha, What service our Tikacharya did in ancient days to Madhva Philosophy, our Dr. Sharma has done in modern times and I feel it our duty to honour him to the best of our ability.

—P. Krishnamurthy
Advocate, Krishnagiri.

Dr. B.N.K. Sharma's services to the revival of interest in the Dvaita system and its literature in the context of modern needs have been incomparable. He has written books for all, —from the child to the most advanced Post Graduate students and scholars in Dvaita Vedanta. They will long tell us and our posterity what it is to be dedicated to a cause, so singularly attuned, at all times.

—K. Raghupathy Rao,
B.E. (Mech.) B.E. (Hons)
MHCI, M.A. (London)
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| 24. Sudarsana Suri | Srutaprakasa |
| 25. Suresvara | Brhadaranyaka Vartika |
| 26. Svami Tapasyananda | Bhakti Schools of Vedanta |
| 27. Vacaspati Misra | Bhamati C. on BSSB |
| 28. Vanamali Misra | Tarangini Saurabha |
| 29. Vijayindra Tirtha | Nym. Amoda |
| 30. Vimuktatman | Istasidhhi |
| 31. Visnudasacarya | Vadaratnavali |
| 32. Vyasa-tirtha | Nyayamrta |

ERRATA

Page	Line	For	Read
v	20	Śatadusanui	śataśūpaṇi
	35	between	between
vi	29	Bnahme	Brahma
	28	Vaibhavepre-	Vaibhavapra-
x		complacence	complacency
xii	30	uniference	interference
xxiii	25	scholastica	scholasta
13	3	irrespective	respective
17	27	मानभावात्	मानाभावात्
19	22	atanīśbhāva	atyantīśbhāva
22	14	shoice	choice
35	16	अवतिष्ठ	अवस्थि
66	19	of non-Knowledge	of Knowledge
68	19	turn ao	turn out
80	22	belonds	belongs
86	9	primise	premise
90	5	Sommon	Common
91	19	his	is
107	15	utsarge	utsarga
111	13	<i>Paur vā parya</i>	<i>paurāparye</i>
115	4	by passe	by passed
118	27	flaes	flaws
117	6	वाचस्पति	वाचस्पति
119	11	अवयव अवयव	अवयव
	12	नाप्युपपत्तेः	नाप्युपपत्तेः
133	24	drdrśya	dr̥gdr̥śya
161	23	<i>in puris</i>	<i>in puris</i>
168	15	Cognitallg	Congenitally
171	10	familiar	familiar
	23	pragabñhasa	prāgabñhavanūśa
173	12	śuktijna	śuktijño

Page	Line	For	Read
174	14	case	esse
	16	whilted	whittled
175		Page heading	Neha nānāsti
176	6	Nithya	Mithyā
179	26	fact,	fact
188	2	<i>Tattedam te</i>	<i>Tattedante svatānyatve</i>
190	17	matta	matte
191	12	<i>Pratīfirupam yajyate</i>	<i>pratītir upayujyate</i>



Dr. Sharma has a way of making even the dry dialectics appetising, with his art of persuasive presentation in lucid, lively English.

He holds that notwithstanding the subtleties, verbiage and innovations of concepts and definitions, from time to time, the Nirviseṣa-Advaita of Sankara creates more problems than it can ever hope to solve and that it is bound to be found disappointing by the level-headed among laymen and intellectuals alike, in our time.

In support, he has drawn pointed attention to the urgent call to followers of Sankara-Vedanta, given by one of the leading lights of Advaita from the Ramakrishna Mission, Swami Tapasyananda, to opt for a "Neo-Vedanta", in place of traditional Advaita, in the Introduction to his latest work *Bhakti Schools of Vedanta*. (Madras 1991.)